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As part of its Millennium Development Goals, the United Nations acknowledges 
that solving the world's water woes requires giving one billion additional people access 
to safe and affordable drinking water, while also noting that this is a difficult goal to 
achieve considering present environmental challenges. Amidst this atmosphere of 
vanishing freshwater, the legislative policy community has begun to encourage diverse 
discourse on the topic of efficient resource management, but the form and function of 
such a solution present unique political and theoretical challenges for policymakers and 
scholars alike. The current consensus among water managers is that a multifaceted 
policy framework known as Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) is the 
most viable strategy for conserving freshwater resources, and as such, it provides a 
proactive solution for mitigating future bouts of water scarcity. There is a puzzling 
disparity in IWRM implementation, however, as developed states have experienced more 
success with the policy than states within the developing world. rWRM's policy 
framework establishes a set of concrete goals for water use, including effective demand 
management, the encouragement of "a water-oriented civil society," transparency in the 
policy creation process, conflict resolution guidelines regarding regional and international 
water issues, equitable access to water resources, the decentralization of water policy, and 
the privatization of water provision. Drawing from scholarship on the efficacy of 
spontaneous, negotiated, and imposed environmental policy regimes, this thesis considers 
the German, Indian, Canadian, and South African IWRM implementation experiences 
from the perspectives of the theoretical literatures on regimes, common-pool 
resources/public goods, privatization, and constructivist arguments about the 
development and diffusion of transnational human rights norms. While all the literatures 
prove useful at explaining various facets of the implementation puzzle, it is the 
scholarship on regimes that offers the most robust explanation of the problem at hand by 
highlighting the importance of a linear sequence of environmental regime creation, the 
integration of both decentralized and centralized water governance mechanisms, and the 
extant character of a region's previous water management regimes as central components 
that help to explain disparate levels of IWRM implementation success. 
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CHAPTER I 
THE PUZZLE OF IWRM IMPLEMENTATION 
Water is the principle, or the element, of things. 
All things are water. 
-Plutarch, Placita Philosophorum 
Water is not only a necessary condition for the existence of life, it is also a 
substance infused with cultural, political, environmental, and religious importance. Such 
complexity is enhanced by the fact that the world's population depends on one water 
system that, by its very nature, transcends international boundaries. Yet human beings 
commonly fail to act as responsible custodians of the world's water supply, a reality that 
seems surprising given the circumstance of increasing water scarcity. Such water 
scarcity, as a "condition in which demographically-induced demand for water exceeds the 
prevailing level of local supply," presents obvious policy issues, as individuals around the 
globe require water for sustenance and continuation of life.1 
Indeed, the United Nations (UN), as the paramount global environmental policy 
body, addresses the world's water issues in many of its deliberations and operationalizes 
its water-related policy objectives in the Integrated Water Resources Management 
(IWRM) framework. This framework, in theory, serves as a management tool for 
democratizing water governance, valuing water as an economic good, and safeguarding 
the sustainability of water resources. Certain developed states, most notably Canada, had 
This paper follows the format requirements of The Chicago Manual of Style, 15th Edition. 
1 Turton and Warner, "Exploring the Population/Water Resources Nexus in the Developing World," 52. 
2 
been using IWRM components in their national water policies for years, but the 
international community did not become involved in implementing such a comprehensive 
water strategy until the early 1990s when the United Nations formally introduced IWRM 
at the 1992 Conference on Environment and Development (Earth Summit) in Rio de 
Janeiro, Brazil as a potential solution for encroaching water scarcity and increasing 
pollution levels. 
To date, almost all of the 155 states that signed the Rio Declaration and its 
corollary Agenda 21 agreement have employed facets of the IWRM policy framework 
within their own water governance regimes, and as such, Rio stands as one of the most 
successful environmental policy regimes of the 20th century in terms of international 
commitment.2 One must note, however, that the majority of Rio signatories have only 
begun to implement IWRM principles in earnest within the last five years. The verdict, 
then, is still out on the success of the policy framework in the majority of adopting states, 
although the next decade will see a number of transboundary and national IWRM 
frameworks maturing to the point at which the efficacy of the policy should become more 
apparent. Despite this relative novelty of the framework's implementation, the United 
Nations still believes and publicly advocates that IWRM is a highly flexible policy 
regime with the potential to improve the water resources of all countries, no matter their 
socio-economic environments, severity of water scarcity, or infrastructural development 
levels. 
Joyner, ed., The United Nations and International Law, 303. 
3 
THE POLITICS OF WATER 
Is such a water policy framework even necessary? The evidence suggests that it 
certainly is, as many scholars argue that a lack of a regulatory framework in the form of 
an international water management regime has allowed decades of water pollution and 
excessive water use to increase almost unabatedly. Certainly, the growing potential for 
water scarcity across the world presents an extremely pressing policy issue, and states 
and intergovernmental organizations struggle to identify and agree upon a unified 
approach to global water management.3 Any such approach, however, must consider the 
complexity of the water issue, as a solution would have to address the various factors that 
contribute to water scarcity, including population growth, pollution diffusion, and the 
potentially negative effects associated with global climate change. 
Although decreasing water availability is a result of various factors, population 
growth and irrigation demand are two of the main contributors to water scarcity. As the 
world's population continues to increase exponentially, and with total population 
expected to reach approximately 8.5 billion by 2030, it becomes progressively more 
apparent that existing freshwater sources are insufficient for meeting personal 
consumption demands.4 In addition, rising pollution levels further threaten the world's 
water supply. Sediment, chemical, organic and nutrient pollution degrade water quality, 
requiring virtually all drinking water to be treated and disinfected to prevent widespread 
outbreaks of water-borne diseases, such as cholera and dysentery. Sadly, outbreaks of 
such diseases kill almost two million people a year across the globe.5 Climate change 
also presents a severe threat to the world's transboundary system of lakes, rivers, and 
Switzer and Bryner, Environmental Politics: Domestic and Global Dimensions, 142. 
4 Ibid., 165. 
5 United Nations. "Meeting Basic Needs." World Water Assessment Program. 
groundwater. Many scientists indeed believe that global warming and water scarcity are 
inextricably linked, as the negative effects from increased atmospheric temperatures 
contain the potential to exacerbate droughts and water shortages across the globe, due to 
changes in rainfall and wind patterns. These water scarcity problems will not lessen or 
disappear without governmental intervention because, in order to ameliorate 
environmental degradation, "policymakers need to implement a broad and integrated set 
of responses at the international, regional, national, and community levels."7 
EXPLORING THE DISCONNECT 
To this end, the United Nations envisions Integrated Water Resources 
Management as a 21st century solution that will alleviate water scarcity, while mitigating 
escalating levels of water pollution. IWRM principles comprise a set of vaguely-defined 
goals for water use, including effective demand management, the encouragement of "a 
water-oriented civil society," conflict resolution guidelines regarding regional and 
international water issues, and equitable access to water resources through participatory 
and transparent governance and the decentralization of water policy.8 Unfortunately, the 
reality of IWRM implementation has not borne out the UN's policy rhetoric, as states 
within the developing world experience diminished success rates with IWRM in 
comparison with their more developed neighbors. 
This disconnect between the UN's theorization of IWRM's potential and IWRM's 
actual policy adaptation certainly deserves further scrutiny, and various bodies of 
international relations literature, including scholarship on public goods and collective 
6 United Nations, World Water Development Report 2, ix. 
7 Homer-Dixon, Environment, Scarcity, and Violence, 10. 
8 United Nations, World Water Development Report 2, 14. 
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action, regimes and institutions, privatization, and the construction and diffusion of 
norms all serve to address, and perhaps explain, the 'disconnect puzzle.' One expects, for 
instance, that the literature on public goods and collective action may explain whether or 
not the implementation gap is due to the way in which a state views the nature of water as 
a resource. The rhetoric of IWRM, for instance, assumes that water is a "highly 
subtractable" resource, since any one individual can deplete the amount of water 
available to others.9 Resource depletion occurs frequently in the field of common-pool 
resources, as each person with access to the CPR has an incentive to exploit as much of 
the resource as he or she possibly can.10 
Many developing states, however, define water as a public good, instead of a 
CPR, due to its many ecosystem and public health services, even though water fails to 
adhere to the classic definition of such a good. Public goods are defined by two 
conditions that distinguish them from private goods. First, they are non-rivalrous, 
meaning that consumption by one person does not diminish the amount available to 
others. Second, public goods are non-exclusive, so that if the good is available to one 
person, then it is automatically available to all others.11 While one may argue that water 
is a non-excludable good because it is exceedingly difficult to prohibit individuals from 
partaking of open water sources such as lakes and rivers, it is more challenging to make 
the case that water is non-rivalrous, as one person's consumption of water definitively 
reduces the amount available to others. This contradiction in definition, however, seems 
unimportant to many developing states, which are more likely to classify water as a 
9 Heikkila, "Institutional Boundaries and Common-Pool Resource Management," 97. 
10 Sweeney, Tollison, and Willett, "Market Failure, the Common-Pool Problem, and Ocean Resource 
Exploitation," 182. 
11 Samuelson, "The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure," 387. 
6 
public good because the "social goods" aspect of water cannot be protected if water is 
i 9 
primarily valued as a private entity. 
Once one examines the nature of water as a resource, the next logical question to 
ask is whether regime type matters in terms of managing the collective action of states in 
global water management. Given the collective action literature, one expects that the 
United Nations' IWRM policy framework would emphasize the facilitation of 
information between states, along with binding limits on water usage, as theory suggests 
that both the number of actors within a regime and the heterogeneity of those actors can 
complicate the effective governance of CPRs unless information exchange occurs, 
offenses are clearly defined, and facilitators successfully monitor and sanction 
1 T 
offenders. Indeed, such regimes are a necessary component for overcoming the 
"tragedy of the commons," and regimes and institutions play key roles in shaping how 
CPR users coordinate their actions to solve resource depletion issues.14 Such institutional 
arrangements may include "enforced formal laws governing individual behavior," or 
"public and private organizational arrangements."15 
Again, though, the reality of the UN's proposed framework for global water 
management defies these expectations. By advocating loosely developed IWRM 
principles as the answer to water scarcity instead of establishing formal communication 
networks or clearly defined offenses and sanctions, the UN's IWRM regime fails to 
provide a definitive point around which a convergence of actor expectations in these 
12 Gleick, et al., The World's Water, 2004-2005, 60. 
Keohane and Ostrom, eds. Local Commons and Global Interdependence, 22-23. 
14 Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker, Rules, Games, and Common Pool Resources, 5. 
15 Heikkila, "Institutional Boundaries and Common-Pool Resource Management," 97. 
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areas might occur. Without a formal regime, the opportunity to share information 
becomes more elusive, and without clearly defined rules and expectations, sanctioning 
offenders proves an impossible task. Indeed, the voluntary nature of such a policy 
framework may adversely affect those states lacking strong governing mechanisms of 
their own, a condition more commonly found in the developing world. 
Regime theory, however, may help to clarify the UN's reluctance to strengthen 
the overall IWRM regime. On the one hand, international regimes serve as responses to 
the "pervasive collective action problems that make cooperation problematic at the 
international level."17 These regimes protect the "availability of key resources to actors," 
while they also define the rules by which actors must operate. Such regimes are often 
less effective when dealing with distributive issues, however, as the actors that "benefi[t] 
from the preexisting arrangements will naturally suspect that the proposed adjustments 
will improve the outcomes for others at their expense."19 Thus actors in these situations 
view mutual gains as unlikely, and this theoretic idea may help to explain the UN's 
reticence to develop a formal regime regulating the highly distributive issue of global 
water management. 
It appears, then, that the literatures on collective action and institutions speak to 
the implementation gap that exists regarding a global water management framework, but 
the privatization literature may also help to decipher part of the puzzle. Indeed, the fiscal 
component of IWRM calls for valuing water as an economic commodity, a policy goal 
that is often operationalized, in the developing world at least, as the privatization of water 
16 Krasner, ed., International Regimes,!. 
17 Young, International Cooperation, 5. 
18 Ibid., 16. 
19 Ibid., 223. 
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supply. At first glance, the literature on this subject implies that the privatization of 
water supply is an appropriate solution to issues of water scarcity in the developing 
world. Although theory certainly suggests that a formal institutional framework is 
necessary for water management, as such a framework can "regulate external spillovers 
from individual actions," such a formal regime would be more appropriate to states with 
strong domestic political institutions. The same literature also suggests, however, that 
if those states benefiting from the redistribution of a natural resource lack power in the 
international arena, then a formal regime is a less likely solution, thus privatization 
represents a more effective and pragmatic resolution to the problem.21 This pragmatic 
perspective implies that privatization is beneficial to states with weaker governments 
because it leaves the burden of providing certain goods in the hands of the private sector. 
Thus, in this context, the IWRM's emphasis on the privatization of water supply makes 
sense in terms of finding a solution to water scarcity in countries whose governments lack 
both effective governance mechanisms and international influence. 
Unfortunately, though, privatization most often takes the form of "contracting 
out," where governments act as "service arrangers" who determine the task at hand and 
then solicit private bids for the implementation of that task.22 Given governmental 
inadequacies or economic restrictions in some areas of the developing world, one may 
characterize the availability of water in the world's poorest states as a choice "between 
inadequate public services offered by the public sector versus inadequate services offered 
by a private firm that is inadequately regulated by the government."23 Certainly, the 
20 Feigenbaum, Henig, and Hamnett, Shrinking the State, 14. 
21 Ibid., 30. 
22 Henig, Hamnett, and Feigenbaum, "The Politics of Privatization," 443. 
23 Bennett, The Politics ofWater, 76. 
9 
UN's voluntary IWRM regime does not invoke the power to sanction private water 
suppliers who raise prices to the point that poverty-stricken individuals can no longer 
afford to have water piped into their homes. The privatization literature, then, may help 
to illuminate the reasons why the economic component of IWRM has found differing 
levels of success in both the developed and developing world. 
Finally, the normative dimension of water provision, or the acceptance of the idea 
of water as an inalienable human right, may further explain the disconnect between 
IWRM rhetoric and reality across different states. Conceptually, a human right is an 
absolute normative value that stands in direct contrast to the idea of market-driven 
policies characterized by low levels of governmental intervention, and for this reason, 
many scholars and policymakers consider human rights to be public goods provided for 
by the state, not rights protected by private entities.25 Certainly, if one considers human 
rights as a "service" protected or provided by the state, it does not seem unreasonable to 
expect that the UN might take the cause of water availability under its mantle as the 
normative diffusion of the human right to water reaches a critical mass by incorporating 
this policy goal within the IWRM framework. 
Indeed, the UN certainly attempted to establish water as a human right throughout 
the latter portion of the 20th century and into the early years of the 21st century. Although 
the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights failed to explicitly mention the human 
right to water, the UN remedied this omission in 1977 with the development of an action 
plan stating that "all peoples, whatever their stage of development and their social and 
economic conditions, have the right to have access to drinking water in quantities and of 
24 Falkner, "Private Environmental Governance and International Relations: Exploring the Links," 77. 
25 Taylor, "Is Environmental Health a Basic Human Right?," 1007. 
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a quality equal to their basic needs."26 The 1989 Convention of the Rights of the Child 
further strengthened the recognition of water as a human right, as this Convention 
declared that children must be guaranteed access to "nutritious foods and clean drinking 
water." Finally, in 2002, the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights finally adopted a provision stating that governments have a legal 
77 
responsibility to fulfill the human right to water. Despite the UN's attempts to codify 
this right into international law, however, the rhetoric of IWRM fails to include an 
emphasis on the human rights aspect of water provision, and indeed, the idea of valuing 
water as an economic good seems contradictory to such a notion. 
Certain developing states, however, seem much more amenable to this normative 
dimension of water provision. South Africa, for instance, has even gone so far as to 
28 
incorporate the human right to water within its constitution. Perhaps, then, one can 
attribute part of the IWRM implementation gap between the developed and developing 
world to whether or not the human right to water has emerged, reached a tipping point, 
cascaded, and been internalized by a state government.29 For those states that value such 
a normative approach, a water policy regime that disregards that approach may prove 
dysmorphic to overall state water policy goals. 
THE CHALLENGE OF WATER PROVISION 
In a world of mounting water challenges, one truth seems undeniable — the 
international policy community should welcome diverse discourse on this topic, as it is 
difficult to overstate the magnitude of the globe's impending freshwater issues. The form 
26 United Nations, World Water Development Report 2, 77'. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Gleick, et al., The World's Water, 2004-2005, 60. 
29 Finnemore and Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," 895. 
11 
and function of a solution to the world's water woes, however, present unique political 
and theoretical challenges for policymakers and scholars alike. The challenge of giving 
one billion additional people access to safe and affordable drinking water seems presently 
insurmountable, and there has never been a more necessary moment for the creation of an 
encompassing global water management solution. 
The United Nations' proposed reliance on IWRJVI represents the beginning of a 
workable solution, but that solution is plagued by an uneven implementation record 
between the developed and developing worlds. As a first step at correcting the 
framework's inconsistency, then, a theoretical analysis of the its performance under 
diverse conditions will help policymakers discover the answers they require to improve 
the efficacy of IWRM's application across the globe. Ultimately, although the four 
distinct bodies of literature on regime creation, common-pool resources, privatization, 
and human rights all help to disaggregate and assess pieces of the UN's policy puzzle, it 
is the scholarship on regimes and collective action that best explains variations in IWRJVI 
implementation. The theoretical perspective regarding regimes highlights the importance 
of a historical sequencing of environmental regime creation, the integration of both 
decentralized and centralized water governance mechanisms, and the extant character of a 
region's previous water management regimes as key factors underlying disparate 
instances of IWRM implementation success. These findings are significant, as they can 
help improve the IWRM policy framework's value in the future - an essential task if the 
international community is ever to meet the goal of alleviating ever-increasing and severe 
episodes of global water scarcity and pollution. 
Gleick, The World's Water, 48. 
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CHAPTER H 
A LITERATURE REVIEW 
Water is life's matter and matrix, mother and medium. 
There is no life without water. 
-Albert Szent-Gyorgyi, 
1937 Nobel Prize Winner 
As a "social institution" purportedly governing the actions of those involved in 
the provision of freshwater resources, IWRM represents an attempt to counteract and 
mitigate collective action problems in the international system by offering a blueprint for 
the homogenization of state-based water management.1 The disconnect between the 
rhetoric of IWRM and its implementation remains puzzling, however, as more developed 
economies have found success with its principles, while developing economies struggle 
to accomplish the same goals. A review of the relevant literature on the subject may shed 
some light upon this contradiction; and a multidimensional analysis of the bodies of 
literatures on public goods and common pool resources, regime creation and 
maintenance, privatization, and the creation and diffusion of normative ideas remains 
necessary for a true assessment of IWRM's potential effectiveness or appropriateness at 
solving the world's water woes. 
PUBLIC GOODS/COMMON POOL RESOURCES 
Is water a common-pool resource or a public good? This question lies at the heart 
of the IWRM implementation gap between the developed and developing worlds. 
Indeed, does the definitional contradiction between the North and the South regarding the 
Young, International Cooperation, 13. 
13 
specific nature of water help to explain why IWRM fails to perform as expected across 
every type of state? Interestingly, the literature tends to support IWRM's focus on water 
as a common-pool resource (CPR) rather than a public good. This distinction is certainly 
an important one, as the problems inherent in providing a CPR and a public good differ; 
thus it seems logical that the solutions may differ as well. For their part, public goods are 
non-rivalrous, meaning that consumption by one person does not diminish the amount 
available to others. Second, they are non-exclusive, so that if the good is available to one 
person, then it is automatically available to all.2 Conversely, CPRs are goods that are 
non-excludable, but rivalrous or subtractable in nature, meaning that one person's 
consumption of water reduces the amount available to others, and it is this rivalrous 
nature that helps to distinguish water as a CPR rather than a public good.3 
Although the subtractable nature of water seems difficult to dispute, the idea of 
water as a non-excludable resource appears more nebulous, as water is routinely piped 
into individual homes, and that water supply may be turned off at the whim of the 
supplier. The literature itself is somewhat ambiguous on this point. Many scholars 
suggest that CPRs are certainly excludable in theory, but in reality, total exclusion is an 
impossibility, as it is far too cost-prohibitive to partition off a CPR of a large size, such as 
a lake or a reservoir that provides freshwater resources.4 Moreover, theorists concede 
that when CPR exclusion occurs, it is through either partitioning or packaging the good 
(or piping it into homes), but to be effective, legally defensible property rights must back 
these partitioning efforts.5 On its most basic level, then, and as a matter of definition and 
2 Samuelson, "The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure," 387. 
3 Ostrom, et al., Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources, 6. 
4 Ibid., 7. 
5Ibid. 
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practicality, CPRs are not excludable, and if open access is part of the natural state of 
CPRs, it seems logical that the difficulties faced by this resource type most often involve 
exclusion of the resource, or what the literature deems 'appropriation' issues. 
A brief explanation of the relevant terminology and definitions involved in CPR 
issues may help to focus this discussion. Common-pool resource users, commonly 
termed 'appropriators,' are "individuals who withdraw or appropriate resource units from 
any kind of CPR." 6 In turn, appropriators withdraw those resources from a CPR 
'facility,' and this facility allows for the existence of a cache of resource units.7 With the 
problem of water scarcity, for instance, a lake or some sort of groundwater reservoir 
serves as a facility from which appropriators withdraw water units. 
Thus, two types of CPR dilemmas exist — problems of appropriation and 
problems of provision. An appropriation problem consists of "excluding potential 
beneficiaries and allocating the subtractable flow," while a provision problem relates to 
"creating a resource, maintaining or improving the production capabilities of the 
Q 
resource, or avoiding the destruction of the resource." In simpler terms, appropriation 
problems involve the users of the resource and provision problems involve the CPR 
facility itself. Water scarcity constitutes a provision issue because factors such as global 
climate change and overpopulation lead to the depletion of stock at water resource 
facilities. At the same time, water scarcity also constitutes an appropriation issue, as the 
privatization of water supply may potentially exclude individuals who cannot pay for the 
water that is pumped into their homes and businesses. Consequently, IWRM, as an 
attempt to address global water scarcity issues, represents an effort to solve both a 
6 Ostrom, et al., Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources, 8. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid., 9. 
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provision and an appropriation issue, and this dual-nature may speak to the contradictory 
character of the proposed IWRM regime across states. 
With water-based resources, issues of appropriation are directly related and 
proportional to issues of provision. If too many appropriators are using the resource in an 
unsustainable manner, and this overuse is coupled with low recharge rates of the facility 
(perhaps due to drought brought on by global climate change), the provision potential of 
the resource decreases exponentially. Indeed, the most critical issue in environmental 
management in general and water scarcity in particular, is that users of environmental 
resources do not see the direct or indirect costs that their usage imposes on others, and 
they certainly do not marry their usage with outside factors that decrease recharge rates. 
This seemingly selfish behavior occurs because the costs of one individual's use may 
seem so insignificant that he or she does not notice them, while "the cumulative costs of 
many users yield destructive consequences" to the resource as a whole. Thus, 
individuals jointly "providing and/or appropriating" from CPRs can face a situation in 
which their individual rationality leads to a suboptimal outcome for the group. Scholars 
often refer to this state as a "tragedy of the commons," or a situation in which each 
appropriator seeks to maximize his or her gain, but that individual maximization degrades 
the overall condition of the common-pool resource.10 
The mitigation of such a CPR dilemma may call for an agency or institution with 
the power to coordinate or to allot individual use of the resource, and certainly much of 
the literature suggests that the "free-rider" issue makes government intervention a 
necessary option since "social arrangements that produce responsibility are arrangements 
9 Bish, "Environmental Resource Management: Public or Private?," 65-66. 
10 Hardin, "The Tragedy of the Commons," 1244. 
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that create coercion of some sort."11 A free-rider is an actor who chooses to receive the 
benefits of a public or a common good without paying the costs for such a good. Thus 
free-riders comprise a "major source of the difficulties afflicting efforts to develop 
1 T 
resource regimes in highly decentralized social systems like the international system." 
Additionally, in large-scale situations involving common-pool resources, political 
institutions can help to overcome the high transaction costs of decision-making, by 
providing an iterated forum allowing for communicating the identification of any 
potential free-riders.14 
Any regime created to address CPR issues, then, whether that regime is 
government-related or independent, must utilize a coordinated strategy between actors 
that addresses both appropriation and provision issues if it is to be effective.15 There are 
two types of coordinated strategies for this purpose, one of which consists of an 
"evolutionary process by which appropriators eventually reach and maintain a set of 
individual strategies that increase joint (and individual) payoffs relative to problematic 
outcomes." 16 This particular strategy seems to echo the idea of a "spontaneous regime," 
where actors do not set out to explicitly create a regime, and instead one arises naturally 
through a sort of tacit learning process.17 The second type of coordinated strategy 
involves more formal regime creation, where appropriators bargain and agree upon 
11 Hardin, "The Tragedy of the Commons," 1247. 
Olson, Jr., The Logic of Collective Action, 76. 
1 Young, Resource Regimes: Natural Resources and Social Institutions, 48. 
14 Baden, "A New Primer for the Management of Common-Pool Resources and Public Goods," 55. 
15 Ostrom, et al., Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources, 16. 
16 Ibid., 16-17. 
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"particular actions they will adopt if others adopt them," while they also develop rules for 
monitoring and sanctioning one another.18 
Ultimately, a combination of these regime arrangements may be necessary for 
solving CPR dilemmas, and the literature also indicates that additional conditions must be 
present for effective resolution of such issues. First, given the geographic diversity that 
exists among natural resource provision, a CPR regime should emphasize a variety of 
solutions to the initial problem, meaning a "one-size-fits-all" approach will not 
effectively stem CPR issues. The involvement of local appropriators in the decision-
making process is a key component of success as well, since local appropriators 
understand the particular environmental conditions in their areas and may be more 
invested in addressing specific localized issues than would a regime composed of 
'objective' bureaucrats.19 
Moreover, issues of scope and heterogeneity may play roles in the effectiveness 
of CPR regimes, but not the roles traditionally suggested by the dominant international 
relations literature. Conventional wisdom indicates that the scope of a regime, or its 
number of participants (N), can make a difference in a regime's effectiveness. This 
occurs because with a large N, each participant understands that he or she will have little 
impact on the outcome, so each regime member may not feel truly invested in the 
regime's goals, thus hindering cooperation. The CPR-specific literature, however, 
counters this assertion with its introduction of the 'nested enterprises' concept. A nested 
enterprise may compensate for difficulty imposed by the N issue, as these enterprises 
function as places where "individuals are organized through smaller groups that are then 
18 Ostrom, et al., Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources , 17. 
19 Ibid., 242. 
20 Olson, Jr. The Logic of Collective Action, 53. 
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organized into larger groupings."21 Such tiered organization allows large group 
cooperation to be built upon the foundation of successful small group cooperation, so that 
the number of regime members becomes secondary to other considerations within the 
22 
regime. 
Heterogeneity, as well, may not pose much of a hindrance to cooperation. 
Instead, the CPR literature asserts that heterogeneity can help regimes thrive if regime 
members have differing preference intensities on alternate issues. This situation of 
varying preferences "creates the potential for mutually advantageous issue linkage, thus 
increasing the probability of successful cooperation." Most importantly, however, any 
successful issue linkage requires that states be able to make credible commitments to 
each other, meaning that the facilitation of cooperation requires some sort of monitoring 
and enforcement of local, regional, or international rules regarding the provision of 
water.24 By using 'top-down' enforcement in combination with regionally-based 
organizational groupings, regimes created to deal with CPR issues can overcome 
problems associated with the scope and heterogeneity of actors. Interestingly, the 
principles around which the UN formed IWRM parallel this regional approach to solving 
water scarcity and certainly involve local stakeholders. In its current form, however, 
IWRM contains absolutely no monitoring or sanctioning schemes to hold states to the 
overall agreement, suggesting perhaps, that issues of heterogeneity may prove 
problematic in IWRM's current incarnation. 
Keohane and Ostrom, eds., Local Commons and Global Interdependence, 57. 
22 Ibid., 22. 
23 Martin, "Heterogeneity, Linkage, and Commons Problems," in Local Commons and Global 
Interdependence, 88. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Keohane and Ostrom, eds., Local Commons and Global Interdependence, 22. 
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REGIMES AND COLLECTIVE ACTION 
Thus, particular regime conditions and strategies may help appropriators to 
overcome certain kinds of CPR dilemmas. Regimes use the convergence of actor 
expectations to "exert pressure on their members to act in conformity with some clear-cut 
social or collective goal," while they also link actors together through rules or 
conventions that "may or may not be formally articulated."26 Some theorists even argue 
that regimes exist wherever one finds consistent behavior within any cohesive issue-area 
in international relations.27 Most broadly, one may define regimes as "sets of implicit or 
explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' 
expectations converge in a given area of international relations." 
Thus, the facilitation of uniform international expectations stands as just one 
benefit of an international regime. Additionally, regimes can make it easier for states to 
improve their reputations within the international system because they help to "reinforce 
and institutionalize" reciprocity, rather than serving as its substitute. Regimes may also 
promote future cooperation by sanctioning states that violate the stated goals of the 
regime, and in this way, regime constructions "delegitimize defection.. .and make it more 
costly."30 Finally, regimes reduce transaction costs within the interstate system, while 
they may also help to develop and perpetuate new norms. ' 
The cooperative benefits of regimes do not automatically negate the importance 
of power in regime formation and operation. For instance, power may play a role in 
26 Young, International Cooperation, 24 and 13. 
27 Stein, "Coordination and Collaboration," 300-301. 
28 Krasner, "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes and Intervening Variables," 186. 
29 Axelrod and Keohane, "Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions," 250. 
30 Keohane, "The Demand for International Regimes," 338. 
31 Ruggie, "International Regimes, Transactions, and Change," 384. 
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determining which states choose to comply with regime objectives and which states 
knowingly violate those objectives, with more powerful states choosing when and if they 
will comply with the regime consensus. Certainly, power factors can also play a role in 
enforcing compliance to a regime's objectives, as "enforcement can only be supplied if 
there is authority backed by coercive resources." Within this view, a hegemonic power 
is a necessary component for the development of strong regimes and the prevention of 
regime collapse.34 Alternately, some scholars feel that this perspective fails to explain 
the delay in international regime change once a hegemon falls out of power, while it also 
does not account for the endurance of regime-inspired institutions created under a fallen 
hegemon. One may explain this dichotomy by envisioning international regimes as 
representing "a fusion of power and legitimate social purpose," and due to this synthesis, 
a decline in hegemony will not necessarily destroy a regime, "provided that shared 
purposes are held constant." 
Thus, regimes are developed in part because actors in world politics believe that 
such measures will allow them to construct mutually beneficial agreements that would 
otherwise be very difficult to create, but not all regimes emerge under identical formative 
circumstances.37 Some regimes are spontaneous creations, and such regimes do not 
require "conscious coordination" among actors or clear consent of regime participants.38 
Conversely, a regime may be explicitly negotiated among its members, and formal 
accounting of results and conscious agreement on the part of actors characterize this 
32 Mitchell, "Regime Design Matters," 428. 
33.Keohane, "The Demand for International Regimes," 344. 
34 Ibid., 326. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ruggie, "International Regimes, Transactions, and Change," 404. 
37 Keohane, "The Demand for International Regimes," 334. 
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category of regime. Imposed regimes constitute a third regime type. The notion of 
imposed regimes harkens back to the idea of hegemonic dominance, as powerful 
international actors establish the 'rules of the game' and force others to conform to these 
arrangements through a combination of "coercion, cooptation, and the manipulation of 
incentives."40 The IWRM regime, for its part, does not seem to fall in the spontaneous 
category of regimes, but instead, appears to be a negotiated regime with elements of 
imposition, depending upon which state's perspective is at issue. 
Moreover, for the purpose of this study, one must note that although Young's 
work speaks directly to the creation of international regimes, this analysis applied his 
ideas to intra-national water management as well, playing upon his acknowledgement of 
the "disconcerting elasticity" of regime definition.41 This seemed an appropriate 
application as both national and international water regimes have a similar structure and 
face similar collaborative problems. Indeed, international water regimes include the very 
same stakeholders that comprise an intrastate water regime because national stakeholders 
play a vital role in complying with the water restrictions set forth by any international 
regime mandate. Moreover, their structural similarity means that both interstate and 
intrastate water regimes contain a large number of stakeholders who all hold differing 
positions of power within their respective contexts and have their own vested interests to 
protect — interests that may or may not be replicated by a neighboring country, province, 
or municipality. 
No matter whether they are of an intra- or interstate variety, spontaneous, 
negotiated, and imposed regimes all help states to solve dilemmas of both common 
Young, International Cooperation, 87. 
40 Ibid., 88. 
41 Ibid., 195. 
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interests and common aversion. For its part, a dilemma of common interests occurs 
"when independent decision-making leads to equilibrium outcomes that are Pareto-
deficient." 42 As the famous Prisoner's Dilemma game illustrates, this simply means that 
all actors involved prefer a solution that is suboptimal. To rectify a dilemma of common 
interests, then, states agree to coerce one another in order to guarantee that none of their 
contemporaries will "defec[t] from the pact and refus[e] to cooperate."43 In this way, 
states involved in a regime can avoid reaching a suboptimal solution in a given issue-
area, while ensuring a particular and preferred outcome. Alternatively, regimes also 
provide solutions to dilemmas of common aversions. In this type of dilemma, the 
problem is not with finding an optimal outcome for the group. Instead, all actors 
involved wish to avoid one specific outcome. Both of these regime types, then, differ 
in their requirements, as dilemmas of common interests require collaboration among 
actors, while dilemmas of common aversion require actor coordination.45 
Although the formation of regimes in any given issue-area of international 
relations may present a challenge to all involved, international environmental regimes 
offer unique challenges to state actors, as the transboundary nature of environmental 
degradation often means that effective management by individual states is not feasible or 
practical.4 More specifically, many environmental issues constitute dilemmas of 
common interest, rather than dilemmas of common aversion, and the UN's IWRM 
regime arguably falls in this category. At first glance, it may seem that all actors want 
simply to avoid the depletion of freshwater resources, which would be a dilemma of 
42 Stein, "Coordination and Collaboration," 304. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid., 309. 
45 Ibid., 312. 
46 Young, International Cooperation, 109. 
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common aversion, but in actuality, each actor desires being the sole user of a water 
resource. If the actor cannot achieve this outcome, it "next prefers joint restraint in the 
mutual use of the good, then prefers joint unrestrained use even if it leads to depletion, 
and least prefers a situation in which its own restraint is met by the other actors' lack of 
restraint." 47 The problem, then, is to devise rules or codes of conduct that restrict the 
behavior of states in such a way as to avoid overuse or exhaustion of freshwater 
resources.48 Theoretically, IWRM, as a regime created to mitigate such a dilemma of 
common interests, should require all states involved to move from a suboptimal outcome 
to one in which they collaboratively manage the natural resource.49 Furthermore, IWRM 
"must specify what constitutes cooperation and what constitutes cheating, and each actor 
must be assured of its own ability to spot others' cheating immediately."50 At this point 
in time, however, the rules bounding the IWRM regime contain no provisions for 
defining offenses, much less for sanctioning offenders, suggesting that IWRM may not be 
effective at achieving its stated goals. 
Distributive issues may also come into play within regimes created to manage 
environmental degradation. In these cases, power and interests within regimes can and 
do matter, as the more powerful states may make initial decisions about the allocation of 
global environmental resources, and such allocation "will have distributional 
consequences," even "if states are interested in absolute rather than relative gains."51 The 
developing world, especially, has reason to fear unfair allocation of natural resources by 
the more dominant powers within a regime, as those more powerful states may not take 
47 Stein, "Coordination and Collaboration," 313. 
48 Keohane and Ostrom, eds., Local Commons and Global Interdependence, 35. 
49 Stein, "Coordination and Collaboration," 313. 
50 Ibid., 312. 
51 Krasner, "Global Communications and National Power," 365. 
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into account any future development needs of their less powerful contemporaries. 
Again, this concept may directly impact the efficacy of the IWRM regime in the 
developing world, certain states of which have had dismal experiences with private water 
allocation.53 
Considering that environmental regimes must promote allocative efficiency, 
ecological integrity, and force all actors to collaboratively manage a natural resource, 
spontaneous regimes seem much more successful than both negotiated and imposed 
regimes at accomplishing these tasks because they do not "give rise to oppressive 
procedural requirements or armies of officials charged with implementing and enforcing 
the terms of formalized regimes."54 Negotiated regimes, in contrast, result in high 
transaction costs, while imposed regimes cannot guarantee distributional equity.55 The 
literature suggests, then, that a spontaneous regime may be the best option for solving a 
global environmental ill, although there are other strategies that environmental regimes 
may employ to improve their productiveness. One of these strategies requires a focus on 
regionalization rather than internationalization. With a regional arrangement, members 
of each regime could include all states with a serious interest in the relevant issue 
"without running into the problems of collective action in large groups."56 Regional 
environmental regimes may also prove more capable of allocative equity, as a regional 
arrangement may not be large enough to allow one member to dominate decisions 
Krasner, "Global Communications and National Power," 343. 
53 For example, the cities of Cochabamba, Bolivia and Manila, The Philippines both awarded water 
allocation contracts to private companies, and both contracts had to be cancelled several years later due to 
poor performance and the denial of water to impoverished people who could not pay their bills. 
Young, International Cooperation, 93. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid., 122. 
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regarding the distribution of resources.57 Indeed, the United Nations' IWRM regime 
emphasizes placing the impetus for water control in the hands of local and regional 
stakeholders, a strategy that the literature indicates may lead to success. 
Moreover, international environmental regimes will find more success if they 
avoid "explicit attempts to define noncompliance" in the early stages of regime 
CO 
formation. Such an approach may "facilitate the confidence building necessary for the 
creation of a regime, as well as encourage broader participation by states."59 This does 
not mean that the regime will never define noncompliance, just that the process should 
occur organically over time through the process of regime building.60 
Epistemic communities must also play a role in environmental regime formation, 
as they may "introduce new policy alternatives to their governments," while also 
educating actors on the complexity of environmental issues.61 Such education may lead 
those governments to "accep[t] the need for more comprehensive and coordinated 
policies to accomplish state and regional goals."62 In turn, when states recognize the 
complexity and interdependence of environmental issues on many other facets of 
development and economic policy, this new awareness may encourage states to pursue 
compliance-oriented environmental regimes, since enforcing compliance in 
environmental areas may carry over and benefit other issue-areas as well.DJ Such issue 
density can certainly lead to "greater demand for international regimes and to more 
Young, International Cooperation, 123. 
58 Brunnee and Toope, "Environmental Security and Freshwater Resources," 57. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Haas, "Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic Communities and Mediterranean Pollution Control," 402. 
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extensive regimes." Above all, environmental regimes are "apt to be hybrids that do 
not conform precisely to the essential features of any analytic type." Dynamism and 
the constant evolution of social, political, and economic realities characterize these 
collective attempts to mitigate transboundary environmental issues. 
PRIVATIZATION 
Regime type is just one aspect of the problem, however, as the UN's advocation 
of water supply commodification as a potential solution to the provision issues associated 
with water scarcity could spawn a new type of appropriation problem, in which private 
suppliers may now exclude individuals who cannot pay for their water supply.66 In 
theory, states privatize certain governmental functions in order to more efficiently 
provide an economic commodity to their citizenry. The history of water privatization, 
however, suggests that such a process is rarely apolitical, as the economic benefits of 
privatization are often overshadowed by rent-seeking behavior on the part of state 
governments or private resource providers. Perhaps even more importantly, the literature 
implies that a state-led regulatory framework is necessary to counteract rent-seeking 
behavior regarding private provision of natural resources. Such a regulatory ideal, 
though, leads to a 'paradox of privatization,' meaning that a policy which is intended to 
reduce government involvement must be regulated by the government.67 This 
contradiction echoes the more fundamental inconsistency at the center of this study - that 
privatization of water provision may ultimately deprive poorer individuals of their human 
right to water. Obviously, such deprivation does not reflect the intent of the United 
64 Keohane, "The Demand for International Regimes," 341. 
Young, Resource Management at the International Level, 217-218. 
66 Dolsak and Ostrom, eds. The Commons in the New Millennium, 8-9. 
67 Robinson, "Privatization: Analyzing the Benefits," 50. 
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Nations' proposed water regime, although the gulf between intent and reality in this case 
may prove impossible to bridge. 
Certainly, IWRM's emphasis on the valuing water as an economic commodity, 
often operationalized as the privatization of water supply, represents a break from 
traditional thinking, as states, rather than the private sector, have most often provided 
water services throughout modern history. State provision of such services makes 
theoretic sense, since water provision can succumb to Pareto sub-optimality. In order to 
counter such a situation, conventional wisdom holds that state governments, rather than 
competitive market instruments, are more suited to providing services that private entities 
either do not have the incentive or means to efficiently supply and allocate. 
If states are better providers of certain natural resources, why might the United 
Nations ignore institutional tradition and instead support a principle that often leads to the 
privatization of water provision? The literature suggests that the answer to that question 
lies in improving both profits and efficiency. Indeed, the efficiency potential of 
privatization is not a novel idea. As long as two centuries ago, Adam Smith argued the 
merits of privatization with his support of the sale of British public lands, when he 
declared that the sale of such lands would "deliver from mortgage a much greater revenue 
than any which those lands have ever afforded to the crown."70 In other words, the 
virtues of privatization rest on the assumption that private owners want to generate for 
themselves as much wealth as possible. As such, these private owners face incentives to 
monitor their businesses and employees closely, so that they may reduce waste in asset 
production. Of course, more waste leads to fewer dollars in the pockets of the business 
6 Abu Shair. Privatization and Development, 36-37. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Smith, The Wealth of Nations, Book IV-V, 496. 
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owner; thus, the private owner will pursue efficiency as a way of maximizing his/her 
wealth. In contrast, states lack these incentives, as state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are 
owned by "taxpayer-owners," instead of private individuals. These "taxpayer-owners" 
cannot buy or sell the asset in question, and they do not reap direct profits from that asset. 
Consequently, "taxpayer-owners" lack strong incentives for efficient business 
performance.71 
In addition to increasing the efficiency of asset production, governments pursue 
privatization in order to attain various other objectives, including the introduction of 
competition, exposing SOEs to market regulation, encouraging foreign investment, and 
raising revenue for the state.72 Moreover, privatization not only involves conveying 
ownership of a particular enterprise from the state to the private sector, but also 
transferring the responsibility for the allocation and pricing of assets and any access to 
the residual profit flows generated by those assets.73 In its extreme form, privatization 
represents a deliberate effort to "shrink the governmental apparatus and 'roll back' the 
boundaries of state responsibility."74 
Privatizing industries is also not a homogenous process, and in keeping with this 
notion, current scholarship separates privatization into two different typologies -
administrative and economic. For its part, administrative privatization "presents 
privatization as a series of options available to public officials seeking to make 
government work better."75 Privatization, from this point of view, symbolizes a 
"toolbox" of techniques from which officials may draw those methods most appropriate 
71 Hanke, "Privatization: Theory, Evidence, and Implementation," 102. 
7 Adam, Cavendish, and Mistry, Adjusting Privatization: Case Studies from Developing Countries, 6. 
73 Megginson, "Privatization," 14. 
74 Feigenbaum and Henig, "The Political Underpinnings of Privatization," 185-186. 
75 Ibid, 187. 
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to meet the task of efficiency.7 Such administrators realize that governments may not 
always provide the most efficient type of social good for citizens; thus for these 
individuals, privatization represents an option for improving government service - in 
essence, these administrators are embracing a proactive response to inefficiency. 
Privatization's economic perspective, on the other hand, stands in stark contrast to 
the administrative outlook, as it presents privatization as "the inevitable consequence of 
neoclassical truths that dictate the retraction of a bulky, intrusive, and parasitic welfare 
state."77 Within this perspective, privatization is the only remedy for the self-interested 
behavior of government officials and lobbyists, as both are groups of individuals "who 
gain more in their role as beneficiaries than they lose in their role as taxpayers." The 
economic approach characterizes state governments as composed of selfish individuals 
who pursue personal gains, rather than considering the common good of the people at 
large, and this self-interested behavior creates inefficiency in the production and 
allocation of assets. Economically speaking, then, the act of privatization represents a 
reactionary response to an inefficient government bureaucracy.79 
Some scholars, however, believe it ill-advised to divide privatization into an 
administrative and economic perspective, and instead suggest that acts of privatization 
are better addressed as individual strategies, the use of which may help to achieve some 
sort of social objective that can "realign institutions and decision- making processes so as 
80 
to privilege the goals of some groups over the competing aspirations of other groups." 
Feigenbaum and Henig, "The Political Underpinnings of Privatization," 187. 
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Such strategies may be broken down into three categories — pragmatic, tactical, and 
systemic privatizations. 
Similar to the aforementioned administrative perspective, pragmatic privatizations 
involve bureaucratic officials attempting to access a tool that can enable government to 
function more efficiently. A key distinction, however, exists between the two, as theory 
suggests that all actors within the administrative perspective champion privatization 
regardless of their political connections, while the pragmatic strategy holds that only 
insulated bureaucrats can employ such a strategy. In other words, political ideology 
plays almost no role in pragmatic privatization, and pragmatic bureaucrats give very little 
thought to ideological uniformity or the potential political consequences of violating such 
uniformity.81 By contrast, tactical privatizations are meant to achieve specific political 
goals for particular parties, politicians, or interest groups. Actors employing this strategy 
see privatization as a means of "altering] the balance of power by attracting allies and 
rewarding supporters.82 The third type of privatization strategy - systemic privatization-
is more politically macro-level in nature, since actors utilizing systemic strategies intend 
for privatization to fundamentally reshape societal expectations of government in three 
ways - (1) by altering ideas regarding for what governments can and should be held 
responsible, (2) by reducing the government's involvement in asset allocation and 
infrastructure creation, and (3) by transforming "the interest group landscape to make it 
less supportive of governmental growth." 
Ultimately, regardless of typology or strategy, not all industries are ripe for total 
privatization, especially industries involving natural monopolies, such as water, 
81 Feigenbaum and Henig, "The Political Underpinnings of Privatization," 191-192. 
82 Ibid., 192. 
83 Ibid., 193. 
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electricity, and gas. A naturally monopolistic industry occurs when supply by one firm 
involves lower costs than supply by more than one firm. State ownership of this type 
of industry rests on the idea that natural resource allocation involves national distribution 
grids, and these grids require coordination between the various producers of the resource. 
Coordination, in turn, "create[s] a monopoly which justifie[s] public ownership," as one 
cannot easily introduce competition into an industry that involves an interlinked 
distribution grid.85 Additionally, natural resource distribution often involves price 
controls in order to assure the availability of the asset to as many people as possible, and 
states have traditionally been the provider in these instances, as a privatized company will 
be less willing to provide "uneconomic services," meaning services that are not always 
priced to market levels. Accordingly, a privatized company providing a natural 
resource may be tempted to raise prices and/or reduce services, which may disadvantage 
or exclude certain sets of consumers not able to pay for a more expensive product.87 
The purveyors of privatization argue, however, that even if an industry is 
naturally monopolistic, portions of that industry can and should be privatized. Consider 
the case of water provision, for instance. The water industry represents a classic instance 
of a natural monopoly, as the water supply process involves the abstraction of water from 
underground and surface sources, the treating of this water at a central treatment plant to 
remove pollutants, and the distribution of the water via a network of pipes to the 
consumer.88 Interestingly, although duplicating the water distribution network (pipes, 
mains, and sewers) is generally inefficient, there can still be market rivalry for the 
84 Cowan, "Privatization and Regulation of the Water Industry in England and Wales," 113-114. 
85 Bishop, Kay, and Mayer, eds., Privatization and Economic Performance, 9. 
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provision of the product itself. 89 As one scholar puts it, "competition in the provision of 
bus and coach services is possible even where competition in the provision of terminals is 
not."90 
Unfortunately, this type of privatization in general, and water privatization 
specifically, holds a questionable record of success especially in the developing world, 
and such privatization efforts have often fallen victim to companies unwilling to ensure 
that certain prices or services are maintained in the face of market competition. 
Monterrey, Mexico is only one example of such a failure. In the early 20l century, the 
Monterrey city government privatized its water system and appointed Mackenzie, Mann, 
and Company, of Toronto, Canada as Monterrey's water managers. Unfortunately, 
Mackenzie Company never altered the water supply per capita, and even as Monterrey's 
per capita needs grew throughout the years with a burgeoning population, Mackenzie did 
not remain faithful to the contract calling for increased water service in proportion to the 
city's growth. By 1940, only half of Monterrey's population received water from the 
municipal system, and Monterrey found itself in a water crisis. The Mexican government 
was eventually forced to buy back the water contract from Mackenzie and deemed 
privatization a complete failure.91 
The story of Cochabamba, Bolivia stands as a more modern, albeit still 
unsuccessful, attempt at water privatization. In 1999, the government of Bolivia chose to 
privatize Cochabamba's water service and awarded a forty-year concession to a 
subsidiary of U.S. multinational corporation Bechtel. The privatization problems became 
apparent quickly, though, with the elimination of subsidies and the subsequent 300% 
89 Cowan, "Privatization and Regulation of the Water Industry in England and Wales," 114. 
90 Bishop, et al., Privatization and Economic Performance, 9. 
91 Bennett, The Politics of Water, 182. 
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increase in the price of water. One can imagine that in Bolivia, where 70% of the 
population lives below the poverty line, "increases in the price of water.. .have a serious 
impact."92 In response to the perceived injustice, many of Cochabamba's citizens formed 
an opposition group called "The Coalition in Defense of Water and Life." This group 
shut down the city of Cochabamba for four days with strikes and mass mobilization 
techniques. The peaceful protests soon turned violent, several protestors were killed, and 
the Bolivian government declared martial law. Soon after the protests, Bechtel pulled out 
of Bolivia and the government repealed its water privatization legislation.93 
As these cases illustrate, developing states may face additional hurdles in the 
privatization of natural resources, and there are several reasons for this circumstance. For 
instance, the allocative role of the state is still valid in many developing economies. Such 
economies often classify objectives such as the creation of high-tech industries, the 
control of natural resources, employment generation, and balanced development as high 
priorities, making the argument for private industrial ownership within certain borders 
somewhat irrelevant.94 That is not to say that privatization cannot benefit these countries, 
but there are qualifications before such states can realize the benefit of private industry. 
Indeed, the literature suggests that privatizing water and the provision of other natural 
resources might enhance the participation of the poor and the underprivileged if the act of 
privatization is implemented within a framework that enhances individual participation in 
decision-making and ownership for people normally excluded from the marketplace.95 If 
local individuals retain decision-making input to the degree that they are affected by the 
2 Levy and Newell, eds., The Business of Global Environmental Governance, 287. 
93 Ibid., 286-289. 
4 Abu Shair, Privatization and Development, 62. 
95 Ibid., 123-124. 
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outcome of the privatization decision, such grassroots organization might enhance 
accountability. 
If, however, the privatization of water relies on the notion of property rights (as is 
more traditional), rather than participation, the "dominance of the private property 
concept will reduce, if not diminish, any interest in community projects and result in low 
participation in decision-making, on which the choice concept stands." 97 Thus, 
privatization, if not handled correctly, can promote a "culture of silence." 98 Although the 
literature fails to provide a basic plan and framework for local ownership of natural 
resource provision, it certainly seems to suggest that private property rights do not mesh 
well with the idea of local accountability and interest in safeguarding natural resources. 
This is an interesting finding given the fact that the concept of personal property rights is 
central to the notion of common-pool resources, a classification to which water belongs. 
Perhaps even more importantly, the developing world requires a strong regulatory 
framework to accompany the privatization of natural resource provision." Collaboration 
among private companies, government, civil society, and other stakeholders is 
fundamentally important in monitoring a company's fulfillment of its contractual 
obligations and its responsibility to provide the resource to all who require it.100 This 
simply means that after the government sells a firm, it cannot just "wash its hands and 
walk away."101 Instead, the state must move from being the provider of resources to the 
overseer of private provision, and governments should establish public control over such 
Abu Shair, Privatization and Development, 62. 
97 Ibid. 
98 Ibid. 
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100 Ibid., 5. 
101 Ibid., 45. 
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resources because the "social goods" aspect of natural resource provision cannot be 
protected if ownership of these resources is entirely private.102 Moreover, in the 
developing world, many states still feature governments with "weak democratic and legal 
foundations, cronyism and out-right corruption." Natural resource provision in states 
with weaker governments, then, may prove exceedingly difficult to regulate.104 If, as the 
literature suggests, "neither public nor private sector managers always work to the best 
interest of the consumer," then both groups need incentives or regulations to ensure the 
most efficient service, while also providing for individual social welfare.105 
Unfortunately, in its current state, IWRM fails to provide a viable regulatory blueprint for 
achieving these dual ambitions. 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND NORM DIFFUSION 
The privatization picture becomes further muddied when one reflects on a 
fundamental goal of the UN - the idea of water as a fundamental human right. The 
notion of unfettered water access for all is, at its core, a normative judgment, and in order 
to accept this principle's legitimacy, one must consider how such norms are 
internationally diffused and accepted. If water access is truly a human right, on par with 
the other rights elucidated within the 1948 United Nations Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, than this emergent norm should have found widespread adoption among 
state governments around the world, as states are ultimately the actors tasked with 
providing water resources to their citizenry. While an observer might question the 
102Gleick, et al., The World's Water, 2004-2005, 60. 
103 Parker, "Privatization and Regulation of Public Utilities: Problems and Challenges for Developing 
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appropriateness of water access as a human rights norm rather than an environmental one, 
the majority of the literature emphasizes this issue in tandem with a human rights 
framework. 
Although the same argument cannot be made for all areas of environmental 
protection, in the case of water, the literature implies that human rights regimes are 
synergistic with environmental law, since laws intended to engender environmental 
protection seek to "protect and preserve the basic living and nonliving resources and 
ecological processes on which all life depends." 106 Theoretically, then, water 
management policy enhances and protects human rights, since the implementation of 
such regulations protects the natural world from deterioration to the point where 
internationally guaranteed human rights become seriously endangered. Thus, water 
policy is ultimately a means to ensuring human rights, but not an end in itself. 
How, then, does the human right to water, and indeed any normative goal, 
become socialized into the fabric of international society and then enforced and upheld 
within international regimes? The United Nations, as the world's most influential 
intergovernmental organization is a major part of this process, and arguably much of the 
UN's value in the modern world is as an arbiter of international norms, whether the origin 
of those norms is based within the areas of security, environmental protection, or human 
rights. Moreover, the human rights goals espoused by the UN not only serve as 
"guidance devices," but also engender cooperation, as the UN provides a forum for 
Shelton, "The Environmental Jurisprudence of International Human Rights Tribunals," 22. 
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people to "pursue goals, share meanings, communicate with each other, criticize 
assertions, and justify actions" on particular normative issues.108 
The UN's IWRM regime should serve such a purpose, as it, like other UN 
regimes "seeks to uphold state obligations and state responsibility toward individuals and 
groups within its own domestic jurisdiction," while also defining an extensive and 
consistent set of norms regarding freshwater access. Fundamentally, then, the 
proposed IWRM regime acts as a constitutive norm, by attempting to "create new actors, 
interests, or categories of actions," and establishing a governing regime that is organized 
around a previously unrecognized combination of principles.1' Indeed, the proposed 
IWRM regime blends a set of variant principles to create an innovative method of global 
water management and then advocates that method within an international setting. 
Further, this emergent constitutive norm contains prescriptive norms within its body of 
logic, or norms that recommend behavior or have a sense of "oughtness" about them. For 
instance, the idea that a state should strive to provide clean water for all its citizens at low 
or no cost amounts to a prescriptive norm, and many of the principles espoused by 
IWRM, are prescriptive norms, as they suggest (rather than enforce or incentivize) that 
states subscribe to certain normative goals in their water management policies.1 n As the 
overall point of this study is to analyze the implementation contradictions within the 
IWRM regime, an examination of the theoretical literature explaining the diffusion of 
norms, the very form and function of IWRM, becomes essential. 
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On that point, the literature clearly suggests that an understanding of the 
materialization and adoption of emergent norms requires an examination of the role of 
civil society in advancing such 'novel' ideas. Today, international civil society (mainly 
comprised of NGOs, faith-based institutions, community organizations, unions, etc..) 
plays a fundamental part in the diffusion of norms and values across various cultural 
contexts, but this was not always the case. Prior to the eighteenth century, the term 'civil 
society' was synonymous with a code of laws and regulations through which citizens 
framed their interactions with each other. In turn, a broader set of societal norms and 
values supported and justified this legal code. Historically, then, civil society was a 
complex mixture of complementary social and legal norms.112 
Modernity, however, understands "civil society" to mean something quite 
different from its previous incarnation, and today, theorists consider civil society to be a 
distinct entity from legal codes enforced by the state. At present, theorists recognize civil 
society as the tier of activity existing above the individual level, but below the level of 
the state. In essence, "complex networks based on interest, ideology, family, and cultural 
affinity" comprise civil society, and individuals use these relational networks to pursue 
i n 
various normative aims. Additionally, civil society also retains a political dimension in 
the modern age, as many of the organizations that exist between the individual and the 
state "directly shape widespread behavior in matters of public concern and 
involvement."114 Modern civil society can also both instigate and be the target of 
political action due to its function as an intermediary between states and their citizens.115 
112 Wapner, "Governance in Global Civil Society," 68. 
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Perhaps most importantly, civil society has become an increasingly transnational force in 
international politics, as its relevant norms and institutions "regulate a vast array of 
functions previously within the domain of nation-states." 116 
While there are scholars that believe the agents of civil society, most specifically 
NGOs, "create the worldwide constructs and principles that shape the form and function 
of actors and purposes," that is an alternative interpretation, as the vast majority of 
international relations literature views NGOs as promoters of emergent norms, not 
necessarily the agents that create the normative structure within which all actors 
operate.117 Instead, the mainstream literature emphasizes "relatively small, interacting, 
1 1 Q 
self-conscious critical communities," as the creators of new normative ideas. These 
epistemic communities create new social values, which are then diffused among a wider 
public audience by civil society advocates.119 Generally speaking, the literature defines 
these emergent norms (or new social values) as standards of appropriate behavior for 
actors with a given identity. 120 These new norms must identify an existent problem, 
name the cause of the problem, and politicize the problem by arguing that a particular 
corrective action will right the situation.121 
One of these emergent norms only becomes commonly accepted among a given 
population when it fulfills its life cycle, or reaches a critical mass that leads to the 
widespread adoption of the norm in question.122 Prevailing scholarship explains such 
norm influence as a three-stage process. The first stage is ' 'norm emergence," or 
116 Klotz, "Transnational Activism and Global Transformations," 49. 
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persuasion by norm entrepreneurs (generally members of civil society). These norm 
entrepreneurs decide on the validity of a new norm, and then attempt to convince others 
of the norm's worth. Norm entrepreneurs are most likely to succeed in this task when 
their "ethical agendas mesh or 'nest' well with other normative agendas." In other 
words, norm entrepreneurs must appropriately frame the norms they advocate, meaning 
they must link their normative goals to the structure of an already accepted value 
foundation.124 In terms of water policy, one might argue that portraying access to water 
as a human rights issue rather than an environmental issue represents an attempt to link 
this emergent norm to the more widely accepted value frameworks espoused and 
supported by international human rights regimes. This framing is fundamentally 
important because any presentation of a new value will always be examined in light of 
those values already held by the targeted population.125 
Once the new norm has reached acceptance in a "critical mass of relevant actors," 
it has reached its "tipping point." 126 In terms of human rights regimes, and indeed most 
types of international regimes, states are the relevant actors that must accept and abide by 
the rules of the regime, as they are the actors tasked with safeguarding the human rights 
of their citizens. Although states, due to their varying capabilities, influence levels, and 
populations, have different weights in terms of 'tipping,' successful tipping generally 
requires at least one-third of the total states in the system to have adopted the norm.127 
Once the tipping point has been reached, the norm will "cascade" through the rest of the 
population, meaning it should be accepted by even larger numbers as a valid new method 
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124 Acharya,"How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter?," 243. 
125 Rochon, Culture Moves, 54. 
126 Finnemore and Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," 895. 
41 
of behavior. Interestingly, many states within the developed world have fought the 
acceptance of the human right to water, sometimes even equating it to a hindrance to free 
trade.128 Within much of the developed world, then, it is certainly questionable whether 
IWRM as a constitutive norm, or indeed, the human right to water as a prescriptive norm, 
have reached their tipping points. 
With the developing world, however, the human right to water has taken more of 
a foothold, and a number of states have even codified this norm within their bodies of 
law.129 For these states, then, IWRM seems to have survived the stages of emergence and 
cascade and entered the third and final stage, that of internalization. Internalization 
occurs when "norms acquire a taken-for-granted quality and are no longer a matter of 
broad public debate."130 In other words, a norm becomes internalized when enforcement 
is no longer necessary to ensure compliance.131 While inter-governmental organizations, 
such as the United Nations, play an enormous role in the internationalization of emergent 
human rights norms in terms of monitoring and enforcement, state governments play an 
even larger role in internalization, as they are primarily responsible for operationalizing 
the norm within their borders. 
State governments internalize norms through what the literature refers to as "a 
boomerang pattern nested within a spiral model." This boomerang pattern occurs 
when domestic groups opposing an action of their government bypass a direct protest of 
that government, and instead ask international allies, in the form of civil society and 
intergovernmental organizations, to pressure the offending state government. These 
128 Diebel, "Canada Foils UN Water Plan," April 2, 2008. 
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actions "crucially depend on the sustainability of networks among domestic and 
transnational actors who manage to link up with international regimes."13 These civil 
society networks provide access, information, and financial support to struggling 
domestic groups, and give their issues international exposure, which then "amplifies the 
demands of domestic groups.. .and.. .echoes these demands back into the domestic 
arena."134 Thus, the boomerang effect is the process of a domestic opposition group 
throwing its opposition out into international society, only to have transnational networks 
redirect opposition back onto the offending state. 
Not every domestic opposition group is able to garner international support, 
however, and those that are most successful at motivating transnational society to work 
on their behalf are groups with "significant material resources, preexisting linkages to 
international actors, skill at international public relations, organizational cohesiveness, 
and leadership charisma."135 Moreover, human rights-based transnational networks tend 
to support causes whose complaints can be described as violations of the 1948 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Opposition groups suffering abuses 
that fit into the categories defined by the Covenant have a better chance of gaining 
international support than groups suffering other forms of repression. Indeed, groups that 
are able to "match" their grievances to recognized abuses by refraining them in 
internationally recognized jargon, are most successful at garnering international advocacy 
for their cause. 
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When a domestic opposition group is able to rally transnational society, the 
informational and advocacy networks employed serve three main purposes during the 
boomerang process. First, they identify and criticize norm-violating states in front of an 
international audience, and second, they support and help legitimate the claims of 
domestic opposition groups against norm-violating states; thus "they are crucial in 
mobilizing domestic opposition, social movements, and non-governmental organizations 
in target countries." 137 Third, transnational norm diffusers attempt to force governments 
to change their policies by applying pressure from the international community and from 
their own domestic citizenry. 
This boomerang process, however, does not always lead to a uniform adoption of 
norms across state governments. What then accounts for the variation in the domestic 
effects of international norms? To answer this question, the literature identifies a "spiral 
model" which consists of several boomerang throws, with each throw having a different 
level of effect dependent upon its target country.138 The effect of change depends upon 
four factors: the strength of the civil society/governmental network and communication, 
the strength of the domestic society in the norm-violating state; the depth of the civil 
society connection with the target state's domestic society, and the national government 
of the norm-violating state, in that the transparency of the regime involved and its 
capacity to block transnational communication strongly affect the domestic opposition's 
ability to garner international support.139 The spiral model, then, is a "dance with many 
Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink, eds., The Power of Human Rights, 5. 
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partners," including transnational civil society, intergovernmental organizations, and 
national governments.140 
Part of the IWRM puzzle, then, may hinge upon the success of the spiral model in 
internalizing the human right to water within the developed and developing worlds. On 
the one hand, the developed world has, by and large, failed to internalize the human right 
to water, but has experienced a high level of success with IWRM, which, incidentally, is 
a policy framework which also fails to advocate the notion of water as a human right. In 
contrast, many of the developing states that have internalized, and even institutionalized, 
the human right to water have failed to successfully implement IWRM principles, a fact 
which seems to suggest that IWRM principles and the notion of water as a human right 
may be mutually exclusive ideals. 




In an age when man has forgotten his origins and is 
blind even to his most essential needs for survival, 
water along with other resources has become the victim 
of his indifference. 
-Rachel Carson, Silent Spring 
World population has risen 300% over the past 50 years, and as a result, current 
freshwater resources cannot satiate the growing global thirst for water.1 The international 
policy community seems cognizant of the need for a highly coordinated approach to 
global water management and has been attempting to implement such a comprehensive 
water strategy since the early 1990s, under the guise of various United Nations' 
conferences and procedural meetings. The 1992 United Nations International Conference 
on Water and the Environment in Dublin, Ireland and, to an even greater extent, the 
Conference on Environment and Development (Earth Summit) in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil 
that same year served as watershed events in environmental policy, and both conferences 
saw the introduction of Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) as a potential 
solution for a diminishing interdependent water resource network. 
In theory, IWRM combines the efforts and voices of civil society, donor, private 
sector, and international and national government organizations in a holistic approach 
that considers the interests of all world populations regarding water scarcity and supply. 
The principles contained within IWRM address four variant policy dimensions -social 
equity, economic management, political transparency and decentralization, and 
1 Soncini-Sessa, et al., Integrated and Participatory Water Resources Management, xiii. 
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environmental sustainability. The social dimension emphasizes the equitable use of 
water resources, underscoring access to clean freshwater for people at the world's lowest 
socio-economic levels, while IWRM's financial component "draws attention to the 
efficient use of water resources and the role of water in overall economic growth," with a 
significance placed on water pricing and demand management. The third dimension of 
water governance, that of political decentralization, stresses the primacy of individual 
stakeholders in the process of water policy formulation, assuming that individuals 
involved in creating policies specific to their own localized conditions will be more likely 
to abide by those policies as opposed to regulations that are imposed by a more distant 
centralized governing power. Finally, the fourth and final dimension of IWRM focuses 
on water treatment and conservation, in order to assure that freshwater resources remain 
free of pollutants and are used in a manner that allows for the future sustainability of the 
resource. 
The United Nations remains one of IWRM's most dedicated proponents on the 
international stage, as it continues to support and promote the idea that IWRM's four 
policy dimensions create a comprehensive and impartial framework for the mitigation of 
water scarcity in the 21st century. Translating the UN's IWRM rhetoric into reality, 
though, has proven to be quite a challenge within certain states, especially within the 
developing world. Those particular governments seem to struggle with the adaptation of 
IWRM's principles, including the enforcement of new water laws, the reorganization of 
water resources into differing units of spatial analysis, the creation of pricing mechanisms 
and the privatization of water supply, and the participation of all stakeholders in the 
2 United Nations, World Water Development Report 2, 46. 
3 Ibid., 47. 
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decision-making process. It seems, then, that certain states are finding it exceedingly 
difficult to achieve a workable policy synergy between all of IWRM's goals. 
IWRM FROM AN IR PERSPECTIVE 
Although the United Nations has been advocating rWRM as a viable 
environmental policy framework for the past fifteen years, academics in the field of 
international relations have shown little to no interest in studying such a policy regime. 
Indeed, the vast majority of existing rWRM-related scholarship approaches the subject 
from a distinctly scientific perspective, and one that rests on the technical analysis of 
various pollutant, climate, and hydrologic models. Although useful, this scientific 
viewpoint fails to address central questions regarding the efficacy of rWRM within the 
international policy community. Thus, very little scholarship exists to answer a 
seemingly obvious question - why is there a contradiction gap between the UN's IWRM 
rhetoric and the actual implementation of IWRM policy across states? This analysis 
attempts to answer that question by considering it from the perspectives of four relevant 
theoretical literatures - those on regime creation and collective action, common-pool 
resources, the privatization of water resources, and the construction and diffusion of 
normative ideas regarding water rights across societies. 
Ideally, an analysis would consider instances of rWRM successes and failures in 
the developed and developing worlds within the context of each theoretical perspective 
and compare those cases to instances in which IWRM had no effect, meaning a state had 
not yet changed its water policy to reflect the characteristics of IWRM. Such a research 
design proves virtually impossible, however, as the 1992 Rio Declaration, the 
international agreement which introduced fWRM principles on a global scale, has 155 
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signatories.4 This high level of state participation suggests that the majority of state 
actors have agreed that their environmental policy will pay at least minimal attention to 
IWRM precepts, a condition which precludes the identification of non-participatory 
states. 
Fortunately, an alternative analytical approach exists, as the evidence suggests 
that states seem to experience success and failure with their IWRM policies at different 
governance levels - either at the state/national level or at the interstate level. 
Consequently, this study examines cases of IWRM implementation success and failure at 
both the transboundary and national levels, an approach which allows for two controlled 
comparisons of IWRM policy execution. To that end, the following analysis will 
evaluate the cases of Germany and India, respectively, as examples of IWRM success 
and failure at the interstate level of water governance. Certainly, there is perhaps no 
more potent symbol of water interdependence between states than a shared river basin. 
Since environmental ecosystem issues such as water allocation and pollution levels 
transcend national boundaries and affect multiple stakeholders across state lines, 
interstate communication over river basin management can indeed represent cooperation 
and/or conflict between states. Both India and Germany, as chief stakeholders in two of 
the world's major river basins, have applied IWRM's water management prescriptions to 
their respective regions, but these two states have experienced widely divergent levels of 
success in those implementation endeavors, with Germany serving as an IWRM model 
for the world, while India has struggled to achieve the same. 
Alternately, the cases of Canada and South Africa will allow for a scrutiny of 
IWRM success and failure at the state level. Issues salient at the interstate level also hold 
4 United Nations General Assembly, Rio Declaration on Environment and Sustainability, June 1992. 
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sway at the state level, where variables such as water pricing, allowable pollution levels, 
and stakeholder involvement can affect the health of national freshwater resources. 
Canada, for its part, has institutionalized IWRM principles within its national water 
policy legislation for the past several decades to the extent that, today, the international 
community often cites Canada as a water policy leader for the world. South Africa, 
however, has strained to throw off its mantle of apartheid in order to create an effective 
water policy that addresses the country's unique water needs, including the provision of 
water to millions of South Africans in the context of ever-increasing water scarcity. 
Under these trying conditions, the South African government has struggled to implement 
IWRM's core principles in an efficacious manner. 
Methodologically speaking, the selection of these four cases controls for macro 
hydrologic characteristics, geographic diversity, democracy, federalism, and good 
governance, as operationalized by World Bank data regarding a state's citizen 
participation and political accountability, government effectiveness, and rule of law. 
Indeed, each of the four states surveyed here fall within the 50-75 percentiles or above in 
terms of these particular governance indicators.5 At the same time, such a research 
design allows the level of development in each state to vary; thus development stands as 
a key independent variable since the United Nations claims that IWRM will succeed 
within any developmental and/or economic context. 
Moreover, this study accounts for longitudinal considerations, as it reflects on the 
present success and/or failure of IWRM-influenced policies and compares such success 
and failure against pre-IWRM water policies. In terms of measuring the characteristics 
5 Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, 2009: Governance Matters VIII: Governance Indicators for 1996-
2008. 
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that constitute an IWRM "success" or "failure," the fluidity of the policy framework itself 
allows one to apply both qualitative and quantitative measures of success to the execution 
of its components. Specifically, this study will evaluate the effectiveness of IWRM 
based upon the answers to several queries. First, did water quality and/or availability 
improve in a quantitative sense in the years following the implementation of IWRM-
related laws? The World Development Indictors' water metrics, which evaluate such 
variables as organic water pollution levels in each state, will provide the data necessary to 
assess any quantitative improvement in this regard. Second, has a state formalized 
IWRM components within relevant legislation? If so, has that state met the IWRM 
objectives it set for itself in the time in which it specified? Finally, do third-parties 
perceive a state's IWRM implementation to be a successful template for the framework's 
execution in other regions of the world? Measurements such as the Water Poverty Index 
— a metric using an amalgamation of a country's total amount of water resources, 
capacity for water provision, and ecological legislative protection of water as the 
barometer of its success will prove useful in assessing the international community's 
perception of a state's water policy effectiveness. 
After a careful consideration of IWRM implementation in Germany, India, 
Canada, and South Africa using the methodology outlined above, it becomes evident that 
the success of IWRM policies varies quite a bit depending upon conditions within each 
particular state, and a polarity between the developed and developing world characterizes 
this variable success rate, both on the state and interstate level. Certainly, the literatures 
on regimes and collective action, common-pool resources, privatization, and the 
normative dimensions of human rights can help to answer the question of why such a 
6 Lawrence, et al., "The Water Poverty Index," 11. 
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chasm exists between the UN's rhetoric of IWRM success and the actual performance of 
IWRM policies across differing contexts. All told, these four cases, a theoretical 
examination of these four cases will help to illuminate reasons why the UN's IWRM 
policy framework seems to find success in the developed world, while facing more of an 
implementation challenge in developing states. The answers to this policy puzzle have 




GERMANY, THE RHINE RIVER, AND IWRM 
In Koln, a town of monks and bones, And pavements 
fang 'd with murderous stones, And rags, and hags, and 
hideous wenches; I counted two and seventy stenches, 
All well-defined, and several stinks! Ye Nymphs that 
reign o 'er sewers and sinks, The river Rhine, it is well 
known, Doth wash your city of Cologne; But tell me, 
Nymphs, what power divine, Shall henceforth wash that 
river Rhine ? 
- Samuel Taylor Coleridge, 1834 
Rivers are, by their very geographic nature, transboundary resources, and as such, 
they can serve as a source of conflict between state actors, engendering political struggles 
over issues like water allocation or the migration of current-driven pollution from one 
state to another. The conflictive nature of such resources is not a static condition, 
however, and given the right set of circumstances, river management can actually 
engender cooperation rather than conflict. As a case in point, the story of Western 
Europe's Rhine River provides an illustrative model of stakeholder collaboration that has 
allowed for the successful implementation of Integrated Water Resources Management 
(IWRM), a policy framework that attempts to democratize water governance, value water 
as an economic good, safeguard the sustainability of water resources, and allocate water 
equitably to all socio-economic levels. 
Although the Rhine's stakeholders have actively promoted the health of the river 
over the latter half of the 20th century, it is really during the last ten years, with the 
introduction of the European Union's Water Framework Directive (WFD), that this 
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support has coalesced into a successful implementation of IWRM principles, despite 
some significant legislative hurdles within Germany, the Rhine's largest stakeholder. 
The Rhine's effective management scheme hinges on several elements, two of which 
predate the introduction of IWRM entirely. Those elements include the legacy left by the 
Rhine's historical administrative organizations, the aftereffects of an environmental 
disaster on the river, and the strength of the European Union as a governing institution in 
the Rhine region. 
More specifically, the success of the Rhine's current IWRM-based regime is due 
to the historical orientation of its previous management regimes, which initially framed 
the Rhine's meandering geography as a hindrance in the free trade of goods between 
local stakeholders. Facing this 'commercial' issue, the river's earliest managers 
attempted to solve the problem by regulating the Rhine's commerce through increasing 
its ease of navigability, paying no mind to the environmental effects of the river's re-
engineering. An industrial-related environmental tragedy in the late 20th century, 
however, catalyzed the Rhine's modern stakeholders into adapting the previous 
commerce-related regime to include a focus on improving the river's ecological integrity. 
In turn, stakeholder memberships in the European Union further supported and 
operationalized this new focus on the Rhine's environmental health. The additional 
element of power and legitimacy provided by the EU's dense institutional network and its 
concomitant support of IWRM enabled the Rhine's riparian states to consistently apply 
the WFD's mandates. In fact, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) actually amended 
its constitution to allow for, among other things, an easier application of the EU's Water 
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Framework Directive, suggesting that international regimes can contain the power to 
reshape state constitutions. 
In a theoretic sense, then, an analysis of the Rhine's experience indicates that the 
related literatures on common pool resources and collective action inform the following 
analysis, as they suggest that the Rhine's success is largely due to the form and function 
of its historic management regimes. These pre-existing regimes, with their foci on 
commercial concerns and later, environmental sustainability, marginalized water's 
economic valuation and completely disregarded the human right to water. Since these 
concerns were never framed as fundamentally important issues within the Rhine River 
basin, the literatures on water privatization and norm diffusion have little to no 
applicability regarding the Rhine situation. 
RHINE RIVER HISTORY 
The Rhine River rises in the Swiss Alps and continues on its meandering path 825 
miles through Germany, France, and the Netherlands, eventually emptying its waters into 
the North Sea. Traditional nomenclature separates this storied waterway into several 
sections including the High Rhine (from Lake Constance to Basel, Switzerland), the 
Upper Rhine (Basel to Bingen, Germany), the Middle Rhine (from Bingen to Bonn, 
Germany), the Lower Rhine (from Bonn to Lobith, Netherlands), and the Delta area 
(from Lobith to Rotterdam, Netherlands). All of these segments combine to create one of 
modern Europe's most vitally important water sources, as the Rhine provides power, 
drinking water, irrigation, and recreation for approximately 50 million people. Although 
Germany, France, Switzerland, and the Netherlands comprise the Rhine's riparian states, 
Germany plays perhaps the most central role in the river's development and maintenance 
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since German soil houses approximately 60% of the length of the Rhine waterway. 
These riparian states, however, are not the river's only stakeholders, and other interested 
parties include the states of Austria, Luxembourg, Belgium, and Liechtenstein, which still 
benefit from the power and drinking water that the Rhine provides, even though these 
state actors collectively share less than 5% of the river's basin area. 
One cannot fully appreciate the success of IWRM implementation in the Rhine 
basin without first understanding the river's historical development and that 
development's role as a contributing force to the river's current pollution woes. 
Recorded Rhine river history stretches back over 12,000 years, with Ice Age hunters 
acting as the first boatmen on the Rhine as they traveled the river in search of food. 
Over the next several thousand years, the Rhine not only provided sustenance to local 
people with its accompanying abundance of flora and fauna, but also aided in the 
advancement of civilizations, a function most realized by the Celts and the Romans. 
These two societies decided to utilize the Rhine's winding waterway as a trade route, 
primarily using the river for the transport of timber. The Rhine's trade role increased 
exponentially from that point on, with sailing vessels giving way steam vessels during the 
early part of the 19th century. At the turn of the 20th century, steam vessels transformed 
into motorized vessels, each of which was capable of transporting several thousand tons 
of freight, and this type of craft still dominates the modern Rhine. Today, some 200,000 
ships cross the Rhine at the German-Dutch border each year, and these vessels transport 
roughly 200 million tons of goods, including construction materials, petrochemical 
1 ICPR, The Rhine Atlas, 2. 
2 Vajpeyi, Water Resource Management, 131. 
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products, ore, charcoal, and manufacturing containers, all on route to North Sea ports.3 
Thus, in early the 21st century, the Rhine is one of the world's greatest commercial 
waterways as measured by volume of traffic, second only to the Mississippi River in the 
United States.4 
Not surprisingly, the Rhine's high level of industrial development engendered 
environmental consequences, as engineers began to reroute the course of the river during 
the 19th century to placate the demands of a growing European industrial community 
wishing for increased ease of ship navigation. To this end, the Congress of Vienna 
enacted the first international regime to encompass the management of the Rhine in 1815, 
and this regime was designed to accelerate the free flow of trade. Accordingly, the 
Congress established the Central Commission for Rhine Navigation (the Rhine 
Commission) and tasked it with eliminating any of the river's chokepoints hindering 
commercial traffic — both anthropogenic chokepoints, like tolls and border checks, and 
natural chokepoints, such as reefs and waterfalls. Through this rerouting of the river's 
banks, the Rhine Commission succeeded at its central mission, as it managed to open up 
the river's navigability, subsequently stimulating the region's economic growth through 
commerce. 
The legacy of the Rhine Commission, then, is one of trade-related river 
transformation. Consequently, engineers eventually replaced meandering streams and a 
multitude of small river branches between Basel in Switzerland and Karlsruhe in 
Germany with a single river channel. In the process, however, the Commission 
overlooked the river's environmental needs, as it virtually ignored the effects that the 
3ICPR, The Rhine: A River and its Relations, 5. 
4 Hutzinger, ed., "The Recovered Rhine and its History," 50. 
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river's increased navigability had on the region's flood control and ecology.5 The 
alteration of the river bed, for instance, produced the unfortunate side effect of 
catastrophic flooding. Areas that had previously served the function of absorbing water 
overflows were cut off from the river and replaced by concrete embankments to improve 
navigability. Over time, developers even used the dried marshlands created by this 
process for residential and industrial expansion. Eventually, such development reclaimed 
90% of the river's wetlands, which exacerbated the Rhine's propensity to flood. 
Population pressures also helped to alter the Rhine's natural route, as resident 
numbers grew in tandem with industrial activity, requiring the construction of additional 
hydroelectric power plants. Over a period of several decades beginning in 1928, Rhine 
stakeholders built numerous hydroelectric power stations in canals parallel to the Rhine, 
which served to severely deplete water levels in the original bed of the river. Later, in the 
1970s, two additional power plants were built on the Rhine itself, in Gambsheim, France 
and Iffeszheim, Germany. These hydroelectric plants, and the subsequent damming of 
the river as a function of their construction, altered the ecology of the Rhine's fauna, 
especially in terms of migratory fish species such as salmon, which could not traverse the 
newly-created dams in order to migrate and spawn. 
As a result, by the late 20th century the Rhine contained only half of the 47 fish 
species that swam there in the year 1800, and many of those survived only because of 
human intervention in the form of fish hatcheries. Salmon, shad, and sturgeon, the three 
most important commercial species in the Rhine, all but vanished.7 Meanwhile, several 
new fish species migrated to the Rhine or were transported there in the intervening years, 
5 Hutzinger, ed., "The Recovered Rhine and its History," 50. 
6 Vajpevi, Water Resource Management, 131. 
7 Hutzinger, ed., "The Recovered Rhine and its History," 59. 
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but tellingly, all of the new species were highly adaptable and, therefore, less dependent 
on the ecological benefits of uncontaminated water, flood-plains, natural riverbanks, and 
meadowlands than their predecessors. The Rhine also lost invertebrate macro-fauna 
(small animals that burrow in soil and/or eat decaying organic material like snails and 
aquatic insects) during this period of time. Again, this was indicative of the Rhine's 
ecological decline, as these organisms generally serve as key indicators of water quality. 
In 1915, for example, the Rhine contained 80 known indigenous species of macro-fauna, 
by 1956 that number stood at 42, and by 1971, only 27 species of macro-fauna remained. 
Additionally, dozens of bird species that had relied on the fish and macro-fauna of the 
Rhine for food sources disappeared as well.8 
The rerouting of the river and its negative environmental consequences were not 
the only problems faced by Rhine stakeholders, as the second half of the 19th century saw 
the Rhine become a dumping ground for industrial offal and raw sewage from growing 
local populations. Indeed, the German government took note of the river's growing 
stench in 1901, when the Reichstag addressed the issue of the Rhine's transformation into 
a "sewer" and ordered its bureaucracy to canvas the Rhine for all sources of pollution. 
The results of the canvas found the following: a red sewage plume between 
Ludwigshafen "as far as Worms," "dirty waters carrying a medley of floating rests of 
dirt" near Frankenthul, and a pollutive Mannheim paper pulp industry adding "yellow 
water" to the body of the Rhine.9 Such pollution levels continued to increase unabated 
over time, and by 1980, the Rhine's water was so contaminated with both sewage and 
pollutants — including salts, cadmium, mercury, lead, nickel, antimony, chromium, zinc, 
8 Hutzinger, ed., "The Recovered Rhine and its History," 59. 
9 ICPR, The Rhine: A River and its Relations, 1. 
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phenols, and pesticides — that no stakeholder could use the water in the river for any 
purpose without exorbitantly expensive treatment. 
THE ILLS OF THE RHINE 
By the mid-20th century, conditions in the Rhine had deteriorated to such a low 
point that riparian states began to suffer consequences related to the Rhine's heightened 
pollution level, its flooding issues, and the disappearance of its fauna. At that point, the 
river's stakeholders collectively acknowledged that the river "could not function as a 
conduit for industrial and agricultural wastes and still provide clean water to cities; it 
could not support endless urban sprawl and still be a favored destination for tourists; and 
it could not offer safety to anyone as long as it repeatedly flooded its artificial banks."11 
The degradation of the Rhine, then, embodied a tragedy of the commons situation, as its 
stakeholders finally recognized that each individual input into the river, such as run-off 
from industrial development or sewage waste, while perhaps making sense from an 
individual point of view, actually degraded the overall quality of the river for all relevant 
users.12 Certainly, the literature is illustrative on this point, as it indicates that common-
pool resources (CPRs) often suffer from such 'tragedies.' Certainly, the Rhine is a true 
CPR as it, like other bodies of water, is subtractable in nature, in that the appropriation of 
water by one party means less water is available to others downstream, but it is also non-
excludable simply due to its length. As a practical matter, no stakeholder can realistically 
fence off a 3,220 kilometer length river that traverses several states, and indeed, there has 
been no attempt to do so over the years. This lack of excludability seems logical when 
10 Hutzinger, ed., "The Recovered Rhine and its History," 58. 
11 Ibid., 59. 
12 Hardin, "The Tragedy of the Commons," 1244. 
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one considers that the Rhine Commission, the river's initial management regime, focused 
on opening up the river for the purpose of commercial trade rather than allowing 
individual stakeholders the leeway to set their own policies regarding the river's use. 
Conventionally, CPR resources can suffer from appropriation or provision issues 
regarding the allocation of water, but as the Rhine never suffered from a depleted water 
stock, the river's stakeholders never had to deal with allocation issues, meaning they did 
not have to find a way to spread an insufficient amount of water amongst many users. 
Although the Rhine's water was certainly polluted, a sufficient quantity of water for all 
stakeholders was always available to those who were willing and able to exercise 
expensive treatment options. The literature suggests, however, that provision problems 
are not only caused by depleted water resources, but can also consist of "avoiding the 
destruction of the resource," a state of affairs that certainly applied to the Rhine.13 
Accordingly, river pollution and the ancillary matter of flora and fauna degradation 
comprised the main issues concerning the Rhine's riparian states. Thus, Rhine 
stakeholders, by the mid-20th century, were indeed facing a problem of provision familiar 
to CPRs due to their failure to mitigate the severe pollution issues that plagued the river. 
A HISTORY OF RHINE-RELATED REGIMES 
With the Rhine's pollution constituting a CPR issue, the literature proposes a very 
specific type of regime as a potential solution; thus, an in-depth look at the form and 
function of Rhine-related regimes is necessary in order to assess their theoretical 
implications regarding IWRM implementation. Indeed, the history of such Rhine 
regimes is comprehensive. When confronted with the Rhine's pollution-related provision 
Young, International Cooperation, 13. 
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issues, the river's stakeholders decided to create a new regime, the International 
Commission for the Protection of the Rhine (ICPR) in 1963, to work separately from the 
Rhine Commission (whose main concern was trade). The Rhine's riparian states charged 
the newly created ICPR with the mission of restoring the river's health, and to achieve 
that end, the ICPR identified three major objectives to aid in its task: 1) researching the 
extent of pollution in the river and identifying its sources, 2) mitigating those sources of 
pollution, and 3) preparing corresponding international agreements to support those 
goals. To further its agenda, the ICPR spearheaded a convention to protect the Rhine 
against chemical pollution in 1976, and this convention established hazardous waste 
limits in the river, created a system to warn all stakeholder states about toxic waste spills, 
and established international water quality monitoring stations.14 
Despite such attempts at progress, more talk than action characterized the first 
two decades of the ICPR's existence. On November 1, 1986, that static condition ended 
with the Sandoz A.G. warehouse fire and subsequent chemical spill in Schweizerhalle, 
near Basel, Switzerland. Due to the Sandoz fire, the run-off from the firefighters' 
extinguishing water flowed straight into the Rhine, and as a result, approximately 30 tons 
of highly toxic pesticides entered the river and killed almost all of the river's fish and 
plant life as far downstream as Koblenz, a distance of approximately 400 kilometers. The 
high level of river pesticides also required that the public along the banks of the Rhine, 
all the way to the Netherlands (almost 1,000 kilometers from the accident site), refrain 
from acquiring drinking water from the river for several days after the accident.15 
Vajpevi, Water Resource Management, 133. 
15 Tuohy, "4 Nations Try to Cope as River Spreads Spilled Chemicals," November 13, 1986. 
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The consequences of this acute crisis deeply shocked the Western European 
public, mobilizing it to apply pressure to its respective governments to clean up the 
Rhine. The focus of the abatement effort not only resulted in pressure to mitigate the 
chemical spill, but also centered on obliterating the image of the Rhine as Western 
Europe's sewer. The ICPR, as the relevant and already extant agency in this field, found 
itself spurred into action by the public pressure, and shortly after the accident, drafted a 
plan to clean up 'Father Rhine.' That draft plan came to fruition in 1987, as the ICPR 
approved the Rhine Action Program (RAP). The ICPR intended the RAP to achieve the 
following targets by the year 2000: the return of native fauna species to the Rhine (most 
importantly, salmon); the reduction of the pollutant contents of river sediments, the 
acceleration of a reduction in permanent pollution from point and non-point sources, the 
reduction of accident risk (no doubt a direct consequence of the Sandoz chemical spill), 
and the improvement of hydrological, biological, and morphological conditions within 
the river.16 
At its core, then, and true to the earlier stated objectives of the ICPR, the RAP 
focused on pollution mitigation, but the specter of an additional problem appeared during 
the winters of 1993 and 1994 and forced the evolution of the RAP. Severe flooding on 
the banks of the Rhine during those years caused the deaths of four people and resulted in 
large scale evacuations of Rhine-adjacent populations. In the wake of these calamities, 
ICPR stakeholders realized that the anthropogenic rerouting of the river was at least 
partially responsible for the severity of the flooding and vowed to address that situation 
1 n 
by merging pollution control solutions with flood control measures via the RAP." In 
Hutzinger, ed., "The Recovered Rhine and its History," 69. 
Vajpevi, Water Resource Management, 133. 
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terms of meeting these stated objectives, the RAP was more successful at improving the 
Rhine's water quality than alleviating its flooding issues. In particular, by the year 2000, 
actions taken under the guise of the RAP had reduced the level of hazardous wastes in the 
river by at least 70%, and the river's water contained more oxygen and a greater diversity 
of species than it did at the start of the RAP in 1986.18 
THE EUROPEAN WATER FRAMEWORK DIRECTIVE 
With its primary focus on pollution mitigation and its virtual disregard of social 
equity, economic water management, and participatory transparency, the Rhine Action 
Plan did not incorporate the policy ideals of Integrated Water Resources Management 
(IWRM). This omission seems logical when one considers that the RAP was created 
long before the international recognition of IWRM in the early 1990s. This all changed 
in the year 2000, however, when the European Union adopted the Water Framework 
Directive (WFD), a comprehensive policy intended to provide legislative cohesion 
regarding the region's water management. The most significant aspect of this legislative 
adjustment was that it altered future Rhine policy through its inclusion and support of 
IWRM principles. As such, a discussion of the WFD is certainly central to the question 
of whether IWRM implementation has succeeded in the Rhine River basin, as the WFD 
operationalized certain tenets of IWRM within a European agenda. 
While the WFD does not explicitly mention IWRM by name, IWRM's core 
concepts comprise its organizing pillars, in effect constituting an implicit endorsement. 
Specifically, with regard to IWRM, the WFD calls for lower pollution levels as an 
element of environmental sustainability (Article 16), public participation in the formation 
18 Hutzinger, ed., "The Recovered Rhine and its History," 71. 
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of river management strategies (Article 14), and to a lesser extent, strategic water pricing 
as an incentive for the sustainable use of water resources (Article 9).19 The WFD fails, 
however, to focus on the fourth component of IWRM, that of social equity. This 
exclusion is perhaps due to the relative wealth of the EU states and their populations' 
widespread connectivity to water sources, a situation which would render the social 
equity component seemingly unnecessary within the Western European context. 
As a piece of legislation, the WFD was meant to fuse the many disparate 
mechanisms of European water management into a one unified policy for application 
across all transboundary EU water resources, including the Rhine River. Such a 
consolidation rests upon a secondary recommendation of IWRM - that of using the river 
basin as the primary unit of water management analysis. To that end, the WFD directs 
that an EU state must identify each river or water source located within its territory and 
then assign that water source to a river basin district (RBD). Additionally, this 
assignation must include coastal waters, which should be appointed to the nearest or most 
appropriate RBD. 
After the identification of river basin districts, each state must identify the 
"appropriate competent authority" charged with the implementation of the WFD in all 
territorial RBDs.21 National RBDs, however, are not the only important consideration, as 
the WFD also addresses transboundary cooperation regarding this issue by prescribing 
the establishment of international river basin districts (IRBDs), a designation to which the 
Rhine River belongs. Member states must ensure that a river basin located in the territory 
of more than one state is designated as an IRBD, and IRBDs must have an appropriate 
19 European Union, Directive 2000/60/EC, October 23, 2000. 
20 Louka, Water Law & Policy, 52. 
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implementation authority assigned as well. For practicality's sake, member states are 
allowed to utilize already existent international administrative organizations for the 
WFD's implementation. In the case of the Rhine River district, the river's stakeholders 
appointed the ICPR as the overseer of the WFD's implementation. 
To guide the management of both national and international RBDs, the WFD 
requires EU states to produce river basin management plans (RBMPs) for all RBDs to 
which waters within a state belong.23 The RBMP is central to river basin planning, and 
states are to produce their first such plan in 2009, with a subsequent update of that plan 
every fifteen years. The RBMPs must include, on a variable deadline schedule, a 
summary of the RBD's health in terms of pollution and ecological sustainability, an 
account of pollution abatement measures, an economic analysis of water use and pricing, 
and a summary of the stakeholder consultation process. Future updates of RBMPs should 
assess any progress made in achieving pollution abatement objectives, account for any 
objectives that are not yet achieved and explain that failure of achievement, while also 
evaluating the future of the RBD. Thus, the RBMPs assume "the function of a 
scorecard," as they track the status of each RBD over time.24 
Finally, the WFD provides clear deadlines for all measures listed above. For 
instance, it required states to establish RBDs and competent coordination authorities by 
2003. By 2004, states had to provide an analysis of the characteristics and pollution 
levels within each RBD, and by 2006, states had to establish a monitoring mechanism for 
RBD progress. Furthermore, states had to present a draft RBMP to the public and all 
interested stakeholders by the end of 2008, and by December 2009, states must submit a 
22 Oberthur and Gehring, eds., Institutional Interaction in Global Environmental Governance, 207. 
Louka, Water Law & Policy, 54. 
24 Ibid., 56. 
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final draft of each RBMP to which its waters belong. Ultimately, by 2015, each EU 
water source must meet all environmental objectives laid out in their respective RBMPs, 
at which point the EU expects the evaluation process to begin anew for a second cycle. 
THE WFD AND GERMANY 
A discussion of the German legal framework and its integration with the WFD 
exemplifies the struggle some states within the EU have experienced with IWRM 
implementation. Germany's adherence to the WFD has been fraught with legislative 
difficulty, as on its inception, the WFD required the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) 
to change aspects of its prevailing model of water management to comply with several 
tenets of IWRM philosophy. Prior to the WFD requirements, for instance, Germany did 
not classify its water sources as part of transboundary "river basin districts," instead 
allowing local, rather than national or international bodies, to manage the health of its 
waters. The WFD has transformed this practice, though, in essence forcing the FRG to 
terra-form its water sources into ten river basin districts, including the Danube, Rhine, 
Maas, Ems, Weser, Elbe, Eider, Oder, Schlei/Trave and Warnow/Peene districts. 
Additionally, the WFD (owing to the TWRM policy component of sustainability) 
requires Germany to monitor the Rhine in terms of its biological and ecological integrity 
— essentially tracking the health of the Rhine's flora and fauna. Previously, the FRG 
only monitored the Rhine for its quality of potable water, but Germany has adapted its 
policy in order to follow IWRM mandates. Today, the German government routinely 
releases the results of these chemical and biological studies to the public, heralding a 
further evolution of German water management and additional adherence to the WFD, 
25 Louka, Water Law & Policy, 57-58. 
26 Unnerstall and Kock, "The Implementation of the EU Water Framework Directive," 208. 
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which requires states to maintain legislative transparency by informing the public 
regarding all water management-related decisions. 
Thus, Germany has made significant inroads with its IWRM implementation as 
envisioned by the WFD. The legislative synergy necessary for such success did not come 
easily however, because the WFD required EU states to harmonize their national laws for 
adherence to the policy focus of the WFD. In Germany's case, this harmonization 
entailed a highly complex legislative process. Upon the WFD's adoption in the year 
2000, Germany's constitution granted its federal government very limited powers over 
water-related issues, meaning that the government was authorized to enact only 
framework legislation rather than directive legislation regarding water management.27 
Framework legislation, according to the German Basic Law at the time, indicated that the 
federal government could only issue water management laws as guidelines, much like a 
list of suggestions that were then meant to be operationalized by the federal states 
(Lander) within Germany. This particular legislative arrangement was based upon a 
1994 constitutional reform, which shifted the power for the interpretation of framework 
legislation to German states and regions rather than the German federal government (Art. 
75 GG, Basic Law).28 
Given these constraints, the early legal implementation of the WFD within the 
Rhine River basin rested upon the German's government 7th amendment to its Federal 
Water Act in 2002, an amendment which adopted the WFD's terminology and promoted 
the assignation of river basin districts.29 Certainly, this revision represented the extent of 
the German federal government's power on the issue. The purpose of the amendment 
27 Unnerstall and Kock, "The Implementation of the EU Water Framework Directive," 212. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid., 213. 
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was to provide a legislative framework which the Lander could then use to format 
implementation regulations. This two-level implementation scheme, however, seemed 
to cause governmental torpor, as the German Federal Water Act had no real enforcement 
power over the Landers' water management policies. In fact, the full acceptance of the 
WFD into German law required the creation and/or amendment of a total of 33 
regionally-based water laws; thus, the extent of the required legislative changes presented 
an incredible challenge for the Lander, attested to by the fact that the 2003 EU deadline 
regarding WFD adherence witnessed the formation of only seven of those 33 laws.31 
The German experience suggests, then, that the WFD's implementation within Germany 
was one of caution, where each region's autonomy took precedence over a cohesive 
national/international water policy.32 
Nonetheless, due to Germany's prior commitment to and involvement with the 
ICPR, the legislative paralysis hindering Germany's WFD implementation did not signify 
complete inactivity regarding IWRM's presence in the Rhine River region. As 
previously stated, the WFD allowed for states to determine which administrative bodies 
would oversee its implementation, and the role of extant organizations was crucial to this 
fact. As such, Germany and other Rhine stakeholders agreed in 1999, with their 
accession to the Convention on the Protection of the Rhine, that the already existent 
ICPR stood as the organization best poised to implement the WFD within the Rhine 
region.33 Then, in 2001, despite the German legislative dissonance on the issue, the ICPR 
was able to successfully transition its efforts into adapting the Rhine Action Program into 
30 Landerarbeitsgemeinschaft Wasser, "Working Paper - German Guidance Document for the 
Implementation of the EC Water Framework Directive." 
31 Unnerstall and Kock, "The Implementation of the EU Water Framework Directive," 213. 
32 Ibid., 217. 
33 European Union, Council Decision 2000/706/EC, November 7, 2000. 
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a more IWRM/WFD-friendly management system entitled Rhine 2020. The Rhine 2020 
program exists as the ICPR's operationalization of the WFD, as it attempts to implement 
IWRM principles in support of the Rhine's sustainable development. The targets of 
Rhine 2020 include the continued improvement of ecological sustainability within the 
Rhine watershed, specifically incorporating the reintroduction of salmon into the Rhine, 
the improvement of flood prevention, the improvement of water quality and groundwater 
protection, and the continued surveillance of the Rhine River for the maintenance of its 
integrity.34 
To meet these new Rhine 2020 goals, the ICPR created a Coordinating 
Committee (CC) consisting of representatives from Germany, France, the Netherlands, 
Austria, Switzerland, Belgium, Luxembourg, Liechtenstein, and Italy. Indicative of the 
torpidity of the German legislative system regarding the WFD's implementation, each of 
the sixteen Lander became members of the CC by virtue of their membership in the 
LAWA (Landerarbeitsgemeinschaft Wasser), a German organization that provides a 
forum for collaboration, as it enables each German state to organize water management 
policy among its contemporaries and then apply that cooperation to the international level 
of freshwater management in coordination with other Rhine stakeholders.35 The presence 
of LAWA members on the CC, however, meant that Germany had more representatives 
on the CC than all other Rhine riparian states put together. It is, therefore, not surprising 
that members of the CC, at times, have complained that the number of competent 
authorities involved in the CC increases the complexity of decision-making, a fact which 
ICPR. Rhine 2020: Program on the Sustainable Development of the Rhine. 
1 Bund/Landerarbeitsgemeinschaft Wasser. "Information about the LAWA." 
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is largely due to the federal structure of Germany and the fact that each Lander, with its 
own priorities and needs, is a separate member. 
To its credit, the German state has recently addressed this problem by attempting 
to adapt its legislative structure to be more welcoming to EU mandates like the WFD. In 
fact, the last two decades saw the German public, as well as actors within the federal 
government, voice their dissatisfaction with the constitutional power of the Lander, 
blaming that power for legislative paralysis within many areas of the German 
government, including, but not limited to, water management. By 2006, the German 
government acted on this public dissatisfaction and adopted a series of constitutional 
reforms aimed at separating the overlapping responsibilities of the federal government 
and the 16 Lander by restricting the power of the Bundesrat, or upper legislative house, 
which represents the Landers' interests. Originally created after WWII, the constitutional 
designers intended the Bundesrat to serve as a check on federal power, but in recent 
years, the German public began to view the power of the Bundesrat as a hindrance to 
timely decision-making, since it could veto 60 percent of all bills put through the 
legislative branch, granting it the power to slow down or completely block key 
proposals.37 
This "mother of all reforms," as it was dubbed by the German media, eliminated 
framework legislation and added natural resource management as a concurrent federal 
power, or a power which is within the jurisdiction of both the federal government and the 
Lander, but over which the federal government retains priority. Most importantly, this 
new constitutional arrangement more clearly defined the legislative power of the federal 
36 Louka, Water Law & Policy, 318. 
37 Deustche Welle. "German States Agree to Reform of Federal Constitution." March 7, 2006. 
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government versus the Lander, and in doing so, allowed the German federal government 
the authority and the flexibility to adhere to the European Union's mandates in a more 
timely and efficient fashion.38 Although it is still too early to judge the outcome of this 
constitutional revision in terms of the Rhine River basin, over the next several years this 
restriction of Lander power should allow for the harmonization of the previously 
fragmented German approach to the WFD through its expansion of federal powers in the 
field of water legislation. 
IWRM IMPLEMENTATION AND THE RHINE 
Thus, the future should see more cohesive German participation in terms of Rhine 
management, but despite the previous incompatibility of the German legislative structure 
with the WFD, the strength of the Rhine region's pre-existing management regime, the 
ICPR, allowed that organization to circumvent most of Germany's policy dissonance and 
successfully apply IWRM principles to the Rhine River basin, in keeping with the 
legislative mandate of the WFD. As evidence of its success, the ICPR has complied 
fully with all WFD requirements and deadlines in the Rhine region since the inception of 
the law in the year 2000.40 Moreover, the WFD directs that public participation in water 
management is crucially important, and the ICPR has complied with that ideal by posting 
all relevant documentation on its internet site, as well as holding regularly scheduled 
public hearings on the Rhine's health.41 An ICPR-related LAWA paper from Germany 
encapsulates the organization's philosophy toward public participation, stating that the 
38 Gunlicks, "Developments: German Federalism Reform, Part I," 123. 
39 ICPR, "Bericht tiber die Koordinierung der Uberblickstiberwachungsprogrammegem. Artikel 8 und 
Artikel 15 Abs. 2. 
40 ICPR, Rhine, Bewirtschaftungsplanfiir die internationaleFlussgebietseinheit Rhein. 
41 ICPR Public Relations Work. 
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"early involvement of the public in the implementation of the WFD should be understood 
as an instrument for improving the decision-making process." 42 Accordingly, the ICPR's 
focus on public participation also allows for "transparency of the implementation process, 
acceptance of the measures to be taken, especially among the associations and groups 
affected, confidence building ...and raising awareness of water protection issues among 
the public."43 
On more quantitative basis, the IWRM-inspired Rhine 2020 program has 
experienced success as well, although it is difficult to gauge whether these 
accomplishments occurred solely as a result of the WFD or are a continuation of 
successes achieved with the help of the Rhine basin's pre-existing regimes. In any case, 
the water quality of the Rhine has continued to improve over the last eight years, and at 
present, the ICPR claims that the oxygen content of Rhine water is at an optimal level.44 
In addition, 50% fewer toxic pollutants, as classified by the WFD, enter the Rhine today 
than entered the water stream ten years ago. Such improvements, while indicative of 
IWRM success, do not imply that all pollution has disappeared from 'Father Rhine,' and 
the ICPR readily acknowledges this fact. In a sign of progress, however, the Rhine's 
remaining pollution no longer consists of primarily industrial effluent or sewage, but 
instead is comprised of non-point source pollution, chiefly organic material of an 
agricultural nature and residual pharmaceuticals.45 
The fauna of the Rhine has also improved over the last two decades, and the 
results of the migratory fish reintroduction into the Rhine river system (a component of 
42 Landerarbeitsgemeinschaft Wasser (LAWA), "Working Paper- German Guidance Document, 86. 
http://www.lawa.de/Publications.html (accessed September 20, 2009). 
43 Ibid. 
44 ICPR, The Rhine: A River and its Relations, 21. 
45 Vajpevi, Water Resource Management, 134. 
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the "Rhine 2020" program) speak to this advancement. Since 1990, more than 5,000 
adult salmon have returned from the North Sea and migrated upstream, but importantly, 
much of that progress has occurred within the last nine years due to the construction of 
fish passages at several of the Rhine's hydroelectric dam sites. Thanks to joint German 
and French efforts, the Iffezheim fish passage, a migratory route bypassing a 
hydroelectric dam, was opened in 2000, and between 2001 and 2004, three new fish 
passages were created in other areas of the Rhine delta. Additionally, in 2006, Germany 
and France again collaborated and opened the Gambsheim fish passage on the Upper 
Rhine. Despite these successes, however, the ICPR recognizes that the Rhine's fish 
reintroduction still holds room for improvement, as the four dams at Strasbourg, 
Gerstheim, Rhinau and Marckolsheim continue to block fish from migrating upstream in 
those respective areas. 
THE LEGACY OF HISTORICAL REGIME CREATION 
In terms of deadline adherence, pollution levels, and species reintroduction, the 
ICPR has successfully implemented aspects of IWRM into the Rhine River Basin, despite 
any hindrance created by a lethargic German legislative process. Certainly, the 
theoretical literatures on CPR and regime creation are enlightening in this respect, as they 
help to illuminate some key factors underlying these accomplishments. The salient 
literature suggests that a spontaneous regime is the best option for a solution of a CPR 
issue, as long as that regime includes a focus on regionalization (the nested enterprises 
concept). In contrast, formalized and imposed regimes, like the current incarnation of the 
WFD, are less helpful when dealing with environmental issues because they often 
46 ICPR, The Rhine: A River and its Relations, 22. 
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incorporate a focus on compliance, which prevents stakeholders from building trust 
before holding each other accountable for breaches of agreement.47 
In a seemingly synergistic series of occurrences, then, the ICPR and the history of 
its Rhine River regime actually incorporates or speaks to the efficacy of both spontaneous 
and formalized regimes regarding environmental issues. The creation of the ICPR in 
1950 was more of a spontaneous process, by which "appropriators eventually reach[ed] 
and maintained] a set of individual strategies that increase[d] joint payoffs relative to 
problematic outcomes."48 At that point in time, the Rhine stakeholders agreed, without 
coercion, to form an organization that would reframe the Rhine's major issue from one of 
commerce to one of ecology, and in this vein, the ICPR committed itself to mitigating 
pollution in the river. The first incarnation of the ICPR was very informal, however, and 
failed to accomplish very much in terms of decreasing Rhine contamination during its 
first two decades in existence. 
The first hint of the ICPR's evolution into a more formalized regime occurred 
after a major environmental crisis, the Sandoz incident, and is evidenced by the creation 
of the Rhine Action Plan, a voluntary mitigation blueprint that contained very definite 
goals, but lacked any enforcement component. Finally, with the EU's adoption of the 
WFD, the ICPR transformed into a very formal regime, which accepted and became 
reliant on the "monitoring and sanctioning" of interested stakeholders.49 Such a 
formalized or imposed (top-down) regime, which creates rules that regulate actor 
behavior, has managed to generate uniform expectations regarding European water 
management. Moreover, the "monitoring and sanctioning" inherent in this more formal 
Young, International Cooperation, 93. 
48 Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker, Rules, Games, and Common Pool Resources, 16. 
49 Ibid., 16-17. 
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regime exists due to the power of the European Union as the ultimate arbiter of the 
WFD's tenets; thus, this regime demonstrates that "power factors can also play a role in 
enforcing compliance to a regime's objectives," as "enforcement can only be supplied if 
there is authority backed by coercive resources."50 Countries that fail to comply with the 
WFD face the risk of considerable daily financial penalties. Such coercion has, in fact, 
already occurred, as the European Commission has referred a number of countries, 
including Belgium, Luxembourg and Italy, to the European Court of Justice for just this 
type of infraction.51 
The ICPR, then, as a spontaneous regime, was eventually affected by the creation 
of an imposed regime (the European Union's WFD), which then forced the ICPR to 
become explicitly negotiated with a "formal accounting of results." Upon the creation 
of the WFD, the ICPR functioned as a 'nested enterprise' to help compensate for the 
difficulties in cooperation presented by the larger number of participants within the EU as 
a whole.53 Therefore, the ICPR's success with its JAVRM implementation suggests that 
an exact sequencing of regime creation may be important for policy effectiveness, 
meaning that regimes created to govern environmental issues must arise spontaneously 
through the interests of all relevant stakeholders, and over time, evolve into a system 
governed by an explicit set of rules and characterized by definitions of and penalties for 
non-compliance. These regimes cannot succeed, however, unless they allow for smaller 
Keohane, "The Demand for International Regimes," 344. 
1 The Chartered Institution of Water and Environmental Management, Water Framework Directive. 
52 Young, International Cooperation," 84-88. 
53 Keohane and Ostrom, eds., Local Commons and Global Interdependence, 22. 
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units of cohesion to exist within the whole, and the literature supports the importance of 
'nested enterprises' in this respect. 
ECONOMIC VALUATION AND SOCIAL EQUITY 
Certainly, the CPR and regime/collective action literatures manage to provide 
some insight into an analysis of the success of IWRM implementation in the Rhine River 
basin, but related research on water privatization and norm diffusion are not as applicable 
to the case of the Rhine, simply because both the WFD and the ICPR prize environmental 
sustainability and public participation over the IWRM policy components of water 
valuation and social equity. In terms of the economic valuation of water, the WFD does 
mention the importance of sustainable water pricing as a tenet of its legislation, but this 
emphasis seems somewhat insincere, as various factors speak to water pricing's 
secondary importance within the WFD framework. First, and rather tellingly, the 
legislative deadline for addressing water pricing practices in each river basin is scheduled 
for 2010, occurring after all other deadlines regarding environmental sustainability and 
public participation. Indeed, the deadline addressing the economic valuation of water is 
one of the last goals set by the WFD, and the 2010 deadline requires only that an analysis 
of regional water pricing be completed by that date; there is no subsequent mention of a 
set deadline for an actual adjustment of water pricing. 
Second, the derivative importance of water's economic valuation is evident when 
one considers Germany's current water pricing practices in light of the WFD advocation 
of the "polluter pays" principle as a method for recovering the environmental costs of 
water usage. Polluter pays traditionally indicates that the industries or farms that serve as 
54 Keohane and Ostrom, eds., Local Commons and Global Interdependence, 22. 
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point and non-point sources of water pollution must pay an extra surcharge in order to 
compensate for the treatment costs of the water that their pollution engenders. In 
practice, however, Germany, as the major stakeholder in the Rhine River basin, actually 
violates this tenet of the WFD, with little to no repercussions for doing so. Individual 
water users in Germany, through an elevated water price, pay or incentivize the polluters 
for practicing non-polluting or low-polluting methods of agricultural or industry, turning 
the "polluter pays" principle on its head. The German government claims that this 
practice is in the interest of efficiency, because it is much more costly to treat and clean 
drinking water than to pay to reduce pollution at its origin.55 One may concede the 
veracity of this statement, but the salient point in terms of this analysis is that the German 
government is actively violating one of the major tenets of the WFD with no 
consequence, which provides further evidence of the EU's low prioritization of this 
IWRM principle. Arguably, the framing legacy of Rhine river regimes plays a central 
role in the marginalization of such a central IWRM component. As previously 
mentioned, the Rhine's historical regime ideology has followed a trajectory ranging from 
commercial interests to fixing the ecology harmed by those commercial interests, and 
these pre-existing regimes never concerned themselves with water pricing or the 
economic valuation of water. The ICPR has never given this issue any attention nor does 
it seem interested in enforcing related mandates, thus supporting the idea that historical 
issue framing continues to set the modern water management agenda in the Rhine region. 
The same idea holds regarding the literature on the normative diffusion of the 
human right to water. Although one can certainly argue that IWRM itself has developed 
into as a constitutive norm within the EU, as evidenced by the WFD's operationalization 
55 Kraemer, Pielen, and de Roo, "Regulation of Water Supply in Germany," 21-24. 
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and institutionalization of said norm, the human right to water garners nary a mention 
within the WFD's tenets, disproving the human rights literature in this case, since the 
WFD and all pre-existing Rhine river regimes disregard the importance of social equity 
in the provision of water. The human right to water was never considered an important 
issue within the region, perhaps because the Rhine has always offered sufficient water 
volume to serve its neighboring population or perhaps due to the relative wealth of the 
EU states and their populations' widespread connectivity to water sources, both situations 
which would render the social equity component seemingly unnecessary within the 
Western European context. As such, the pre-existing Rhine regimes never addressed the 
connection between human rights and water access, and the historical discounting of this 
issue carries over into the modern ICPR regime, in a sense legitimizing its disregard of 
one of the main IWRM policy components. 
A MODEL FOR THE FUTURE 
Today, the Rhine River serves as a heartbeat for Western Europe, supporting the 
populous by providing drinking water, as well as serving as a juggernaut of industrial 
activity. During the last century, however, that heartbeat slowed to a crawl because of a 
growth in both industry and population that polluted the Rhine with carcinogenic 
industrial effluent and raw sewage. It seemed in keeping with the Rhine's status, then, 
when General George Patton publicly urinated in the river in March of 1945 to display 
his contempt for Nazi Germany. 
To their credit, by the mid-20th century, the Rhine's riparian states recognized the 
decline of the river's health and decided to create the ICPR to mitigate the Rhine's 
pollution. Although the loose affiliations of the stakeholders within the ICPR hindered 
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the organization from producing many tangible advancements for several decades, the 
ICPR did succeed in garnering public support for the idea that the Rhine was "not just a 
geological entity - a construct of plate tectonics, volcanic activity, climatic variation, soil 
erosion, and other natural processes," but was also "a human artifact, a techno-river, 
[and] a thoroughly anthropomorphized stream in Europe."56 Over time, that first 
spontaneous regime grew to encompass a formalized set of rules and regulations, 
overseen by the ICPR, but institutionalized through the European Union's Water 
Framework Directive. The WFD enabled the ICPR to apply IWRM within the Rhine 
region, as a coherent, holistic approach to water resource management tailored 
specifically to the Rhine region, while still adhering to the larger vision governing all EU 
water sources.57 
The relationship between theory and practice in the case of the Rhine hinges on a 
number of dynamics: the role and orientation of the river's historical regimes, catalytic 
environmental disaster(s), and the intervention of a strong institutional network. Indeed, 
the Rhine is not the only European river to follow this implementation model, as the 
European Commission acknowledges that the Danube IRBD has seen more success that 
most of its counterparts as well. Since the Danube, like the Rhine, was governed by an 
evolutionary series of spontaneous to formal regimes over the past 150 years, the modern 
goals of which were influenced by the legacy of its previous regimes, the failure of other 
IRDB regimes within Europe supports the idea that the complex amalgamation of factors 
C O 
at work in the Rhine region may be necessary for IWRM implementation success. 
55 Hutzinger, ed., "The Recovered Rhine and its History," 51. 
57 Global Water Partnership, Integrated Water Resources Management, Technical Committee, TEC Paper 
4. 
58 Water Information System for Europe, Water Note 1: Joining Forces for Europe's Shared Water, 4. 
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Moreover, the case of the Rhine, and the role of the ICPR, confirms the literature's 
advocation of 'nested enterprises,' or the necessity of small working groups within a 
larger entity as a precursor to a successful mitigation of common-pool resource issues. 
Certain elements of the theoretical literature, then, speak to the success of the 
Rhine's stakeholders, although as a practical matter, those stakeholders freely 
acknowledge that the overall health of the river is still far from optimal. Their significant 
progress in terms of reaching quantitative benchmarks in the river's improvement over 
the last decade, however, suggests that, taken as a whole, IWRM implementation has 
succeeded in the Rhine River basin. Under the leadership of the European Union and the 
WFD, these stakeholders have each relinquished a portion of their sovereignty over the 
river in order to mitigate a classic tragedy of the commons situation. This abdication of 
sovereignty exists to the extent that the Rhine's majority stakeholder, the German 
government, actually amended its constitution so that its legislative process would better 
conform to the WFD and other EU legislation, rather than continue to provide 
impediments to international collaboration efforts. Hence, the successful implementation 
of IWRM in the Rhine River basin demonstrates that water, like the cooperation it has 
engendered, is truly a transboundary entity, substantiating the Aristotelian adage — 
"Boundaries don't protect rivers, people do." 
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CHAPTER V 
INDIA, THE GANGES RIVER, AND IWRM 
/ am the wind among the purifiers, and Lord Rama among 
the warriors. I am the shark among the fishes, and the 
Ganges among the rivers. 
- Bhagavad Gita (10:31) 
At first glance, South Asia's crippling water scarcity and pollution issues, coupled 
with the region's historical emphasis on the doctrine of empowerment, position it as a 
welcome partner for the IWRM policy framework.1 Despite this perceived congruity, 
however, IWRM"s application in the Ganges River Basin has proven largely 
unsuccessful due to a number of factors, including India's commitment to unilateralism 
in water management, its hegemonic dominance over the river's other stakeholders, and, 
paradoxically in terms of IWRM principles, its commitment to decentralized 
environmental policy creation. Moreover, the aggressive nature of the region's extant 
water management regimes has contravened IWRM's transboundary application. 
Relentless bilateral conflict and infighting have characterized Ganges-related stakeholder 
communication over the last sixty years, and as a result, any joint attempts to manage the 
Ganges have been few and far between. Ultimately, it is India's categorization of Ganges 
degradation as a uniquely Indian problem requiring a uniquely Indian solution that has 
hindered the multilateral collaboration necessary for IWRM's efficacious execution. 
The Ganges, unlike the Rhine, has not been governed by cooperative regimes that 
have existed for several hundred years. Instead, attempts to collaboratively manage the 
1 Biswas, Varis, and Tortajada, eds., Integrated Water Resources Management in South and South-East 
Asia, 17. 
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Ganges did not exist until the mid-20th century, and even then, those attempts were 
collaborative in name only, as regional powerhouse India manipulated and dominated any 
water management regimes with its insistence on unilateral control of Ganges water. 
Certainly, the transboundary application of IWRM could never work in such a context 
because IWRM, at its core, is a multilateral policy framework, and unilateralism 
mitigates the framework's impact and effectiveness. The theoretical literature provides 
additional insight in explaining the failure of Ganges-related water management regimes. 
The scholarship on common pool resources and collective action, in particular, inform the 
following analysis. They suggest that IWRM's failure in the Ganges River Basin is 
largely due to both the aggressive character of its historic management regimes and the 
geography of the river. The route of the Ganges natural flow, in particular, allows India 
the physical ability to exclude other stakeholders from accessing Ganges water, thus 
negating the river's existence as a common-pool resource. 
Interestingly, the failure to apply IWRM principles across all Ganges' 
stakeholders does not suggest that such principles have been completely marginalized 
throughout South Asia. In fact, the opposite holds true — IWRM as a policy model has 
found an advocate in India, the Ganges' most powerful and vocal stakeholder. Over the 
last fifteen years, India, adhering to its insistence on unilateralism, has attempted to 
independently implement certain IWRM precepts in the Ganges River Basin, essentially 
foregoing all transnational application of the framework's principles. Unfortunately for 
the health of the river, India's independent implementation attempts have been largely 
ineffective, again speaking to the significance of multilateralism in transboundary water 
source IWRM application. The story of the Ganges suggests ultimately that a 
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transboundary water source traversing more than one state requires a transboundary 
solution, and the unilateral implementation of such a solution is wholly insufficient for 
combating South Asia's 21st century water scarcity woes. 
THE GANGES: A SPIRITUAL RIVER 
Although the Ganges is one of three rivers comprising the massive Ganges-
Brahmaputra-Meghna (GBM) river system, it is perhaps the most significant of the GBM 
waterways in terms of its transboundary cultural, industrial, and ecological impacts. Its 
physical presence, for instance, is more imposing than its neighboring rivers. The 
Ganges alone drains more than one million square kilometers of China, Nepal, India, and 
Bangladesh, an area encompassing more than half of the entire GBM basin. The 
Gangotri Glacier, high within the Himalayan Mountains, serves as the source of this 
storied river, and from that glacial plain, the Ganges begins its descent into the foothills 
of northern India. It then traverses the northern and eastern portions of India, winds its 
way into Bangladesh, and joins the Brahmaputra River at the Bangladeshi town of 
Goalundo. Eventually, the Ganges and the Brahmaputra, known collectively as the 
Padma, combine with the Meghna River before all empty into the Bay of Bengal.2 
Buddhist records suggest that civilization along the Ganges began in the sixth 
century B.C., as hunter-gatherers colonized themselves in order to consolidate their 
resource bases. By the fourth century B.C., ten substantial cities had developed along the 
river's banks, and the Ganges continued to serve as the main watercourse for long-
distance trade and transportation throughout the rise and fall of the region's dynasties 
2 Saravanamuttu, "South Asia: The Ganges and the Brahmaputra," 114. 
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over the next 1,000 years.3 Today, the population residing along the banks of the Ganges 
is staggering, totaling over 45 million people.4 The majority of those people reside in 
India, and it is in this country, that the Ganges assumes its most primary geographic and 
cultural functions. India's Ganges Basin is densely populated and holds over 37% of 
India's total population, while it also traverses 861,000 square kilometers, representing 
one-quarter of India's geographic area.5 The Ganges basin system effectively drains 
eight states of India, and approximately 47% of India's irrigated land is located within the 
basin's borders.6 
The Ganges not only holds geographic significance for India, but it is credited 
with spiritual significance as well. The river is known to Hindus as 'Mother Ganga' and 
is sacred within that religious context as a "goddess, purifier, and sustainer of all life." 
Hindu legend explains the story of the Ganges creation as a sort of gift for the long and 
arduous prayers of King Bhagirathi to aid the salvation of his deceased ancestors. The 
king desired the celestial Ganges water to descend from heaven and cleanse the ashes of 
relatives who had been killed in battle, and the king's prayers and meditation eventually 
resulted in the river appearing to him in corporeal form and agreeing to descend to the 
mortal plane if someone could break her fall - a fall which would otherwise raze the earth 
with its power. Lord Shiva agreed to catch the river as it fell from heaven and eventually 
o 
released the river from his grasp, where it took its present-day form. Today, the Ganges 
serves as India's river of faith and devotion. Due to its celestial origins, millions of 
3 Alley, On the Banks of the Ganga, 54. 
4 Ibid., 51. 
Das Gupta, ed., Basin Sub-basin Inventory of Water Pollution, 5. 
Helmer and Hespanhol, eds., Water Pollution Control, 303. 
Alley, On the Banks of the Ganga, 17. 
8 Shiva, Water Wars, 132-133. 
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Hindus accept Ganges water as curative and believe the river's water to be holy because 
'Mother Ganga' "absolves worldly impurities and rejuvenates the cosmos with her 
purificatory power." 9 
Aside from its cultural significance, the Ganges serves a practical purpose in India 
and other riparian states, as it is the greatest source of drinking water for the cities, towns, 
and villages along its banks. The river also provides a majority of the water used for 
industrial development in both India and its downstream neighbor Bangladesh. The 
demand for the river's water currently stands at more than 62 billion cubic meters per 
day, and that number will only increase as the population and development level of South 
Asia increases over the next several decades.10 Currently, the combined population of 
this region is approaching 1.4 billion, and experts project an increase to 1.9 billion by 
2025.n Thus, the massive agglomerations of people in South Asia present a unique stress 
on that region's environment, and such densely placed populations, when combined with 
seasonal variations in the hydrologic cycle, exacerbate the already severe water scarcity 
issues plaguing the Ganges River.12 
WATER ALLOCATION WOES 
The water woes afflicting South Asia came to a head soon after Partition in 1948 
and have led to an almost sixty-year conflict between the Ganges' main riparian actors. 
Indeed, the roots of this conflict begin in India and end in Bangladesh, following the flow 
of the river itself. Water scarcity is the first, and perhaps most pressing cause of this 
Helmer and Hespanhol, eds. Water Pollution Control, 303. 
10 Alley, On the Banks of the Ganga, 51. 
Biswas, Varis, and Tortajada, eds., Integrated Water Resources Management, 4. 
12 Ibid., 9. 
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ongoing dispute, as the water of the Ganges depends heavily on seasonal rainfall. 
Precipitation comprises the main source of the river's flow, but 85% of this rainfall 
occurs from June to October during the monsoon season of each year. Ironically, an area 
deluged by rain four months of the year suffers from severe water shortage during the 
remaining eight. The lack of rainfall during the dry season inhibits the region's 
agricultural and industrial development and can even lessen the availability of electricity, 
as a quarter of the region's power plants are hydroelectric.14 Moreover, the uneven 
pattern of water allocation in both India and Bangladesh leads to recurrent flooding of the 
Ganges' banks; since most rainfall occurs in the four to five months of monsoon, it is 
often concentrated in several days of heavy storms.15 
Water scarcity, then, presents the most critical problem underlying the conflict 
between the Ganges' riparian actors. The extremely high level of pollution in the river, 
however, plays a secondary, but major, role as well. The little water that flows through 
the river, especially during the dry season, is so degraded that it is useless without the 
most modern water treatment technology, a luxury which the Ganges' riparian states 
cannot generally afford. In this sense, the pollution levels of the Ganges exemplify a 
tragedy of the commons situation within India, as human beings act rationally from an 
individual point of view by using the river to dispose of human, animal, and industrial 
wastes, but those actions are to the detriment of the river's collective stakeholders.16 
India's Central Pollution Control Board reports that the main sources of Ganges 
pollution include industrial liquid waste, surface runoff from solid waste landfills and 
13 Uddin Ahmad, "Forgetting Political Boundaries in Identifying Water Development Potentials in the 
Basin-wide Approach," 181. 
14 Policy Research Project, Water Resource Challenges in the Ganges-Brahmaputra River Basin, 1. 
15 Shamsul Huda, "Integrated Water Resources Management in Bangladesh," 113. 
16 Hardin, "The Tragedy of the Commons," 1442. 
87 
dump sites, and solids and liquids from religious practices such as cattle bathing and 
corpse immersion in the river. Sewage, however, stands as the primary form of point 
source pollution in the Ganges basin, as three-fourths of the river's contamination stems 
from the discharge of untreated municipal sewage directly into Ganges waters. By 
India's official standards, water containing more than 500 fecal coliform bacteria per 100 
milliliters is considered unsafe for bathing. Unfortunately, this level is exceeded on a 
regular basis; for instance, in parts of Varanasi, India, where 60,000 devotees perform 
daily ablutions in the river, the Ganges water contains 1.5 million fecal coliform bacteria 
per 100 milliliters.18 
Industrial pollution plays a significant role as well. The Upper Ganges Plain 
running through the Indian state of Uttar Pradesh is the most industrialized part of the 
river basin. Uttar Pradesh is home to sugar factories, leather tanneries, textile, food 
processing, paper and pulp industries, chemical factories, and fertilizer and rubber 
manufacturing units. Many of the chemical byproducts of these industrial processes find 
their way into the Ganges, and as a result, heavy metals and carcinogens such as 
cadmium, zinc, nickel, lead, chromium, and copper are concentrated in the river's water 
and sediment.19 
Although the situation of India's share of the Ganges seems dire, the state of 
Bangladesh is in an even more precarious position in terms of its relationship to 'Mother 
Ganga.' While the Ganges does not hold the same spiritual significance for most 
Bangladeshis, the majority of whom are Muslim, the river's physical effects loom large 
over the country. As the lowest riparian state in the Ganges basin, Bangladesh lacks 
17 Alley, On the Banks of the Ganga, 52-53. 
iSThe Economist, "India and Pollution: Up to their Necks in it," July 17, 2008. 
19 Alley, On the Banks of the Ganga, 53. 
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control over 97% of its catchment area, and it has to bear the brunt of India's pollution in 
the form of the sediment loads, industrial effluents, agro-chemicals, and sewage that pass 
through her river network. To this incoming toxic soup are added locally-generated 
industrial and fecal pollutants. Ironically, Bangladesh's natural wetland and estuary 
network could mitigate these pollutants to a certain extent, but during the dry season, 
there simply is not enough water volume to perform these cleansing functions. 
A HISTORY OF BILATERAL REGIMES 
Water allocation in this region, then, is of primary importance, and ultimately, the 
lack of the Ganges' dry season flow, even more than the river's increasing pollution 
levels, lies at the heart of the decades-old dispute between the river's primary riparian 
actors. Even during the rainy season, the river fails to hold an adequate volume of water 
for the burgeoning populations of India and Bangladesh to utilize now or in future years. 
By 2030, according to the Center for Science and the Environment in New Delhi, India 
will draw eight times the amount of water from the Ganges it does today because the 
Indian population along the river is projected to double from present levels.21 
Additionally, by the same year, Bangladesh's population will increase by 52 million 
people, making an already tenuous water-sharing situation even more dire. To their 
credit, India and Bangladesh have officially acknowledged the water allocation problem, 
but over the last sixty years, both have offered contradictory solutions to ameliorate this 
predicament. While Bangladesh has favored a multilateral solution, similar to the 
approach taken by the Rhine's stakeholders, India has advocated a bilateral solution, 
although that bilateralism exists in name only, as India has consistently violated the joint 
20 Shamsul Huda, "Integrated Water Resources Management in Bangladesh," 118-119. 
21 Hammer, "A Prayer for the Ganges," November 2007. 
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treaties it has signed with Bangladesh regarding this issue.22 In reality, an Indian 
insistence on unilateralism has characterized its historical interactions over Ganges water 
allocation. 
Certainly, the disputes over Ganges water distribution, as well as the management 
regimes they have spawned, are highly complex. The decreasing dry season flows of the 
Ganges first triggered a water dispute between India and Pakistan (now Bangladesh) in 
1951. In that year, India announced its decision to divert water from the Ganges into the 
Bhagirathi-Hooghly River on which the Calcutta (now Kolkata) Port is located. India 
planned to achieve this water diversion through the construction of a barrage, or a low 
dam, across the Ganges at the town of Farakka, about 17 kilometers from the border with 
what was then East Pakistan. India expected that the barrage would divert 40,000 cusecs 
(cubic feet of water per second) out of a dry season average flow of 50,000 cusecs from 
the Ganges in order to reduce silt levels in Calcutta Bay. In turn, this diversion would 
negate the need for constant dredging of the port area and allow for increased 
navigability. In October of 1951, Pakistan officially protested the construction of the 
barrage because of its potential effects on water availability in East Pakistan, and in 
March of 1952, the Indian government responded that the project was only under 
preliminary investigation, and that any Pakistani concern regarding the barrage was 
"hypothetical."23 
Over the next several years, Pakistan occasionally revisited the issue with India, 
but each time, India failed to respond to Pakistani concerns. Pakistan tried to overcome 
this wall of Indian resistance by proposing that the United Nations intervene and assist in 
Saravanamuttu, "South Asia," 114. 
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planning for the cooperative development of the Ganges. India turned down each of 
those proposals, though, instead insisting upon a strictly bilateral approach to 
transboundary water management with Pakistan. 
In 1970, despite Pakistani opposition, India finally completed construction on the 
Farakka Barrage, although it did not begin immediately operating the dam. The Pakistani 
government once again vociferously protested the construction of the barrage, arguing 
that its eastern province needed assurance of a present and future equitable water supply. 
In response, India denied the transboundary nature of the Ganges, asserting that instead, 
the Ganges belonged to India alone, and in any case, the Farakka Barrage would not 
cause East Pakistan to lose additional water resources because the water problems in East 
Pakistan were due to the excesses of its people, rather than a genuine water scarcity.24 
Indeed, the river's unique geography allowed India's to compartmentalize the Ganges 
into mutually exclusive units, one belonging to India and the other to East Pakistan. 
India saw the water scarcity problem in East Pakistan as a tragedy of the commons 
situation within that state alone, not as a dilemma of common interest exacerbated by 
upstream Indian withdrawals from the river.25 
From 1950 to 1970, then, the conflict over the Ganges mirrored other 
Pakistani/Indian interactions of the time, in that it was characterized by hostility and 
aggression between the two states. The situation changed in 1971, as East Pakistan 
ceased to exist and Bangladesh arose in its place, an occurrence that led to a cessation of 
the earlier Indo-Pakistani hostility that had hindered any agreement on water-sharing. In 
a new found spirit of cooperation, the governments of India and Bangladesh agreed to 
Abbas, The Ganges Water Dispute, 3. 
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establish the Indo-Bangladesh Joint Rivers Commission (JRC) in 1972, with the purpose 
of developing "the waters of the rivers common to the two countries on a cooperative 
basis."2 The question of the Ganges, however, was specifically excluded from this 
agreement because the initial mandate of the JRC prevented it from making substantive 
recommendations or addressing the key issue of water-sharing. Instead, the JRC was 
restricted to a liaison function between the two governments on flood control and other 
ancillary water projects. 
Due to the weak mandate of the JRC, negotiations over the Ganges water flow 
were left to the prime ministers of India and Bangladesh, who met in New Delhi in May 
of 1974 to discuss the Ganges issue. At that summit meeting, the two leaders officially 
acknowledged the Ganges-related water scarcity affecting both states, and both prime 
ministers agreed that during low flow months, the volume of Ganges water would have to 
be increased somehow in order to meet the requirements of the two countries. Moreover, 
they vested the JRC with the power to determine the optimum method of augmenting 
Ganges flow. The JRC was then faced with competing proposals from Bangladesh and 
India as to how this augmentation would occur. Bangladesh favored the construction of 
storage dams in Nepal to capture and store excess monsoon rains, while India advocated 
the construction of a feeder canal that would link the Brahmaputra River to the Ganges 
and help supplement the flow of the latter. At that same summit, both leaders also agreed 
that a mutually acceptable allocation diversion amount needed to be determined before 
India began to officially operate the Farakka Barrage.28 




At the next ministerial-level meeting in 1975, India requested permission to run 
the Farakka Barrage on a trial basis while discussions continued on future augmentation 
amounts. Bangladesh acquiesced, and the two sides agreed to a limited 40 day operation 
of the barrage, with diversion levels varying between 11,000 and 16,000 cusecs over a 
two-month period in 1975. Without renewing or negotiating a new agreement with 
Bangladesh, however, India continued to divert the Ganges waters at Farakka after the 
trial run, and for the next two years, at 40,000 cusecs — the full capacity of the 
diversion.29 
The consequences of India's water diversion on Bangladesh were dramatic. On 
March 29, 1976, the dry season flow of the Ganges in Bangladesh was reduced to a 
record low and as a result, the Gorei River, one of the Ganges' tributaries in Bangladesh, 
dried up completely. In retaliation, Bangladesh tried to mobilize international support for 
its cause by raising the issue at the Colombo Non-Aligned Summit and the Istanbul 
Islamic Foreign Ministers Conference to no avail, and the Bangladeshi government was 
eventually forced to lodge a formal protest against India with the General Assembly of 
the United Nations. In response to that formal protest, the UN General Assembly 
adopted a consensus statement in November of 1976, encouraging the parties to meet and 
continue negotiations on the Ganges dispute. 
Spurred by international pressure, India agreed to recommence negotiations in 
December of 1976, and a year later, both countries signed the Ganges Water Agreement 
(GWA). The GWA was a five-year water-sharing accord that provided for joint action to 
Abbas, The Ganges Water Dispute, 96-103. 
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find a long-term solution to augmentation of the river's dry season flows.31 Specifically, 
the GWA addressed allocation by stating that Bangladesh's share of Ganges water should 
not fall below 80% of whatever its unencumbered share of the water would be in any 
given season. Additionally, the JRC provided a monitoring function, with its directives 
regarding the supervision of water allocation levels, the provision of a constant data 
stream to the two governments, and the submission of an annual report on the Ganges 
status to both Bangladesh and India. Finally, the GWA tasked both sides with finding a 
long-term solution to the problem of Ganges water scarcity without providing any 
specifics on how to accomplish that goal.32 
At the end of the GWA's life in 1982, India and Bangladesh issued a joint 
communique in which both sides agreed not to extend the 1977 agreement, but rather to 
initiate fresh attempts at achieving a solution within 18 months, an objective which was 
not met. A state of limbo prevailed until November of 1985 when an Indo-Bangladeshi 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was signed regarding the sharing of the Ganges 
dry season flow. The MOU, in essence, extended the guidelines of the 1977 agreement 
through 1988 and established a Joint Committee of Experts between the two states to help 
resolve future water-sharing issues. India's proposals in this regard still focused on 
linking the Brahmaputra with the Ganges, while Bangladesh's focus still centered on the 
creation of a series of dams along the Ganges' headwaters in Nepal. Although both the 
Joint Committee of Experts and the Joint Rivers Commission met regularly throughout 
1986, no consensus was ever reached on a viable solution.33 
31 Saravanamuttu," South Asia," 115. 
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Bangladesh also asked Nepal for its input during this iteration of the negotiation 
process. Nepal, however, declined involvement in the Ganges dispute, due to its 
unrelated, but ongoing, conflicts with India. Nepal, as a land-locked state, had officially 
sought direct access to the sea in past years, but found that such access required 
cooperation from co-riparian states, along with a treaty on free navigation. Unfortunately 
for Nepal, India rejected the Barcelona Statute on the Regime of Navigable Waterways of 
International Concern in 1956, and by completing the Farakka Barrage almost two 
decades later, India's actions effectively blocked Nepal from achieving its sea-access 
goal.34 Additionally, trade and transit questions had been a continuing source of tension 
in the Indo-Nepalese relationship. In 1988, Kathmandu claimed that in response to its 
arms deal with China, New Delhi shut down 13 of the 15 transit points into India which 
were crucial for Nepal's trade and survival. The consequences of this shutdown were so 
debilitating that the IMF had to grant Nepal $9.5 billion in urgent economic relief before 
the trade points were eventually reopened.35 For its part, Bangladesh found that such 
powerful Indian leverage over the Nepalese state discouraged Nepal from becoming 
involved in the Ganges conflict, despite its riparian status.36 
During all these years without an official agreement in place, the Farakka Barrage 
remained operational, and India refused to grant Bangladesh a minimum guaranteed 
water allocation flow. Finally, in December 1996, the situation seemed to resolve itself 
when the two states agreed to sign the Ganges River Treaty (GRT). Largely based on the 
principles within the 1985 MOU, the most notable change in the GRT was the 
establishment of a new formula for calculating water distribution levels at the Farakka 
34 Zamen, ed., River Basin Development, 104-105. 
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Barrage. More specifically, the GRT states that if the flows at Farakka Barrage should 
fall below 50,000 cusecs, the two governments will meet together to consult as to the 
appropriate response, all the while taking into consideration "principles of equity, fair 
play and no harm to either party."37 The GRT also requires Bangladesh and India to 
review the sharing arrangements at five-year intervals. If the parties are not able to come 
to an agreement at one of these intervals, India is to release no less than 90 percent of 
Bangladesh's flow at Farakka until a solution is mutually agreed upon.38 The treaty, 
however, does not contain any arbitration clause to ensure that the parties uphold its 
provisions, and since the signing of the GRT in 1996, Bangladesh has repeatedly accused 
India of failing to release the amount of water agreed upon in the accord. Moreover, the 
Bangladeshi government is now seeking a renegotiation of the 1996 agreement, citing the 
harm the Farakka Barrage continues to inflict upon its population.39 
Bangladesh argues that, since its construction, the Farakka Barrage has been 
devastatingly detrimental to Bangladesh's people. In the rainy season, water releases 
from Farakka cause floods in Bangladesh, and in the dry season, the lack of freshwater in 
the Ganges basin allows salt-laden seawater from the Bay of Bengal to seep into 
Bangladesh's soils and disrupt and destroy its agricultural production.40 Bangladesh also 
contends that even in India, the barrage has had unintended negative consequences. For 
instance, the Farakka Barrage, like the hydroelectric dams on the Rhine River, has 
obstructed fish migration and led to the extinction of certain species of fish in northern 
India. Moreover, the barrage's initial justification was as a solution to save the Calcutta 
37 Ahmad, "Forgetting Political Boundaries," 192-193. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Pangare, et al., Springs of Life: India's Water Resources, 312-313. 
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Port, but it has failed to reduce silt in the port area as much as expected. Consequently, 
the Government of West Bengal in India has made the city of Haldia the main port in that 
area.41 Bangladesh contends additionally that the Farakka Barrage has had a harmful 
effect on the overall depth of the Ganges River. In 1975, the depth of the river at the 
barrage was 25 meters, while in 1997 it was only four meters, with the change completely 
due to silt accumulation at the dam site.42 
Finally, recent additional unilateral actions by India promise to further exacerbate 
Bangladesh's myriad of water scarcity problems. Over the last several years, India has 
undertaken a development project known as the Rivers Interlinking Project (RIP). The 
RIP is India's plan to link dozens of rivers throughout India by way of aqueducts and 
pumping stations that will transport water from the Ganges River to parts of southern and 
eastern India that are prone to water scarcity. Under RIP, 46 rivers across India would be 
connected by 2016 through 30 major links involving 10,000 kilometers of canals and 32 
dams. The Bangladeshi government is understandably disturbed by RIP's potential 
impact on Bangladesh, but India has, up to this point in time, refused to speak with 
Bangladesh regarding this issue.4 
SOUTH ASIA'S REGIONAL GOVERNANCE REGIMES 
As its actions over the last sixty years suggests, India, as the most powerful 
riparian state, is well aware of its influence and impact in the Ganges River Basin. 
Indeed, India's insistence on bilateral negotiations, and its resultant unilateral behavior, 
served as an attempt to prevent a further loss of sovereignty over a river it viewed as a 
41 Pangare, et al., Springs of Life, 312-313. 
42 Mizanur Rahaman and Varis, "Integrated Water Management of the Brahmaputra Basin," 63. 
43 Pearce, "Conflict Looms over India's Colossal River Plan," February 2003. 
97 
possession of its own geographic territory: For India, the Ganges is a uniquely Indian 
problem that requires an Indian resolution, and as such, the cooperative aspects of 
transboundary IWRM application have not manifested. Unlike the involvement of the 
European Union in the management of the Rhine River, regional institutions have played 
little role in the management of the Ganges conflict, despite the constant efforts of 
Bangladesh to involve them. The lack of regional regime oversight is due, in large part, 
to the historic role played by the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation 
(SAARC), the closest EU equivalent in this region. 
In the Rhine region, which provides a comparable parallel since both rivers are 
transboundary resources that involve multiple stakeholders at the state level, international 
IWRM cooperation succeeds, in part, because the EU provides enforcement authority 
"backed by coercive resources."44 SAARC, however, simply cannot play the same role 
in South Asia, as since its inception, the regional institution has lacked the regulatory 
power to intercede and enforce a transboundary solution to the Ganges conflict. 
Although SAARC s official discourse at its creation in 1985 tasked the organization with 
mitigating conflicts in the South Asian region, it was never legitimized with the 
institutional tools and scope to adequately enforce such collaboration.45 The SAARC 
Charter provides the first evidence of its weak mandate in this respect, as it states clearly 
that the principle of unanimity is the only official decisions procedure; thus, the 
institution holds no power to process or cope with dissent and disagreement among its 
members. As such, SAARC s signing members (originally Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, 
Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, and since 2005, Afghanistan) agreed on 
44Keohane, "The Demand for International Regimes," 344. 
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creating an intergovernmental institution to which they relinquished none of their 
sovereign powers.46 This decision was due to the regional hegemony of India, who 
threatened to forgo the creation of SAARC if its smaller neighbors were given the power 
of using a majority vote against it.47 Given SAARC s constrictive legislative framework 
and lack of political will, it cannot play the same role that the EU does in the Rhine 
region, rendering it impotent in the alleviation of the Ganges conflict between India and 
Bangladesh. SAARC, at this point in time, is powerless to mitigate India's unilateralism, 
even though the institution has officially endorsed multilateral water management 
through the "creation of dynamic complementarities transcending national boundaries."48 
A UNILATERAL SOLUTION 
Although the fragile bilateral/unilateral Ganges management structure does not 
complement IWRM implementation on a transboundary basis, India has decided to 
unilaterally embrace and employ IWRM principles on a national basis in an attempt to 
assuage increasing levels of Ganges pollution. India's legislative embrace of IWRM 
mandates began in 1993. Its most aggressive implementation of IWRM policy during the 
last fifteen years has been in the area of participatory governance, as India attempts to 
empower its citizens and communities in water policy decision-making. The Indian 
government even amended its Constitution to recognize local government as the 
legitimate environmental decision-maker and policy implementer. The 1993 73rd and 
74th Amendments to the Indian constitution seek to strengthen local democracy and, 
hence, ensure decentralization of governance. Specifically, these amendments allow 
46 Obino, "SAARC: The Political Challenge for South Asia and Beyond," 119. 
47 Hagerty and Hagerty, "India's Foreign Relations," 11-48. 
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municipalities (defined as metropolitan areas, smaller urban areas, and transitional areas 
between urban and rural) the power to have elected governments, to enjoy fiscal 
autonomy, and to manage their urban environments. Similarly, at the village level, the 
governance and management of the village rests on Panchayats, or bodies of duly elected 
49 
representatives. 
Moreover, the 1993 Twelfth Schedule of the Indian constitution lists urban 
planning; planning for economic and social development; public health, sanitation, 
conservancy and solid waste management; and protection of the environment among the 
powers of local authorities, and as such, further strengthens the impetus for community 
environmental governance.50 By 1997, all of India's states had amended their Municipal 
Acts to ensure the implementation of these constitutional provisions, and most 
municipalities held elections for their local governing bodies.51 Theoretically, these 
amendments allow citizens of local municipalities to develop programs and legislation to 
meet their own environmental needs, a task that was impossible in a centralized regime.52 
Within its historic and cultural context, India's embrace of the participatory 
approach is certainly logical, as it attempts to recapture the more provincial traditional 
methods of Indian water management. In the 18th and 19th centuries, for instance, local 
townships built canals themselves and relied on small-scale locally conceived and 
managed cooperative irrigation systems, such as commonly-held water harvesting 
tanks.53 With the establishment of the British Raj in 1858, the federal government 
officially usurped the ownership and management of waters, but unofficially, the 
Low, et al., eds., Consuming Cities, 188. 
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51 Low, et al., eds, Consuming Cities, 189. 
52 Sengupta and Sinha, eds., Challenge of Sustainable Development, 81. 
53 Mohile, "Integration in Bits and Part: A Case Study of India," 56. 
components of an informal water economy still dominate India's resource management. 
Informal water economies are systems in which water users depend heavily on "self-
provision, informal exchanges and local community institutions that are not under the 
direct influence of formal public institutions." Such an informal water model still 
exists in modern India, as evidenced by a 2002 nationwide survey covering almost 
80,000 households. This landmark survey found that less than 10% of Indian households 
used water from sources owned and managed by the government. In addition, less than 
20% of rural households were connected with any public or community water supply 
system, and only one in every 12 villages had any public or community water supply or 
irrigation system even available. This evidence is not uniform across India, as socio-
economic levels play a large role in whether the state manages water within a particular 
locality. For example, in Bihar, one of India's poorest states, none of the 364 villages 
surveyed had a public/community water supply, but in the somewhat richer state of 
Haryana, over half the villages surveyed had a public water supply system, and in still 
richer Goa, every village surveyed had a public water supply system available for use, 
although one must note that not every household was hooked up to that system.56 
It is precisely the informal nature of this water economy that has prevented the 
Indian government from experiencing much success with its emphasis on the IWRM 
principle of valuing water as an economic good. It is not for lack of trying, however, and 
the National Water Policy of India, initially adopted in 1987 and updated in 2002, speaks 
to this desire, as it advocates pricing priorities for different water-using sectors, defines 
54 International Water Management Institute, IWRM Challenges in Developing Countries: Lessons from 
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water as an economic good, and "proposes the use of water pricing in a manner that 
would cover the costs of investment, operation and maintenance."5? Additionally, India 
publicly supports the South Asia Water Vision, created by the Global Water Partnership, 
an outreach group co-founded by several international organizations, including the 
United Nations Development Programme. The South Asia Water Vision calls for the 
privatization of water supply, and a pricing scheme for water that correlates "the levels of 
service to the prices charged; and to effective cost recovery."58 Despite India's rhetoric 
and support of IWRM's economic aims, in reality, India's actions in this regard are 
superficial at best because most of the country's population is not served by public water 
providers, or indeed, any sort of formalized water system; thus, pricing water to manage 
the demand of the resource holds little practicality or effect.59 
GANGA ACTION PLAN 
Notwithstanding the implementation hindrances created by the nature of its 
informal water economy, India did succeed in altering its constitutional framework 
regarding environmental protection to be more reflective of IWRM's drive for local 
stakeholder involvement in the water management process. In reality, though, the results 
of this effort suggest that the constitutional reforms made by the government of India are 
more cosmetic than substantive, as the central and state governments still retain most of 
the power for devising and implementing ecologically-related regulations. In effect, then, 
local governments continue to be excluded from efforts to mitigate the degradation of 
Ganges waters. One only needs to examine India's execution of the Ganga Project 
57 Ahmad, "Forgetting Political Boundaries," 187. 
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Directorate (GPD) and the Ganga Action Plan (GAP) to see the failure of its IWRM 
implementation. 
The Indian government originally created the GPD and the GAP upon examining 
the results of a 1982 scientific study undertaken by the Central Pollution Control Board 
(CPCB), India's national pollution monitoring body. The CPCB's report detailed heavy 
land-use patterns, unacceptable loads of domestic and industrial pollution, and high levels 
of fertilizer and pesticide use in and around the Ganges River, and these unsettling results 
formed the basis of the Ganga Action Plan. Realizing the need for urgent intervention, 
the central government set up the GPD as a federal body responsible for both 
coordinating the different government ministries involved in the financial administration 
of the GAP and supervising all aspects of GAP compliance. 
State governments, in contrast, were responsible for the actual execution of GAP 
directives, and the GAP's main objective has always been to intercept and divert urban 
waste away from the Ganges River through the establishment of sewage and industrial 
effluent treatment plants, public toilets, and electric crematoria.60 Local governments, for 
their part, played very little role in the initial conception of either the GPD or the GAP, 
although as IWRM gained prominence in Indian legislative trends, certain localities 
attempted to exercise their newly granted constitutional rights regarding the pollution 
mitigation of their local Ganges waterways. Unfortunately, the exercise of 73rd and 74th 
Amendment municipality rights meant that an already largely ineffective plan, rendered 
so by clashes between federal and state bureaucracies, now had to contend with the 
wishes of local governments as well. The result was a three-tiered system of legislative 
chaos and disorder that stagnated efforts to mitigate the degradation of the Ganges. 
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A STUDY IN CHAOS AND INEFFECTIVENESS 
Upon examination of the GAP's timeline for implementation, the ineffectiveness 
of the plan becomes apparent. The first phase of the GAP began in 1985 and was initially 
scheduled to be completed by March 1990; however, due to inactivity, that deadline was 
continued until 2001, an eleven year extension. Phase I was still incomplete as of 2001, 
though, so India's central government further extended the GAP's deadline until 
December 2008. Moreover, GAP planners originally intended Phase II to begin in the 
late 1990s, and run concurrently with an extended Phase I, but as of March 2006, public 
interest litigation and judicial decisions had prevented the nationwide implementation of 
Phase II. 
A series of reports by India's Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) provides 
the most compelling evidence of the GAP's overall stagnation and ineffectiveness. By 
2004, despite spending approximately 3.5 billion rupees, the GAP had met only 39% of 
its primary sewage treatment targets. In addition, government auditors observed that only 
45% of the grossly polluting industrial units along the banks of the Ganges had installed 
effluent treatment plants, and 18% of those newly installed treatment plants did not 
function properly or failed to meet technical standards.61 
The CAG Reports also highlight the complete disconnect between Indian federal, 
state, and local authorities, a divide that runs contrary to the cooperative multilateralism 
IWRM advocates. On the federal level, the Ganga Action Plan evaluation committee met 
only twice to monitor the GAP's progress, once in 1994 and once in 1997. Federal 
enforcement of the plan's directives, then, did not exist. In addition, the Indian central 
61 Comptroller and Auditor General of India, CAG Audit Reports 2004. 
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government and GAP officials decided on dissolved oxygen content and biological 
oxygen demand as the two pertinent criteria for measuring the health of the Ganges 
River, but both of the numerical standards they chose for those criteria were below 
international World Health Organization standards, thus leaving the Indian population 
susceptible to a higher risk of waterborne disease. 
As for the role of the states in the GAP's implementation, auditors found that 
while states complained that a lack of funds was the main reason for delay and failure to 
achieve their GAP targets, many of those same states failed to spend the money they were 
initially allocated. Other states, such as Bihar and West Bengal, drew on the GAP funds 
given to them, but they misappropriated those funds and used them for non-Ganges 
related expenditures.64 Likewise, the GAP allowed states to determine which towns 
within their borders had the greatest need for sewage treatment plants, but by allowing 
for the decentralized determination of the requirements for those plants, the final list of 
approved towns and villages lacked a sense of uniformity and seemed to be based more 
on political cronyism and special interests than on actual need.65 
On the local level, the CAG observed that local communities, and Indian citizens 
in general, were either ignorant of or totally alienated from the objectives of the GAP, 
and, as a result, they did not feel a need to participate in the revitalization of the Ganges. 
Certain state governments were, in part, responsible for this lack of community 
involvement. The GAP originally called on states to establish citizens' monitoring 
committees by town, in order to increase the GAP's transparency so that the local 
populations might have some input into the pollution abatement process. The Haryana, 
63 The Statesman, "GAP between Words and Action," May 22, 2005. 
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65 The Times of India, "All Plan No Action on Ganga Clean-Up," December 29, 2000. 
Bihar, and Delhi governments, however, failed to create the citizens' monitoring 
committees in any of the towns included in the project. West Bengal, for its part, formed 
citizens' committees in only five out of 42 towns, and those five committees met very 
infrequently. 
Overall, then, the Ganga Action Plan, India's nationalized version of IWRM 
implementation, has been abysmally unsuccessful, and India's own government auditors 
place the blame on inadequate administration at every level of the federal hierarchy. To 
date, approximately 12 billion rupees have gone towards cleaning up pollution in the 
Ganges, to little effect. The Indian government, however, is still proceeding to 
implement the GAP despite present failures. To that end, the government approved the 
creation of the National Ganga River Basin Authority (NGRBA) in February 2009 as 
Phase III of the GAP (even though Phase II has not been completed) in order to abate the 
exponentially increasing levels of pollution in the river. Interestingly, the NGRBA 
parrots the rhetoric of IWRM's emphasis on the formation of River Basin Districts, and 
the Indian government claims that the NGRBA comprises a holistic approach to the 
Ganges by using "the river basin as the unit of planning." Like all other Indian action 
on the Ganges issue, however, the NGRBA is a strictly unilateral Indian creation. The 
river's additional riparian stakeholders are not considered a part of the NGRBA, so 
Bangladesh continues to suffer the deleterious effects of India's unsuccessful localized 
IWRM implementation. 
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HEGEMONY AND UNILATERALISM 
In the absence of a shared historical experience of transboundary cooperation, like 
the one that existed between the Rhine's stakeholders, a sense of realpolitik seems to 
reign in South Asian water management. Although the outcomes of both cases are 
divergent, the historical orientation of Ganges River management regimes plays a 
primary role in the success or failure of IWRM implementation, just as it did within the 
Rhine River Basin. Over the last sixty years, an approach that is bilateral in name, but 
unilateral in reality, has characterized India's Ganges water management strategy, and it 
is an approach that lies in stark contrast to the multilateral precepts of IWRM. 
The theoretical literatures on collective action, common-pool resources, and 
privatization are particularly helpful in explaining India's unilateral water policy 
implementation. Since power factors can determine which states choose to comply with 
regime objectives and which states knowingly violate those objectives, regional 
hegemons, like India, choose when and if they will comply with the regime consensus. 9 
Indeed, in the case of the Ganges, India is so dominant over all other riparian states in 
terms of its international presence, land area, population, and financial resources that it 
has the capability to dictate the terms of the regime to other actors. 
This factor, perhaps more than any other, explains India's insistence on 
bilateralism/unilateralism in the Ganges' regimes of the last sixty years. Theory suggests 
that hegemonic preferences will prevail within a regime, and the Ganges case supports 
this concept, as India, the hegemonic regional power, successfully torpedoed the creation 
70 
of effective multilateral regimes time and time again over the last several decades. Just 
69 Mitchell, "Regime Design Matters," 428. 
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as with the creation of SAARC, India refuses to allow smaller, less powerful, actors to 
form a multilateral system capable of vetoing its decisions regarding the Ganges. 
Instead, India's unilateral version of the Ganges regime takes the form of imposition, a 
notion which also connects to India's hegemonic dominance in the region. India, as 
powerful actor, has established the 'rules of the game' and forced others, namely 
Bangladesh and Nepal, to conform to these arrangements through a combination of 
"coercion, cooptation, and the manipulation of incentives," particularly through its 
71 
construction of the Farakka Barrage. 
With that weight of leverage over its rivals, there is nothing to prevent India from 
taking what it wants of the Ganges and denying its neighbors access to precious water 
resources. Amalgamating that type of regional hegemonic power with the added stress of 
severe water allocation issues attaches an additional layer of complexity to the conflict -
a complication not seen in the Rhine River Basin, which never suffered from water 
allocation disputes between its stakeholders. If water is life, then without it, populations 
and their respective states can wither away. Consequently, it does not seem hyperbolic to 
claim that states may view the availability of water as a major security issue that fails to 
open itself to a cooperative resolution. It is this acute nature of the water scarcity 
problem in South Asia, combined with the asymmetric and aggressive orientation of the 
region's previous water management regimes that renders IWRM implementation 
unsuccessful in the case of the Ganges. 
The CPR literature highlights further India's ability to force unilateral solutions to 
what is, at its core, a transboundary problem. In fact, an unusual characteristic of India's 
experience with the Ganges distinguishes it from Germany's experience with the Rhine 
71 Young, International Cooperation, 88. 
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and enables India to forgo multilateral water management solutions. In theoretic terms, 
the Rhine River comprises a common-pool resource (CPR), or a resource that is 
rivalrous, but non-excludable in practice.72 Indeed, this definition holds true in the Rhine 
River Basin because all relevant stakeholders had never faced problems of appropriation, 
having always had access to the water they needed. India's construction of the Farakka 
Barrage, along with its geographic dominance of the river, transformed the Ganges from 
a CPR into a private good, and the construction of the barrage enabled India to effectively 
hoard Ganges water and exclude Bangladesh from using the resource. In doing so, the 
regime-related claims within the CPR literature, such as the effectiveness of spontaneous 
regimes at solving environmental policy quandaries or the ability of cooperation to solve 
dilemmas of common interest and/or aversion, fail to apply to the Ganges situation. In 
essence, the Farakka Barrage negated the non-excludability characteristic of the Ganges, 
thereby negating the need, in India's eyes at least, for any type of collaboration on water 
management. 
Additionally, as the privatization literature suggests, India's effective redefinition 
of the Ganges as "private property" further speaks to the absence of transboundary 
IWRM policy in this region. The principles underlying IWRM are anathema to the idea 
of water as a private resource because "dominance of the private property concept will 
reduce, if not diminish, any interest in community projects and result in low participation 
in decision-making.73 As the India/Bangladesh conflict suggests, India's claim of private 
property rights over the Ganges do not mesh well with the idea of a shared accountability 
and interest in safeguarding natural resources between all stakeholders. 
72 Ostrom, et al., Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources, 6. 
Abu Shair, Privatization and Development, 123-124. 
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India's unilateral policy orientation extends even into its internal application of 
IWRM's principle of participatory management, to the detriment of the policy's 
implementation. The privatization literature, applied creatively, provides more insight 
into the failure of India's localized IWRM application than any other theoretical 
explanation. India took all the necessary steps, on paper in any case, to implement a 
more participatory management framework over the state's water resources. Indeed, this 
approach seems compatible with India's informal water economy, which already sees 
small communities managing their local water resources on a large-scale basis. India's 
implementation failure in this situation was in its follow-through. The Indian federal 
government required a massive change to existing water policy by supporting IWRM's 
implementation, but then failed to provide a "strong regulatory framework" to 
accompany the new policy focus.74 Just as with the privatization process, the government 
cannot simply "wash its hands and walk away" after such a policy is implemented.75 
Instead, the Indian government needed to monitor IWRM's progress on a regular basis 
and establish strict control over the implementation process, which it failed to do. The 
privatization literature also suggests that natural resource provision in states with 
fragmented governance structures may prove exceedingly difficult to regulate because 
there is no one agency or governance level designated as the overseer to a complex policy 
77 
implementation process. Instead of centralizing IWRM oversight, India's constitutional 
reforms decentralized the implementation process, rendering it wholly ineffective. 
Lovei and Gentry, The Environmental Implications of Privatization, 7. 
Ibid., 45. 
Gleick, et al., The World's Water, 2004-2005, 60. 
Parker, "Privatization and Regulation of Public Utilities," 550. 
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The literatures on CPRs, collective action, and economic privatization serve as 
helpful aids in piecing together the intricate puzzle that is IWRM implementation in 
South Asia, as they help to explain several factors contributing to the sorry state of 
cooperative IWRM implementation in South Asia. India's regional hegemony, its 
geographic control over Ganges water, the aggressive nature of the river's previous water 
management regimes, and the lack of an effective regulatory environmental policy 
framework within India all combine to transform Ganges water management into a 
fragmented chaos of management. Amidst all the policy dissonance, the degradation of 
the Ganges remains consistent — the water in the Ganges continues to disappear, and the 
little remaining water is so polluted that it is often poisonous to the human beings, 
animals, and agriculture it serves. In legend, King Bhagirathi asked that the sacred 
Ganges water descend from heaven and purify the ashes of his ancestors. It is doubtful 
that he could have imagined that, today, all relevant stakeholders seem either powerless 
or unwilling to purify and effectively protect the waters of holy 'Mother Ganga.' 
I l l 
CHAPTER VI 
CANADA AND IWRM 
When I was in space looking down on our magnificent blue 
and brown planet Earth, I realized how truly unique Canada 
is. This country with its fresh water, soil, atmosphere, and 




A metaphor provided by one of Canada's own rivers symbolizes the unique 
complexity involved in the management of this vast nation's water resources. Members 
of Canada's First Nations communities consider sacred a river in Manitoba from which 
water flows both east into the adjoining Hayes River and west into the Nelson River. The 
Cree people call this unusual circumstance the Echimamish, or 'the-river-that-flows-both-
ways.' In homage to the almost magical reversal of flow that allows for easy navigation 
between the Hayes and Nelson waterways, native people traditionally leave offerings 
each time they cross the Echimamish as a tribute to the river's dual nature.1 This duality 
echoes the polarity confronted by water administrators across Canada's expansive 
territory - in that, Canada, as a relatively water wealthy nation, still suffers from episodic 
water scarcity. 
Certainly Canada is an internationally-recognized leader in water management, 
and its water provision system ranked second out of 147 countries measured by the 2003 
Water Poverty Index — a metric using an amalgamation of a country's total amount of 
water resources, capacity for water provision, and ecological legislative protection of 
1 Newbury, "Return to the Rivers of Discovery in Western Canada," 237-248. 
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water as the barometer of its success. IWRM principles play a significant role in 
Canada's water-related success and have for many years, as Canadian water policy 
adhered to IWRM ideals decades before the United Nations introduced the management 
framework to the international community at the 1992 Rio Conference on the 
Environment. Tacit references to IWRM principles appeared in Canadian national water 
policy as early as the 1960s and continued to affect legislation over the next two decades, 
finally finding official articulation in Canada's landmark 1987 Federal Water Policy. 
Interestingly, the evolution of Canada's IWRM implementation within its own 
domestic context follows a very similar pattern to the transboundary execution of its 
Rhine counterpart, as the historical orientation of the region's previous water 
management regimes, along with an adherence to a sort of linear dialectic of regime 
sequencing have played a significant role in the Canadian experience. Canada's initial 
water management regimes were spontaneous in nature, arising out of a joint need for 
stakeholders to solve dilemmas of collaboration. Like the historical Rhine regimes, these 
early Canadian policy frameworks emphasized the IWRM components of environmental 
sustainability, interjurisdictional cooperation, and the democratization of water policy, 
although the actual implementation of these principles was hampered initially by a 
legislative push to lessen the government's role in water provision and service. A water-
related tragedy, however, forced the Canadian government's return to a more formal 
implementation of the IWRM doctrines that had characterized the historical character of 
Canada's earlier water management regimes, and like a phoenix rising from the ashes of 
privatization, IWRM in Canada was born again. 
2 Lawrence, et al., "The Water Poverty Index: An International Comparison," 11. 
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In theoretical terms, the related literatures on common pool resources and 
collective action inform the following analysis illustrate how Canada is in the process of 
successfully implementing those IWRM policies that conform to the principles advocated 
by its historical management regimes. These pre-existing regimes, with their foci on 
environmental sustainability, collaborative enterprises, and public participation, 
marginalized water's economic valuation and completely disregarded the human right to 
water in a similar manner to the Rhine's management regimes. Additionally, the 
Canadian experience mimics that of the Rhine in terms of the efficacy of regime type and 
sequencing, as spontaneous, formalized, and imposed regime creations all play a 
fundamental role in the story of IWRM in Canada. The Canadian experience diverges 
with that of the Rhine on the implementation of water-related privatization, however; 
thus, the privatization literature plays a more significant role in Canada's case than in did 
in Western Europe, as it addresses Canada's disastrous efforts to privatize water 
provision and service. 
THE TRUTH (AND FICTION) OF CANADIAN WATER 
Modern-day Canadians share a deep-seated environmental ethic and commitment 
to ecological protection. According to a 2008 Environics International public opinion 
poll, eight out of ten Canadians believe that environmental protection should be given 
priority over economic growth, and this is the highest proportion of support for the 
environment out of thirty countries surveyed. Another recent study found that care for 
the natural environment was one of only two common ideals espoused across all socio-
3 Boyd, Unnatural Law, 4. 
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economic segments of Canadian society (socialized medicine was the other).4 Even 
Canada's national iconography reflects its interest in the natural world, as the country's 
federal and provincial flags, coat of arms, and currency all exhibit images of landscape 
and wildlife. 
Unfortunately, Canada's collective ecological commitment has not always 
translated into protection for the country's freshwater resources. Such neglect is due 
largely to the widely-held perception that Canada is a water wealthy country; and in the 
Canadian consciousness the idea that water is abundant has often appeared to negate the 
need for its legislative protection. Canada's proximity to large bodies of freshwater 
ostensibly validates this opinion, and the Canadian land mass lies adjacent to six of the 
largest freshwater lakes in the world (Ontario, Huron, Erie, Superior, Great Slave, and 
Great Bear). Moreover, several large rivers traverse this huge country, most notably the 
Fraser, Tatshenshini, Mackenzie, Saskatchewan, Red, Bow, Don, Ottawa, St. Lawrence, 
and Saguenay. 
It is, perhaps, this perceived abundance that leads to the oft-cited claim that 
Canada holds 20% of the world's freshwater. In principle, this claim an honest one, but it 
is certainly misleading, as much of Canada's freshwater is either nonrenewable "fossil 
water" that has been trapped underground for millions of years in aquifers or is water that 
is solidly frozen in glaciers and inaccessible for human use. Considering these 
circumstances, Canada's actual share of the global supply of renewable freshwater is 
approximately 7%, placing it behind Brazil (with 12.4%) and Russia (with 10%) in terms 
of total available freshwater resources.5 Still, at approximately 33 million people, 
Boyd, Unnatural Law, 4. 
World Resources Institute, Freshwater Resource 2005. 
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Canada's population is relatively small in proportion to its landmass; thus, on a per capita 
basis the country has a tremendous amount of renewable freshwater available for its 
citizens. At 99,000 cubic meters per person/per year, Canada's accessible freshwater far 
surpasses the water available to people in the United States (9,277 cubic meters per 
person/per year) or France (3,408) and is staggeringly more than the amount of water to 
be had in more arid countries like Israel (389) or Kuwait (95).7 
Although it may seem counterintuitive in the face of its relative water abundance, 
Canada does in fact suffer from instances of water scarcity. The uneven distribution of 
the country's water resources is the primary cause of this scarcity, as approximately 60% 
of Canada's fresh water drains to the north, even though 85% of its population lives 
within 300 kilometers of the country's southern border with the United States. Simply 
put, fresh water is largely unavailable for use in the southern part of the country, where 
the majority of Canadians live and work. Rainfall amounts play an additional role in 
Canada's water woes. Precipitation totals in the country vary from more than 5,000 
millimeters per year along parts of the Pacific coast to less than 100 millimeters per year 
in parts of northern Canada and the prairies. Exacerbating these water shortages is the 
fact that Canadians are profligate water users, and they use the second largest amount of 
water per capita out of all the states in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) — the United States is first in this regard. This means that 
Canadians use water at a rate twice the European average and more than ten times the 
6 De Loe' and Kreutzwiser, "Challenging the Status Quo," 85. 
7 Boyd, Unnatural Law, 14-15. 
8 Sprague, "Great Wet North? Canada's Myth of Water Abundance," 25. 
9 De Loe and Kreutzwiser, "Challenging the Status Quo," 85. 
116 
water use average in Africa and parts of Asia.10 These factors combine to produce 
dilemmas of common interest in Canada which, like the Ganges River Basin, has a 
constant need of an agency or institution with the power to coordinate or to allot 
individual use of its sometimes scarce water resources." 
Allocative issues are not the only source of Canadian water scarcity. In many 
cases, physical water resources exist, but the quality of that water is extremely degraded 
due to pollution, thus rendering it almost unusable without expensive treatment. 
Byproducts from industry, farming, ranching, logging, mining, sewage disposal, and 
urban sprawl all combine to contaminate Canada's water resources.12 Billions of liters of 
raw or minimally-treated sewage are dumped into Canadian waterways every year, and 
business and industry annually discharge more than 20 million kilograms of toxic 
chemicals into the country's rivers, lakes, and streams. 
Canada's cattle industry stands as the worst offender of all the country's myriad 
water polluters. In Canada, cattle ranching produces 132 billion kilograms of manure 
annually, and the run-off from cattle farms threatens local water supplies with coliform 
bacteria, nitrates, and pesticide residue.14 Fecal coliform infiltration is perhaps the most 
pressing consequence of ranching, as it is often responsible for outbreaks of waterborne 
disease in Canada - most commonly, giardia and Cryptosporidium. Out of 423 treated 
water samples from across Canada, for example, 18.2% contained giardia, an organism 
which causes constant and debilitating diarrhea, and 3.6% contained Cryptosporidium, a 
Schindler, "The Cumulative Effects of Climate Warming and Other Human Stresses on Canadian 
Freshwaters in the New Millennium," 19. 
11 Ostrom, et al., Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources, 6. 
12Boyd, Unnatural Law, 18. 
13 Ibid., 14-15. 
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pathogen which can cause serious disease or death in people with auto-immune disorders. 
Out of the provinces, British Columbia exhibits the highest levels of these waterborne 
diseases within the Canadian state, with 27 contamination outbreaks reported in the 
province during the last 18 years.15 These waterborne diseases are especially prevalent in 
the native Canadian, or 'First Nation,' communities, where more than 20% of the water 
systems contain excessive levels of sewage and toxic pathogens. 
WATER MANAGEMENT FRAGMENTATION 
Due to well-publicized water contamination incidents in Walkerton, Ontario and, 
to a lesser extent, North Battleford, Saskatchewan, Canadians have begun to confront the 
country's 'myth of water abundance' with more honesty and concern in recent years. In 
particular, these incidents have encouraged Canadians to express a stronger commitment 
to water governance than in previous years, and a 2004 poll found that 97% of Canadians 
agreed their country should adopt a comprehensive national water policy that, among 
other things, addresses the country's uneven water distribution and pollution issues, while 
also recognizing clean drinking water as a basic human right. 
Although progress is certainly occurring, a comprehensive national water policy 
remains more of a dream than a reality due to structural cleavages within Canada's 
legislative water management framework. Much like the configuration of water 
governance in Germany and India, Canada's federal water policy hierarchy is a study in 
fragmented jurisdiction. Historically, this fragmentation has confused the actual 
implementation of water laws and legislation, while also leading to "regulatory gaps, 
Boyd, Unnatural Law, 17. 
16 Ibid. 
Bakker, ed., Eau Canada, xi. 
118 
policy vacuums, and management by crisis."18 In recent years, however, the Canadian 
federal government and provinces have begun to rectify their disjointed approach to 
water management in order to emphasize the principles of environmental sustainability, 
interjurisdictional cooperation, and policy democratization, all core IWRM components. 
For one to understand the modern context of Canadian IWRM implementation, a 
discussion of the country's legislative foundation for water governance is necessary. The 
Canadian Constitution Act of 1867 divides legislative power over water between the 
federal and provincial governments, with the provinces having the most direct 
responsibility for water management. Specifically, the Act holds that provinces and 
territories are accountable for protecting water quality, regulating drinking water systems, 
and making resource use and allocation decisions. This is not to say that each province 
governs its water resources in an identical manner; in reality, the opposite is true. Since 
the Second World War, each province has evolved its own legislative approach to water, 
and this has resulted in a large number of dissonant provincial water regimes in Canada.19 
The federal government's role in water management is more constitutionally 
imprecise than that of the provinces, as the Canadian Constitution allows the national 
government to take legislative initiative only over navigation, oceans, fisheries, federal 
waters (such as those in national parks and military bases), and certain water resources 
found on First Nations' land. Not content with the constitutional vagaries of its water 
management role, Canada's federal government sought to redefine and expand that role 
during the 20th century by utilizing the promotion of the "peace, order, and good 
government" constitutional clause as justification for assigning itself the responsibilities 
18 Muldoon and McClenaghan, "A Tangled Web: Reworking Canada's Water Laws," 246. 
19 Booth and Quinn, "Twenty-Five Years of the Canada Water Act," 65. 
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of regulating toxic substances, promoting pollution prevention, and funding water-related 
scientific research.20 The federal government also took upon itself to remedy the 
fragmentation of the country's many provincial water regimes by preserving a role for 
federal intervention in provincial water management, most specifically through the 
enactment of the Canada Water Act of 1970 and the Federal Water Policy of 1987. 
THE CANADA WATER ACT OF 1970 
With its implementation of the Canada Water Act (CWA), the federal government 
attempted to provide a structure for cooperative work between provinces on water-related 
issues, while also reserving a role for federal government mediation in the event that 
cooperation failed. Indeed, the rationale behind the introduction of the CWA may best be 
understood by a brief discussion of the legislation it replaced. The Canada Water 
Conservation Assistance Act of 1953 provided for federal financial assistance to 
provincial construction of dams and reservoirs, essentially serving as a monetary source 
for any project whose goal aimed to store water for later allocation. The 1953 Act was 
largely ineffectual, however, as only a few small flood control works qualified because 
cost-sharing disagreements between provincial stakeholders prevented the Act's 
application to major transboundary water construction projects like the proposed South 
Saskatchewan River Dam or the Winnipeg Floodway. Ultimately, both those projects 
were approved under special agreements that fell outside the purview of the 1953 
legislation, rendering the Act almost completely ineffective in terms of interjurisdictional 
collaboration.21 
Hughes, Lucas, and Tilleman, Environmental Law and Policy, Chapter 2. 
21 Booth and Quinn, "Twenty-Five Years of the Canada Water Act," 65. 
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The Canada Water Act, passed in June of 1970, was the eventual response to the 
collaborative shortcomings of the 1953 law. Rather than restricting federal participation, 
the CWA provided a structure which could be more comprehensive in its scope than 
separate federal and provincial approaches would allow. The Act consisted of four parts, 
each with its own goals and objectives. Part One allowed for joint federal and provincial 
collaboration regarding the management of water resources of "significant national 
interest." Part Two called for unilateral federal intervention if two provinces failed to 
agree on the proper management of a transboundary water resource, and Part Three 
addressed pollution, by regulating the concentration of nutrients in cleaning agents and 
water conditioners (for instance, it limited phosphates in laundry and dishwashing 
detergents). Finally, Part Four allowed for the creation of public information programs 
and advisory bodies on water management, and this component of the Act actually served 
as an early evolution of what would become the primary r\VRM principle of public 
participation in water governance. 
For all of its ambitious goals, the Canada Water Act faced serious issues of 
implementation. The CWA, for example, permitted the federal government to formulate 
management plans with respect to waters of "significant national interest," but it 
delegated no actual implementation authority for these tasks. Part Two of the Act is even 
more far-reaching in terms of federal action, as it permits Ottawa to intervene unilaterally 
in provincial water-related disputes; however, it is an act without teeth, as the 
government has failed to invoke this unilateral power even once over the past forty years. 
In reality, there is little prospect of such intervention happening in the future, given the 
22 Booth and Quinn, "Twenty-Five Years of the Canada Water Act," 66. 
121 
reaction of provincial governments, which have utilized the federal court system to 
challenge the CWA over what they see as an affront to the precarious balance between 
federal and provincial responsibility over water management.24 The Canadian courts, in 
response to these lawsuits, have sided largely with the provinces by narrowly defining the 
federal interest in water and restricting it to the particular constitutional power being 
invoked - for example requiring that "legislation passed pursuant to the fisheries power is 
indeed related to the management of fisheries rather than to wider goals of water 
management."25 
THE 1987 FEDERAL WATER POLICY 
Seemingly undeterred by the constitutional shortcomings of the Canada Water 
Act, legislators crafted a second bill that defined a more specific federal role in Canadian 
water management. The 1987 Federal Water Policy (FWP) was the result of this effort, 
and it was largely visionary in its construction, as it embodied the IWRM principles of 
stakeholder cooperation, environmental sustainability, public participation, and the notion 
of water as an economic good six years before those principles were ever institutionalized 
by the United Nations at the 1992 Rio Conference. The idea of Canada as an IWRM 
forerunner, then, arose out of an attempt to maintain a federal role among provincial 
legislative disorder. 
The origins of the FWP lie in a 1985 federally-supported panel of inquiry, which 
was given a broad mandate to travel across Canada and "identify and substantiate the 
Saunders and Wenig, "Whose Water? Canadian Water Management and the Challenges of Jurisdictional 
Fragmentation," 125. 
25 Ibid., 122. 
nature of emerging water issues, including the interjurisdictional dimensions thereof." 
The policy that emerged out of that panel's findings had a stated overall objective 
compatible with the goals of sustainable development, as it encouraged "the use of 
freshwater in an efficient and equitable manner consistent with the social, economic and 
environmental needs of present and future generations." Most interestingly in terms of 
IWRM implementation, the FWP holds obvious parallels with the much later European 
Water Framework Directive (WFD) in terms of its stated methods and objectives. 
Although there is no direct evidence that elements of the WFD were modeled on the 
FWP, correspondence between the two pieces of legislation is striking. 
The FWP's division of water sources into ecological management units based on 
watersheds, for instance, serves as an early version of the river basin district (RBDs) 
concept that has proven a success in the administration of the Rhine. Such a designation 
rests upon a secondary recommendation of IWRM - that of using the river basin as the 
primary spatial unit of water management analysis. Canada was indeed ahead of its time 
in this regard, as the use of such geographic units of analysis was not unprecedented in 
Canadian water management at the creation of the FWP in 1987. In fact, the Canadian 
federal government had recommended comprehensive river basin planning in the late 
1960s to its provinces, albeit with low levels of success. A later governmental 
assessment of that early Canadian experience with river basin planning revealed that the 
approach's major drawback was that the recommendations applied to each river basin 
were usually not prioritized - a problem further exacerbated by the fact that once a plan 
was complete, the team which had prepared it dispersed, leaving few people who could 
Environment Canada, Currents of Change: Final Report, 189. 
Ibid. 
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provide insight about priorities. Within the tenets of its 1987 Federal Water Policy, then, 
the Canadian national government utilized the lessons of its 1960s experience to improve 
the river basin management planning process, and in doing so, provide a firmer, if 
implicit, foundation for future IWRM implementation in Canada. 
The FWP called also for the establishment and application of strict evaluation 
criteria for all federally-sponsored water projects to ensure their compatibility with 
federal water management priorities, and again, the EU's WFD reproduced this trait 
within its tenets. Moreover, Canada's FWP supported opportunities for public 
consultation and participation in the water policy process, operating on the assumption 
that a well-informed public, along with clearly defined channels for public participation, 
would provide assurance that water management decisions account for the full spectrum 
of public values. To achieve effective implementation of the policy, the federal 
government designated the Interdepartmental Committee on Water (ICW) as the focal 
point for coordinating the policy among federal departments and agencies, much like the 
assignation of the ICPR in the Rhine region as the central coordinating agency 
responsible for the Rhine's management. As part of its responsibility, the ICW, like the 
International Commission for the Protection of the Rhine, was tasked with producing an 
annual report on the overall implementation of federal water policy, as well as assessing 
9Q 
the strengths and weaknesses of that policy's execution. Furthermore, the assignation of 
the ICPR as a static agency in charge of the planning process for the Rhine River Basin 
mitigated the concern with transitory planning regimes that had hampered early IWRM 
implementation in Canada. 
28 
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At the same time, the FWP called for improved federal-provincial coordinating 
mechanisms and bilateral arrangements in the water management field, including 
consultation and information exchange through interjurisdictional forums such as the 
Water Advisory Committee of the Ministers of the Environment (CCME) and 
intergovernmental agreements for cooperative programs with all provinces/territories.30 
The 1987 Policy, like the 1970 Canada Water Act, also created a mediation role for the 
federal government in the case of provincial disagreements over water management when 
the jurisdictions involved tried, but failed, to reach an agreement.31 Again, the much 
newer WFD echoed all of these legislative components, simply substituting the institution 
of the European Union in place of the Canadian federal government; thus, transforming a 
national policy into one applicable in an international context. Finally, Canada's FWP 
emphasized the strategic pricing of water through the establishment of a "fair value" for 
water, meaning a call for water prices to include the real value of the resource and its 
delivery systems, and the promotion of the "polluter pays" principle, both ideals espoused 
by the WFD twenty years later.32 
Canada's 1987 Federal Water Policy, then, served as a precursor to later IWRM-
specific legislation, as it tacitly advocated three of the four IWRM principles - those of 
environmental sustainability, the democratization of water policy, and the economic 
management of water, all within the context of interjurisdictional cooperation. Moreover, 
in yet another remarkable similarity to the WFD, the FWP ignored the role of social 
equity in the water management equation, perhaps speaking to the fact that Canada's 
relatively privileged economic status allowed the vast majority of Canadian citizens to 
30 Environment Canada. Federal Water Policy. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid. 
benefit from the country's excellent water infrastructure, a condition that negated the 
need to institutionalize this principle in legislation. Unlike the European Union's Water 
Framework Directive, however, Canada's Federal Water Policy found no success in its 
first incarnation, as a wave of privatization swept the Canadian federal government 
during the next decade and mitigated the effectiveness of the 1987 policy. Until the 
Walkerton tragedy at the turn of the 21st century, the FWP remained little more than a 
statement of good intentions rather than a fully realized water management framework. 
THE PARADOX OF PRIVATIZATION 
During the 1990s, a newly-appointed federal administration led by Progressive 
Conservative Premier Mike Harris advocated the popular neoliberal economic agenda of 
the 'Washington Consensus' as a guiding principle of Canadian governance.33 Premier 
Harris and his administration believed that by emphasizing deregulation, privatization, 
and fiscal austerity, the Canadian budgetary outlook, which was besieged by deficits 
during that decade, would improve. As a consequence, this new policy focus 
marginalized the FWP's emphasis on an increasing federal role in water policy; instead, 
the new government supported the privatization of certain aspects of water management 
and sold it to the Canadian public as a "toolbox" of techniques from which the 
government might draw those methods most appropriate to meet the task of efficiency.34 
In this model of distributive governance, the role of the Canadian state transformed as it 
shifted decision-making to the lowest, most local, level and increased the reliance on the 
private sector to provide effective water management and service.35 
33 Stiglitz, Globalization and Its Discontents, 16. 
34 Feigenbaum and Henig, "The Political Underpinnings of Privatization," 185-186. 
35 Paquet, "Straws in the Wind," 76. 
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A legislative movement known as the 'Common Sense Revolution' (CSR) 
typifies the policy climate in Canada during that time. The CSR operationalized the 
policy components of the 'Washington Consensus,' and in essence, represented a push to 
provide Canadians with more service for less government. The subsequent creation of 
the Red Tape Commission, established in November 1995, became the policy vehicle of 
the CSR, as it identified areas of government "waste" and forced those particular 
departments to severely reduce their budgets. Environmental organizations and agencies 
became primary targets in this effort to reduce the size and role of government, and these 
organizations faced cuts of anywhere from 30% to 65% to their operating budgets. 
THE RISE AND FALL OF THE P3 
The specter of federal budget cuts meant that provinces received less money to 
help subsidize state-provided water treatment, leaving many municipalities struggling to 
fund their water treatment facilities in the midst of declining governmental revenues. To 
solve this dilemma, the mid-1990s saw several Canadian municipalities sign contracts 
with private companies for water supply and sewer management. These T3s' were 
public-private partnerships where the government retained ownership of supply networks, 
while contracting with private companies for a defined period of time to design, build, 
operate, or manage components of a public water supply system.37 Theoretically, the P3s 
were to deliver infrastructure and services more efficiently and at a lower cost than 
government provision of the same service, and in Canada, the trend toward P3s on the 
municipal level was very much a reflection of the fiscal policies advocated by the Red 
36 O'Connor, Report of the Walkerton Inquiry: Part 1," 462-463. 
37 Bakker, "Commons or Commodity? The Debate over Private Sector Involvement in Water Supply," 
185. 
Tape Commission. The most notable instance of a P3 emerging out of an increased 
desire for efficiency in water production was the contract that Hamilton, Ontario signed 
with Philip Utilities Management Corporation (PUMC) in December of 1994. This ten 
year agreement transferred responsibility for the operation, management, and 
maintenance of Hamilton's water and sewage system to PUMC, and at the time it was 
signed, the deal was the largest P3 agreement of its type in North America. 
As a requirement of the contract, PUMC promised to safeguard Hamilton's water 
resources, while also providing new jobs in the water treatment industry for the city's 
citizens. Instead, PUMC slashed its workforce by 50% within eighteen months, spilled 
180 million liters of raw sewage into the city's harbor, and flooded 200 homes and 
businesses by way of substandard water pipe maintenance.39 Additionally, PUMC's 
inadequate management of Hamilton's wastewater treatment plant caused the city's 
sewage effluent to often exceeded limits for phosphorus discharge, and these excessive 
phosphorus levels caused eutrophication and subsequent fish kills in local waterways. In 
response to PUMC's many ecological mishaps, environmental fines against the company 
mounted.40 
It did not help matters that, due to a series of corporate buyouts, the contract kept 
changing hands. During PUMC's tenure, the contract shifted five times, at one time 
landing with a subsidiary of Enron, and ending with German company RWE as the 
provider in charge at the time of the contract's renewal in 2004. During the renewal 
period, the Hamilton City Council chose initially to try the private option again and 
38 Bakker, "Commons or Commodity? The Debate over Private Sector Involvement in Water Supply," 
185. 
39 Anderson, Privatizing Water Treatment, 4. 
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instructed city managers to invite proposals from all bidders. These new bids were 
required to estimate costs for the city's newly proposed contract which addressed some of 
the problems of the previous agreement, including establishing liability in the case of 
another sewage spill, requiring liability insurance to be carried by the operator, and 
requiring the private operator to pay for routine system maintenance and upkeep. This 
new contract attracted American Water as its sole bidder, and the company presented a 
price that was three times the estimated cost of providing the service. At that point, the 
City of Hamilton opted to bring water management back into the public sector and run 
the water treatment and wastewater plants itself.41 
The return to public operation of Hamilton's water and wastewater treatment 
saved the city at least $1.2 million in its first contract year and also improved the quality 
of wastewater effluent in Hamilton, as levels of phosphorus in the sewage effluent were 
down 75% in 2005 from 2004 levels.42 In Hamilton's case, then, it rang true that state 
governments, rather than competitive market instruments, were more suited to providing 
services that a private company like PUMC did not have the incentive or means to 
efficiently supply and allocate.43 Regardless, the negative privatization experience of the 
City of Hamilton seems to have soured the Canadian public on such ventures. Since 
Hamilton, there have been repeated protests, intense lobbying campaigns, and negative 
media attention against attempts to privatize water utilities in both Halifax and 
Vancouver, and today, most Canadian municipalities appear committed to the public 
provision of water and wastewater treatment over what are perceived to be more 
expensive and less effective private options. 




Although the experiences of cities like Hamilton have led to a virtual 
abandonment of private water provision across much of Canada, another type of 
privatization had an even more lasting effect on Canadian IWRM implementation. At the 
behest of the Harris administration in the mid-1990s, the Red Tape Commission required 
all government agencies to identify the basic functions needed to continue "effectively" 
serving the Canadian citizenry. For its part, Environment Canada identified its three 
main functions as the provision of policy, science, and service, but in the face of fiscal 
austerity, it expressed the wish to maintain the capacity for policy and science and to 
reduce the provision of service. In terms of water management, this diminution of 
service meant significant reductions in water quality monitoring. Before the budgetary 
cuts, the federal government provided each province in Canada with funds to operate 
several scientific laboratories tasked with monitoring water quality from Canadian cities 
and towns. After the 'Common Sense Revolution,' the government farmed out the job of 
water quality oversight to private laboratories which, the Red Tape Commission 
theorized, could provide the service more efficiently and at less cost to the Canadian 
taxpayer.45 Unfortunately for some of Canada's citizens, the privatization of water 
quality monitoring had deadly consequences, most specifically in the towns of 
Walkerton, Ontario and North Battleford, Saskatchewan. The cumulative effect of both 
tragedies prompted a reexamination and, ultimately, a discarding of the efficacy of 
privatization in Canadian water management and a reestablishment of a more prominent 
federal and provincial role in Canada's water policy framework. 
Bruce and Mitchell, "Broadening Perspectives on Water Issues," 4. 
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THE WALKERTON TRAGEDY 
The Walkerton tragedy, more than any other water-related incident in modern 
Canadian history, served as the catalyst that sparked a return to the IWRM principles of 
environmental sustainability, public participation, and interjurisdictional cooperation in 
Canadian water management. For residents of Walkerton, Ontario, a small town of 
approximately 5,000 people, the Victoria Day weekend in May 2000 heralded the start of 
summer. This was not a Victoria Day like all others, however, and by the Monday 
morning following that year's holiday, Walkerton's first resident had died from drinking 
contaminated water — that death only a precursor of the epidemic of waterborne illness 
that was to grip the small town.46 
At that time, like 80% of municipal water systems in Ontario, Walkerton's 
drinking water supply was managed by a publicly-run utility chartered and funded by 
both the town itself and the Province of Ontario. In Walkerton's case, a combination of 
elected representatives headed the town's Public Utilities Commission (PUC), while staff 
hired by those elected officials managed the utility's daily operations. Perhaps not 
unusual given Walkerton's small population size, two brothers, Stan and Frank Koebel, 
were primarily responsible for administering Walkerton's water utility, with Stan as the 
general manager of the Walkerton PUC and Frank as its foreman. 
The week leading up to that year's Victoria Day had been filled with heavy rain. 
In Walkerton, a rural area where cattle farms surrounded many of the town's water 
sources, water quality tests provided an essential service in measuring the danger 
presented by the runoff from those farms. On Saturday, May 13, 2000, the first day of 
Victoria Day weekend, Frank Koebel was tasked with completing a daily measurement of 
46 Prudham, "Poisoning the Well," 343. 
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the chlorine residuals in Walkerton's well no. 5. At the time, well no. 5 served as the 
primary source of the town's water, and like all well water in Walkerton, well no. 5 was 
supposed to be disinfected every day by the use of sodium hypochlorite.47 In standard 
operating procedure, a PUC employee would add sodium hypochlorite (a type of 
chlorine) to the well water, and he or she would then test the well's chlorine residuals to 
determine its viability as a healthy water source. While a measurement of high chlorine 
residuals suggests a low level of contamination, a measurement of low to no residuals 
indicates the presence of bacteria in the water, since chlorine dissipates as it eradicates 
contamination. Unfortunately for the people of Walkerton, Frank Koebel did not 
measure chlorine residuals that day nor in the days that followed, instead entering false 
information in log books kept by the utility. Two years later, the official inquiry into the 
Walkerton outbreak found that Walkerton PUC employees routinely entered a chlorine 
residual of 0.5 mg/L or 0.75 mg/L, even though they were actually setting the chlorine 
dosage much lower than that, and in some cases failing to add any chlorine at all, in 
response to complaints from the residents that there was "a chlorine taste in the water."48 
According to the court testimony of PUC manager Stan Koebel, this type of record 
falsification had occurred unabated for twenty years.49 
Frank Koebel's failure to perform the chlorine residuals test on May 13 meant 
that Walkerton's public utility was unaware contaminated water from cattle runoff was 
entering the town's water distribution system. Two days later, on May 15, PUC 
employees collected routine water samples from well no.5 and sent them to A&L 
Laboratories - the private lab contracted by the Walkerton PUC to conduct 
47 O'Connor, Report of the Walkerton Inquiry: Part 1, 57. 
48 CBC News, "Walkerton Inquiry: Sterling grilled about responsibility," June 28, 2001. 
49 O'Connor, Report of the Walkerton Inquiry: Part 1, 57. 
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microbiological analysis on the town's water. On May 17, A&L informed Stan Koebel 
that there were high levels of the deadly bacteria Escherichia coli 0157:H7 (E. coli) in 
the water system, but Mr. Koebel chose to remain silent in the face of this report and 
failed to notify the town's managers or the provincial public health authorities about the 
contamination of Walkerton's water.50 
On May 20, in response to inquiries from the regional Ministry of Health Office, 
which by that time was inundated with reports of E. co/z'-related illness, Stan Koebel 
flooded the well-water system with chlorine until adequate residual levels were restored. 
Mr. Koebel did not, however, make a statement to the public regarding the health of 
Walkerton's water, nor did he acknowledge or report the documented presence of E. coli 
to Ontario's Ministry of the Environment (MOE). In fact, he failed to provide the results 
of the A&L Laboratory tests to the MOE until those results were directly demanded by 
Ministry staff on Monday, May 22.51 Moreover, when the MOE initiated an investigation 
of the Walkerton water system on May 22 and May 23, PUC employees, under the 
direction of Stan Koebel, altered the daily operating sheets to conceal the fact that many 
of the city's wells had operated without chlorination for the past several months.52 
By the time authorities were able to contain and eradicate the E. coli outbreak, 
seven Walkerton residents had lost their lives, and at least 2,300 had fallen seriously ill.53 
Stan Koebel later admitted that that "mistakes were made and things were done 
improperly" throughout his tenure as head of Walkerton's PUC, confirming that he 
falsified water safety test results, mislabeled water samples, submitted false annual 
50 O'Connor, Report of the Walkerton Inquiry: Part 1, 57. 
51 Prudham, "Poisoning the Well," 350. 
52 O'Connor, Report of the Walkerton Inquiry: Part 1, 57. 
53 Ibid. 
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reports to Ontario's MOE, and operated wells without any chlorination.54 Koebel 
claimed that, in hindsight, he should not have been the top executive at the public utility 
because he lacked the education to run the town's water system.55 In the end, 
investigators found that Mr. Koebel was not even aware of the existence of E. coli 
0157:H7, nor that this bacterium was potentially lethal, and his own behavior supports 
this finding of ignorance. In the days following the outbreak and after he had received 
the results of the A&L water quality test, Stan Koebel drank water from both a fire 
hydrant and a garden hose and filled his daughter's swimming pool with the 
contaminated water, all of which are unthinkable behaviors for someone aware of the 
potential consequences of E. coli infection. Three years after the E. coli outbreak in 
Walkerton, the Canadian government charged Stan and Frank Koebel with several crimes 
relating to public endangerment and falsifying records. Both Koebel brothers were 
convicted, and Stan Koebel was sentenced to a year in prison, while Frank Koebel 
received six months of house arrest. 
The 2002 federal inquiry into the Walkerton tragedy established the Koebel 
brothers' culpability and suggested that along with the brothers' negligence, the 
governmental move to privatization was responsible for the Walkerton tragedy. First, the 
provincial government reduced its environmental inspections of water systems during the 
1990s due to staff cutbacks, leaving Walkerton's history of falsified water quality reports 
to go unnoticed. Of even greater consequence was the closure of 13 government-
operated public health laboratories that provided routine microbiological testing of 
drinking water for Ontario's municipalities. In Walkerton's case, a provincial laboratory 
54 O'Connor, Report of the Walkerton Inquiry: Part 1, 183. 
55 CBCNews, "Walkerton Water Tests Regularly Faked: Koebel," December 20, 2000. 
56 O'Connor, Report of the Walkerton Inquiry: Part 1, 183-184. 
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in Palmerston, Ontario tested water quality samples for the town before September 1996. 
As part of the aforementioned Red Tape Commission and its accompanying push for 
privatization, however, the province of Ontario felt the need to close these government-
run water testing labs. This move left local water utilities, like the Walkerton PUC, 
scrambling to find private labs to provide the same service. 
The federal inquiry into Walkerton concluded that during this privatization 
transition, the federal and provincial governments failed to enact a regulation obligating 
private labs to report contaminated water test results to governmental authorities due to 
the Red Tape Commission's general "distaste for regulation."57 Due to these regulatory 
oversights, when A&L Laboratories found E.coli in Walkerton's water supply, it did not 
warn provincial officials because it was not required to do so. As a result of this inaction, 
health authorities required six extra days to figure out what was making so many people 
CO 
sick, and by that time several people had died from their exposure to the contamination. 
A water contamination incident in North Battleford, Saskatchewan in 2001 further 
supported the conclusions of the Walkerton inquiry. In April of 2001, the city of North 
Battleford (population 15,000) faced an outbreak of the Cryptosporidium parasite in its 
public water supply, and this contamination killed three people and sickened over 6,000. 
Authorities later determined that the release of untreated sewage from the town's 
"antiquated" wastewater treatment plant into the North Saskatchewan River near the 
city's drinking water intake facility caused the outbreak.59 
Much like the Walkerton tragedy, a federal inquiry into the North Battleford 
incident was launched and found that regulatory failures due to provincial budget cuts 
57 O'Connor, Report of the Walkerton Inquiry: Part 1, 368. 
58 CBCNews, "Walkerton Inquiry: Sterling Grilled about Responsibility," June 28, 2001. 
59 Province of Saskatchewan, The North Battleford Water Inquiry, 12. 
had contributed to the Cryptosporidium contamination. Specifically, Saskatchewan, like 
Ontario, had discontinued routine government inspections of water and wastewater 
treatment plants in the mid-1990s in favor of a "risk-based" approach, where only the 
municipalities that requested inspections received them. This was a cost-cutting measure 
employed as a result of the Red Tape Commission. Due to its implementation, the North 
Battleford water treatment plant had not been inspected in ten years at the time of the 
outbreak, allowing its continued operation of outdated filtration technology. 
Additionally, the federal inquiry found that the expertise of the waterworks' employees 
was inadequate, and because employees were not aware of the newest water treatment 
protocols, they did not follow proper procedure, a failure of operation that allowed the 
Cryptosporidium outbreak to occur.60 One witness even testified that expertise at the 
plant was so lacking that the plant was seemingly run "by the seat of the pants," with no 
discernable order or hierarchy of decision-making. ' 
It is difficult to overstate the significance of the Walkerton, and to a lesser extent 
the North Battleford, contamination incidents, as both served as failures of "expert 
systems" in Canadian water governance and prompted a reexamination of the 
governmental role in water policy. Indeed, the federal inquiries in both cases laid the 
blame for the contamination squarely on the neoliberal agenda of the Progressive 
Conservative government of the 1990s, as they bemoaned the negative effect that 
privatization had on protecting both the environment and the public health.63 In light of 
these two tragedies and after the loss of public confidence following them, the federal 
60 Laing, Report of the North Battleford Inquiry, 5. 
61 CBCNews, "North Battleford Water Inquiry Hears Final Testimony," January 14, 2002. 
Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, 84. 
63 Neufeld and Mulamoottil, "Groundwater Protection in Canada: A Preliminary Inquiry," 15-22. 
government pressured Canada's provinces to revisit their collective policies on subjects 
ranging from drinking water safety to water allocation to the environmental sustainability 
of watersheds, all directives that opened the door for a renewed policy emphasis on 
IWRM. 
THE REBIRTH OF IWRM IN CANADA 
In the wake of the Walkerton and North Battleford incidents, Canada's renewed 
IWRM implementation has focused on framework principles espoused by earlier 
Canadian legislation - those of environmental sustainability, public participation, and 
interjurisdictional collaboration. In terms of sustainability, the Canadian federal 
government has created a number of funding mechanisms that foster IWRM 
participation. Perhaps the most prominent of these is the Canada Strategic Infrastructure 
Fund (CSIF), an account of $4.3 billion created in 2003, which serves as an 
implementation apparatus for IWRM's environmental sustainability principle. The 
Fund's objectives in terms of water management are providing for "safe, clean, and 
reliable drinking water," and the "environmentally responsible and sustainable treatment 
of wastewater," as well as "improving] water and wastewater facilities to not only 
benefit the quality of life and the health of Canadians, but to also help protect aquatic 
habitat and promote economic growth."64 
The Canadian federal government, under the auspices of its 'Infrastructure 
Canada' department, uses the CSIF to propagate the application of mandatory IWRM 
criteria in all municipalities applying for water-related CSIF grants and loans. The Fund 
requires municipalities applying for CSIF funding to develop and submit an integrated 
64 Infrastructure Canada, "CSIF Program Details." 
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watershed management plan that demonstrates long-term sustainability objectives. Like 
the ICPR's Rhine River Basin Management Plans, the CSIF planning process calls for the 
establishment of clear goals and objectives regarding future water management, the 
design of implementation programs to meet those objectives, and the formulation of an 
empirical method for measuring implementation progress. 5 
Additionally, since the Walkerton tragedy, the federal government has begun to 
operationalize the arbitration role it attempted to create for itself in the 1987 FWP by 
creating a number of interjurisdictional organizations that allow for stakeholder 
collaboration on specific water issues with transboundary provincial implications. These 
organizations conform to the "nested enterprise" concept found in the CPR literature, as 
they, like the ICPR in the Rhine region, function as places where "individuals are 
organized through smaller groups that are then organized into larger groupings." 66 Such 
nested enterprises are meant to redeploy the large number of Canada's collective water 
management actors into smaller, more targeted groups that will serve the personal needs 
of local stakeholders with more efficiency. 
In Canada, many of these nested organizations and councils have existed for 
several decades, but languished until the catalytic effect of Walkerton. The Canadian 
Council of Ministers of the Environment (CCME) is perhaps the most well-known 
example of this type of organization, as it was initially created in 1987 as part of the 
FWP, but was essentially disbanded during the 1990s 'drive to privatize.' Experiencing 
resurgence after Walkerton, the CCME is not a governing body per se, but it is an 
important collaborative institution through which the provinces, territories, and federal 
Infrastructure Canada, Integrated Water Resource Management: Research Note, 1-2. 
Keohane and Ostrom, eds., Local Commons and Global Interdependence, 22. 
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government discuss and act on common approaches to many environmental priorities. In 
that vein, the CCME has become a cooperative vehicle for water-related research, the 
development of water quality guidelines, and better linking of networks that monitor 
water quality across Canada. Composed of the environment ministers from the federal, 
provincial and territorial governments, the CCME has 14 members who meet at least 
once a year to discuss national environmental priorities and determine work to be carried 
out under the purview of the organization. Since the organization lacks any element of 
enforcement power, however, its approach to water governance is generally consensus-
based.67 
The Prairie Provinces Water Board (PPWB) serves as another notable cooperative 
organization that has been revamped since the Walkerton tragedy. Initially, the provinces 
of Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba, along with the federal government, recognized 
the need for cooperative management of shared waters in 1948, with the signing of the 
Prairie Provinces Water Board Agreement. From 1948 to 1969, the Board recommended 
the best allocation arrangements of interprovincial waters, although its recommendations 
were not binding and were seldom invoked in provincial water management. After 
Walkerton, however, the PPWB created a new mandate. As outlined in the 
organization's new charter (signed in February 2006), that mandate is to ensure that 
interprovincial waters are protected and equitably apportioned; protect the aquatic 
ecosystem and the sustainability of transboundary aquifers, provide a forum for 
information exchange in order to prevent or resolve conflicts; and promote cooperation in 
interprovincial water management.68 Like the CCME, the PPWB works by consensus, 
67 Muldoon and McClenaghan, "A Tangled Web: Reworking Canada's Water Laws," 251. 
68 Environment Canada, "Prairie Provinces Water Board." 
and its board members are senior water administration officials in Alberta, Saskatchewan, 
Manitoba, and the federal Departments of Environment and Agriculture. 
Similarly, the Mackenzie River Basin Board (MRBB) exists to aid in the 
implementation of the Transboundary Waters Master Agreement of the same name, an 
accord which forms the basis for cooperation in protecting and addressing the water 
quantity and quality of an aquatic ecosystem that covers one-fifth of Canada. Unlike the 
CCME and the PPWB, the MRBB is a relatively new creation emerging slightly before 
the Walkerton incident, and the parties to the MRBB have committed to five principles, 
all concomitant with the precepts of IWRM. These principles include maintaining the 
ecological integrity of the aquatic ecosystem; managing the use of the water resources in 
a sustainable manner; providing for early and effective consultation, notification and 
information on water-related issues; and resolving disputes on a cooperative basis. Its 
members include representatives from the Canadian federal government, as well as the 
provinces of British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, the Northwest Territories, Yukon, 
and the First Nations community. The MRBB prides itself on the strength of its 
interjurisdictional partnerships, the participation of Aboriginal members (it is one of the 
only cooperative water organizations in Canada to allow First Nations membership), and 
its focus on maintaining the ecological integrity of the whole basin. Like other 
cooperative forums, the MMRB gained traction after the Walkerton incident, and one of 
its major achievements since the year 2000 is the drive to standardize water quality 
monitoring techniques in its member provinces.71 
Environment Canada, "Prairie Provinces Water Board." 
Environment Canada, "Mackenzie River Basin Board." 
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The Walkerton tragedy also served to reintroduce the idea of involving the 
Canadian public in water policy, allowing for the realization of yet another key IWRM 
principle. Since Walkerton, many federal, provincial, and territorial environmental 
statues now enshrine public participation in water legislation. The Canadian 
Environmental Protection Act (CEPA), for instance, requires federal environmental 
officials to publish a list of newly proposed regulations in the Canada Gazette, the 
official newspaper of Canada's federal government. Within sixty days of publication of a 
regulation, any person may file a notice of objection requesting a review, and this is part 
of a "prior approval" approach. Recently, six of Canada's ten provinces have parroted 
the federal government on this issue and have adopted the prior approval approach to 
help enhance IWRM's effectiveness with respect to public involvement in environmental 
management.72 
Finally, the Canadian federal government employs technology to enhance public 
participation in the water management process. To this end, the federal government 
created ResEau, a website that provides Canadians easy access to a variety of freshwater-
related information. The website's managing board spans several governmental 
departments, including Environment Canada as the lead, with Health Canada and Natural 
Resources Canada as secondary managers. The mandate of ResEau is to "support clean, 
safe, and secure water for all Canadians and ecosystems."73 Specifically, the website 
provides access to both quantitative data and analytical texts collected from a variety of 
governmental and private water information sources and delivers them in a multifaceted 
Shrubsole and Draper, "On Guard for Thee? Water (Ab)uses and Management in Canada," 46. 
Environment Canada, "ResEau: Building Canadian Water Connections." 
141 
platform to reach all Canadian citizens "from school children to professional water 
managers. 
CANADA AND WESTERN EUROPE PARALLELS 
Canada as a nation and water as an element seem inextricably intertwined. The 
country's large amount of freshwater, its early emphasis on IWRM policy principles, and 
its general respect for ecology and the natural world all suggest that Canada and IWRM 
are complementary entities. The international community even recognizes Canada's 
recent progress and prominence on freshwater policy issues and awareness. In 2003, the 
United Nations (UN) ranked Canada's water as one of the best managed water systems in 
the world. Five years later, the UN chose Canadian water policy expert Maude Barlow to 
serve as its "water czar," a position created to advise the international community on 
global water policy issues. In this position, Ms. Barlow has repeatedly invoked aspects 
of Canada's water policy as a model for the rest of the world.75 
When one discounts this type of anecdotal evidence, however, it is too early to 
conclude that Canada has in fact reached a high level of IWRM implementation success. 
All one can say for certain is that Canada's IWRM implementation is strikingly 
analogous in many respects to IWRM implementation in Western Europe's Rhine River 
Basin in terms of the fundamental roles played by historical regime orientation, the linear 
dialectic of regime sequencing, and the presence of a water-related tragedy as a catalyst 
for change. Certainly, the theoretical literatures on CPRs and regime creation are 
enlightening in this respect, as they help to illuminate some key factors underlying these 
accomplishments. First, the historical orientation of Canada's water management 
74 Environment Canada, "ResEau: Building Canadian Water Connections." 
75 CBCNews, "Maude Barlow Named 1st UN Water Advisor," October 21, 2008. 
regimes, like those of the Rhine basin, has favored the IWRM principles of 
environmental sustainability, stakeholder collaboration, and public participation. 
Canada's federal water management framework even legitimized these particular IWRM 
components through numerous legislative efforts years before the United Nations 
advocated those principles in the context of global water policy. After Canada's failed 
privatization experiences and the Walkerton tragedy, the newly emergent regimes 
governing Canada's water resources emphasized those same IWRM components, as they 
were influenced by the historical model set by their antecedents. 
Additionally, Canada's IWRM implementation, like that of the Rhine basin, 
disregards the principle of social equity in water management. The Canadian 
government's historical water-related regimes paid no attention to the human right to 
water, perhaps because the population it governed had long maintained widespread 
connectivity to water sources, rendering the social equity component seemingly 
unnecessary within the Canadian water policy framework. As such, the country's pre-
existing water management regimes never addressed the connection between human 
rights and water access, and the historical discounting of this issue carries over into 
Canada's more recent IWRM implementation endeavors. 
Likewise, both the Canadian and Rhine water management frameworks pay lip 
service to the importance of water pricing, but neither has made strides in executing any 
type of pricing reform. In Canada's case, the 1987 FWP called for the redefinition of 
water as an economic good, but in the ensuring years since the policy's creation, the 
federal and provincial governments have taken little action on this directive, even in the 
wake of Walkerton. Prices for water in Canada are set provincially or regionally for 
143 
industrial and agricultural users, and locally for municipal water users, just as they have 
been for the last several decades. Under this system, Canadians enjoy the cheapest water 
prices in the industrialized world, and the OECD has chastised Canada repeatedly for its 
profligate and heavily subsidized use of water and its refusal to charge prices that reflect, 
at a minimum, the costs of water supply infrastructure. Indeed, the OECD describes 
Canadian water unflatteringly, remarking that it is "cheaper than dirt." 
The method used for pricing water in Canada contributes to the country's high 
levels of water use as well. Fifty-six percent of Canadian utilities charge a flat rate for 
water, meaning consumers pay the same amount regardless of how much they use. 
Another 13% of Canadian utilities charge a declining block rate, which means the more 
consumers use, the lower the price per unit becomes; in essence providing a bulk 
discount for water usage. The fact that only 57% of Canadian households have their 
water usage metered at all only serves to exacerbate the situation. In major cities like 
Vancouver and Montreal, that figure is less than 1%.77 
Since the introduction of the Federal Water Policy in 1987, and more 
significantly, since the Walkerton tragedy in 2000, no major initiatives involving pricing 
have arisen to reduce water consumption. Arguably, as in the case of the Rhine, the 
framing legacy of Canada's water management regimes plays a central role in the 
marginalization of such a central IWRM component. As previously mentioned, Canada's 
historical regimes framed their concerns within the lenses of environmental 
sustainability, interprovincial cooperation, and public participation, and paid little 
attention to operationalizing the economic valuation of water. Moreover, in the wake of 
76 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, "OECD Environmental Performance 
Reviews, Water: The Experience in OECD Countries." 
77 Environment Canada, A Federal Perspective on Water Quantity Issues: Draft Report, 14. 
Canada's negative experiences with the privatization of water service and provision, the 
country's water regimes seem even more reluctant to support the economic valuation of 
water, thus perpetuating the idea that historical issue framing continues to set Canada's 
modern water management agenda. 
As for the future of Canadian IWRM implementation, the case of the Rhine may 
prove instructive, as it suggests that regime sequencing can play a significant role in the 
endeavor to achieve policy effectiveness. The regimes created to govern the Rhine arose 
spontaneously through the interests of all relevant stakeholders, and over time, evolved 
into a system governed by an explicit set of rules and, eventually, oversaw the institution 
of a governing body given the power to enforce penalties for non-compliant regime 
members.78 Certainly, Canadian water governance has echoed the Rhine regime's 
evolutionary track to for the most part. Canada's initial water management regimes were 
spontaneous creations that emphasized the holistic management of water - ranging from 
an emphasis on using the river basin as a managerial unit of analysis in the 1960s to the 
creation of nested enterprises like the Prairies Provinces Water Board in 1948. Over 
time, the federal government attempted to formalize these regimes by enshrining their 
water-related goals in legislation — specifically the 1970 Canada Water Act, and to an 
even greater extent, the 1987 Federal Water Policy. Unfortunately, the consequences of 
Canada's subsequent drive to privatize prevented these policies from taking hold. Just as 
the Sandoz tragedy on the Rhine River served as a catalyst to jumpstart IWRM 
implementation in Western Europe, the Walkerton water contamination incident spurred 
Canadians to reexamine their own water management hierarchy and reemphasize the 
roles of both IWRM and the federal and provincial governments. 
Young, International Cooperation, 84-85. 
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It is in this new, and more modern, implementation of IWRM that the experience 
of Canadian water management diverges from the linear model provided by the Rhine 
River Basin. After the Walkerton and North Battleford incidents, the Canadian federal 
government attempted to convert many of these previously spontaneous regimes to more 
formalized regimes with an official accounting of results and conscious agreement on the 
part of regime actors, but it has yet to achieve the level of imposition/enforcement 
provided by the European Union in the Rhine regime.79 Canada, in fact, may never reach 
that particular iteration of regime evolution because its federal constitution limits the 
national government's water management responsibility, restricting it to the legal role of 
bystander, rather than enforcer. Unless Canada amends its constitution as Germany did 
to give the federal government more of an official regulatory role over water 
management, it may never achieve the type of imposed regime that successful IWRM 
implementation requires. At the very least, quantitative benchmarks have yet to be set in 
Canadian water policy, as there is no coercive governing power to enforce such 
benchmarks. Without this type of quantifiable measurement to help indicate success or 
failure, the final verdict on Canadian IWRM implementation remains hopeful, but is 
ultimately unknown. 
Young, International Cooperation, 87. 
Ibid., 88. 
CHAPTER VII 
SOUTH AFRICA AND IWRM 
We want the water of this country to flow out into a 
network - reaching every individual - saying: here is 
this water, for you. Take it; cherish it as affirming your 
human dignity; nourish your humanity. With water we 
will wash away the past. 
-Antjie Krog, 
South African poet 
The public perception of South Africa's environmental policy has entirely 
transformed over the last fifteen years. Prior to 1994, South Africa's apartheid 
government forcibly removed thousands of black South Africans from their ancestral 
lands and segregated them in impoverished 'township' and 'homeland' areas, denying 
them basic citizenship rights. Such institutionalized discrimination carried an unintended 
consequence, in that it encouraged many in the country's black population to resent the 
idea of state-driven ecological protection. This resentment was certainly understandable 
given the circumstances; as black South Africans saw their government allocate millions 
of dollars to protect the flora and fauna on white-owned farms and game parks, while 
condemning the majority of the population to a life without vital infrastructure, including 
electricity, sewage disposal, and/or drinking water treatment. During the apartheid era, 
then, many black South Africans perceived environmental protection to be at best a 
concern of the white race that was of "little relevance to the anti-apartheid struggle," and 
at worst, an "explicit tool of racially based oppression."1 
McDonald, ed., EnvironmentalJustice in South Africa, 1. 
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With apartheid's end in the early 1990s and the subsequent return of multiracial 
democracy in South Africa, the country's new leaders began to present environmental 
policy to the South African public in a new light, reimagining it as an instrument of 
recovery and healing, rather than one of subjugation. The new government went so far as 
to feature environmental priorities within the state's 1996 constitution, a document which 
granted eco-protection a place of legislative prominence by guaranteeing every South 
African the right to a healthy and sustainable environment. That constitution affirms that 
South Africa's government can achieve its eco-goals by enacting regulations that prevent 
pollution and support conservation, while also promoting justifiable economic and social 
development.2 Notably, this constitution is one of the first in the world to institutionalize 
environmental protection in such an explicit and detailed manner, although the 
operationalization of its commitment to these principles has oft proven difficult given the 
immense social obstacles left by apartheid's legacy of poverty and discrimination. 
Nowhere is this difficulty more apparent than in the governmental management of 
South Africa's water resources. In the wake of apartheid-era policies operating amid a 
fragmented chaos of governance between the federal, provincial, municipal, village, and 
tribal levels, South Africa has attempted to implement Integrated Water Resources 
Management (IWRM), a water policy framework that has been embedded formally as a 
legal instrument within state legislation since 1998. Unfortunately, South Africa has 
struggled mightily with its implementation of the framework's principles over the last 
decade due to the state's past discriminatory policies - a historical condition that has 
engendered within South Africa a primary need to redress the inequities of apartheid rule. 
Simply put, this means that the South African government has prioritized the social 
2 Republic of South Africa Constitution. Act 108, Section 24. 
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equity component of IWRM above all else, positioning social equity as the lens through 
which it interprets all other IWRM principles. This homogeneity of perspective, 
however, has sabotaged South Africa's effective realization of IWRM's other 
components. Indeed, although South African legislation recognizes the importance of 
decentralization, environmental sustainability, and privatization in water management, 
the execution of these principles has been overwhelmed — and at times contradicted — by 
the state's need to provide for social justice in water provision. 
This singular focus has led to a continuing failure of IWRM implementation, as 
evidenced by the millions of South Africans who still lack access to water and sewage 
infrastructure, the unclear mandates and lack of training that exist among the various 
levels of governmental water managers, and rivers that remain overrun with fecal 
pollution. In theory, IWRM was a policy framework with the potential to correct all of 
these problems, but the homogeneity of objectives in South African water management 
has hindered the country's execution of IWRM principles. Certainly, this seems an 
interesting finding when much of the theoretical literature suggests that South Africa took 
many of the necessary steps for successful water policy management, and its efforts to 
redefine water as a common-pool resource, privatize the provision of water cost recovery, 
along with its acceptance of the constitutive norm of the human right to water should 
have led to the IWRM framework's success within the South African context. In the end, 
though, just as apartheid policies marginalized the water needs of black South Africans, 
the post-apartheid government's attempts to rectify those same injustices have 
marginalized the heterogeneity of IWRM's various non-equity related policy 
components — in essence denying the framework's potential to realize a holistic and 
integrated approach to water management. 
A CHALLENGING RESOURCE 
There is no question that South Africa suffers from severe water scarcity. Its 
mean annual rainfall of 475 millimeters is roughly half of the world average, and as in 
India's Ganges River basin, South Africa's precipitation amounts are subject to monsoon 
variability, as very little rain falls for eight out of twelve months of the year.3 Indeed, 
South Africa's per capita water availability of 1,100 m3 ranks 120 out of 149 countries 
around the world for which data are available.4 Making matters worse is the fact that 
South Africa has no truly large or navigable rivers, and the combined flow of all the 
rivers in the country amounts to less than half that of the Zambezi River, a water source 
that traverses South Africa's neighboring states.5 
Moreover, the availability of South Africa's groundwater is little better than its 
surface water. The predominantly hard rock nature of the country's geology prevents the 
accession of most groundwater resources, and only 20% of the country's groundwater is 
readily available through large-scale aquifer withdrawals.6 Historical circumstances 
further aggravate these scarce water conditions, as the location of natural resource mines 
and/or the former segregation of black South Africans in homelands established most 
urban and industrial development in locations remote from large water sources.7 As a 
result, South Africa suffers not only from water scarcity, but also from an uneven 
Conca, Governing Water, 315. 
4 Ibid., 311. 




distribution of water in both space and time, and a poor fit exists between the location of 
the country's water and the needs of its water users. 
In terms of allocation, irrigation comprises the majority of South Africa's water 
use, accounting for approximately 62% of the country's water requirements. Urban and 
industrial water uses occupy 23% of total water use, while rural water use and mining 
o 
constitute the remaining allocation of water within the South African state. Intense 
conditions of water scarcity and the irregular distribution of the country's water resources 
have prevented, however, many of these sectors from getting the water they require. 
Thus, in recent decades, the South African government has tried to ameliorate scarcity by 
dramatically reengineering the country's river systems, primarily by building dams. Both 
the apartheid and post-apartheid governments engaged in approximately 520 dam-
building projects on South Africa's rivers, including a dozen smaller rivers that drain the 
coastal regions to the sea; the Orange and the Vaal, which cross through the center of the 
country; and several border region rivers, including the Crocodile, Olifants, Limpopo, 
Molopo, Incomati, and Maputo. As a result of the government's reengineering efforts, 
there are no substantial rivers within South Africa whose flows remain untouched by 
anthropogenic change. Thousands of smaller reservoirs or "farm dams" also exist in the 
country, and most of these are not registered with the South African government, making 
it almost impossible to estimate their effects on water allocation and river diversion 
except to say that they exacerbate an already dire situation.9 
Republic of South Africa - Department of Water and Forestry, National Water Resource Strategy, 29. 
9 Conca, Governing Water, 311-315. 
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THE WATER POLICY OF APARTHEID 
South African water provision not only suffers from a lack of rainfall and an 
uneven distribution of the country's water resources, but also from the historical 
inheritance of apartheid, which presents perhaps the biggest obstacle in terms of South 
Africa's allocation of water to the people that need it the most. Since apartheid rule 
created or exacerbated many of the water challenges faced by contemporary South 
Africans, a brief history of the relationship between race, water scarcity, and apartheid 
ideology is in order. Historically, the pastoralist Khoisan people and the San hunter-
gatherers lived within the borders of what is now modern-day South Africa. Due to the 
region's low level of rainfall, both of these communities gradually adopted a nomadic 
way of life, roaming the countryside to find subsistence by following the local rainfall 
patterns. In their interactions with each other, the Khoisan and the San did not consider 
land and natural resources, including water, to be private property. Instead natural 
resources were the commonly held property of all, and every individual was free to use 
those resources as he/she required.10 Under these conditions, water was treated as a true 
public good, or a resource that was both non-rivalrous (since population densities were so 
low at the time) and non-excludable.11 
Change was on the horizon, however, as the arrival of the Dutch East India 
Company in 1652, along with the subsequent introduction of the more formal European 
system of private land ownership, altered the Khosian and San nomadic ways of life and 
reframed water as an element of private property. Upon their arrival, the Dutch occupied 
the Cape of Good Hope and claimed ownership of all local land and adjacent water 
10 Funke, et al., "Redressing Inequality: South Africa's New Water Policy,"12. 
11 Samuelson, "The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure," 387. 
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resources. In time, the idea of controlling any permanent water supply that flowed across 
a piece of owned land became known as the "riparian principle," and its implementation 
altered the way of life for Southern Africa's native peoples. Eventually, the restrictions 
inherent in the riparian principle forced many of the Khosian and San to work on Dutch 
East India Company farms because, in the case of the Khosian, they were denied access 
to the land or water resources needed to sustain their cattle, and in the case of the San, 
they were not able to hunt animals on Dutch-owned land. n 
Dutch rule ended in 1805, but the idea of water as private property remained, as 
the British government took over the Cape Colony. The British even formalized the 
riparian principle by creating policies that advanced and institutionalized it. The 
Irrigation and Conservation of Waters Act of 1912, for instance, promoted irrigation by 
enhancing the customary riparian allocation. The Act freed water for irrigators' demands 
by distinguishing between 'normal flow' (the minimum reliable flow) and 'surplus 
water.' Although normal flow remained subject to the traditional riparian allocation, 
every riparian owner was now entitled to use as much surplus water as he/she wished. 
This allowed white-owned farms to expand their irrigation operations because 
landowners could lay claim to surplus waters well beyond the provisions of their riparian 
allocation. In turn, the excess use of water for irrigation further limited the amount of 
water flowing downstream and into some of the newly created "reserves" for black South 
Africans (land that would later be expanded into the 'homeland' territories), creating 
even greater conditions of water scarcity there.13 
12 Funke, et al., "Redressing Inequality: South Africa's New Water Policy," 12. 
13 Conca, Governing Water, 320. 
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The 1940s, and in particular the aftermath of World War II, saw South Africa 
undergo rapid industrialization. As evidence of its growth, manufacturing increased from 
4% of South Africa's GDP at the end of the Great Depression to almost 20% by the early 
1950s.14 This newly created industrial sector required enormous amounts of water, and 
with the competition for water rights between it and the agricultural sector, both 
businesses and farms scrambled to acquire land in order to gain water rights. 
At the same time, the political rise of the National Party (NP) in the late 1940s 
introduced apartheid as the government's official ideology, a move that further worsened 
water access for black South Africans. Under apartheid, South Africans of color were 
denied citizenship and had very few basic rights, and the government institutionalized its 
new ideology through a myriad of discriminatory policies, perhaps most infamously with 
its forced resettlement of millions of black Africans into segregated homelands. In terms 
of water policy, the 1956 Water Act entrenched discrimination into South Africa's water 
management framework and helped to cement the NP's control over water resources. 
The creation of the Department of Water Affairs (DWA), a government agency mandated 
with providing and allocating water for all types of development, only served to worsen 
the black population's water access. Under the 1956 law, the DWA decided who could 
and could not access water by implementing a permit system for industrial, agricultural, 
and urban water users.15 
There were two methods through which an individual or company could gain 
access to water under the new permit scheme. First, that individual could own the land 
through which the water flowed, thus employing the riparian principle of land ownership. 
4 Conca, Governing Water, 321. 
15 Ibid., 324. 
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Second, the state could intervene and reallocate water to an individual or business if it felt 
that reallocation was in the public interest. Ultimately, then, access to water "derived 
from racially discriminatory land laws and/or the intervention of the racially 
discriminatory state." 16 Not surprisingly, South Africa's white population benefitted 
enormously from the 1956 Act, as the DWA considered the water needs of black South 
Africans to be its lowest priority, continuing to allocate the majority of South Africa's 
scarce water to white-owned farms and businesses.17 
The marginalization of black South Africans' water needs grew with the 
entrenchment of apartheid over the next several decades. In 1961, the Republic of South 
Africa declared independence from Britain, while also continuing its commitment to 
apartheid rule. Over time, the sustained race-based policies of the government had a 
major effect on the black community's access to potable drinking water and wastewater 
sanitation, as the DWA restricted funding for the infrastructural development of the black 
homelands; therefore using water as "a very effective weapon in the apartheid 
1 8 
government's arsenal of oppression and control." Moreover, with no political clout, 
black South Africans had no say in the demarcation of the homeland boundaries. Thus, 
white farms, the most fertile land, and the riches of potential mining areas remained in 
white-owned hands. In terms of water, this meant that black South Africans were forced 
to live on land with little to no water resource access.19 
Conca, Governing Water, 324. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Funke, et al., "Redressing Inequality: South Africa's New Water Policy," 13. 
19 Kalipeni and Mijere, "Population and Environment: The Political Economy of Resource Distribution in 
Transkei, South Africa," 271. 
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MOVEMENT TOWARD A NEW WATER PARADIGM 
By the late 1980s, facing both international pressure and domestic upheaval, 
South African President F.W. de Klerk helped to engineer the state's transition from 
apartheid rule to a more equal democracy, and the country held its first multiracial 
democratic election in 1994.20 The African National Congress (ANC) won control of the 
government in that election, and when it took the helm of state later that year, it faced a 
catastrophe of water provision, as approximately 14 million South Africans lacked access 
to piped water within 200 meters of their home, and 21 million people had no access to 
wastewater or sewage treatment. An additional four million people did not have access 
to a toilet of any kind, and roughly six million individuals had no form of trash removal. 
Given the history of apartheid rule, it is unsurprising that the impact of this infrastructural 
deprivation fell disproportionately on black South Africans. Moreover, the 
environmental implications of these infrastructure deficits were quite grave.21 Generally 
speaking, the lack of toilets and garbage collection meant that large numbers of people 
were defecating as well as dumping their refuse in rivers, streams, and open spaces. In 
turn, these behaviors caused extensive public health dilemmas by creating disease 
channels for malaria, cholera, and tuberculosis, as well as contributing to ground and 
surface water contamination. 
Faced with such acute health crises, the new South African government 
embarked on a quest to change the country's philosophy of, prioritization, and approach 
to water resource management. The provision of basic water supply and sanitation to the 
majority of South Africa's people, as well as the need for equity in the allocation of 
Conca, Governing Water, 332. 
21 Hemson, "Easing the Burden on Women? Water, Cholera, and Poverty in South Africa," 152. 
McDonald, ed., Environmental Justice in South Africa, 292-293. 
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water, was suddenly given high priority on the political agenda. Indeed, several new 
water laws over the next few years reflected the government's new priorities. Perhaps 
the most prominent of these was the new Republic of South Africa Constitution (Act 108 
of 1996), which established a human rights dimension for access to adequate and 
sustainable water supply and services. The wording of this new constitution contained an 
overt attempt by the government to redress the wrongs of the apartheid era and in the 
government's own words, "end discrimination with regard to access to water on the basis 
of race, class or gender."23 
The 1996 constitution speaks to water issues on several levels. First, it contains 
ambitious language on individual rights, social justice, and the need for national healing 
and reconstruction in light of apartheid's inequities. In this vein, several of its provisions 
indirectly address human water needs, including the constitutionally created rights to 
equality (Section 8), life (Section 9), human dignity (Section 10) and health (Sections 24 
and 27). Second, the constitution contains provisions on environmental protection and 
land use that affect water policy and practice. For instance, it guarantees all South 
Africans a constitutional right to an environment that protects human health and well-
being.24 Third, the constitution speaks directly to the water question, stating that all 
South Africans shall be guaranteed access to "sufficient food and water" (Section 27).25 
This new constitution helped to set the stage for the prioritization of IWRM's social 
equity component, as the landmark document itself unequivocally recognizes that the 
country's history of oppression, race-based inequality, and widespread poverty created a 
Republic of South Africa Constitution. Act 108, Section 2.1.4. 
Conca, Governing Water, 333. 
Republic of South Africa Constitution. Act 108, Section 27. 
particular context for the current transition toward realization of these rights. In other 
words, the historical orientation of South Africa's previous water regimes directly 
impacted the state's modern water policy, a fact supported by a closer look at the 
specifics of South Africa's IWRM implementation over the next several years. 
THE PRIMACY OF SOCIAL EQUITY 
With such an emphasis on redressing the wrongs of apartheid, the implementation 
of IWRM, and in particular its social equity component, seemed a natural fit for the 
South African state. Interestingly, IWRM was not a new idea within South African water 
policy circles, as an episode of severe water scarcity precipitated South Africa's first 
implicit foray into IWRM policy consideration in the late 1980s. From 1978 through the 
early part of the next decade, South Africa experienced another in a long line of brutal 
droughts, and the accumulation of years of drought conditions triggered massive 
restrictions on water use, more aggressive demand-side management efforts, and 
extensive public criticism of the DWA, the government's water policy arm.27 
As a result of that drought, the DWA produced a 1986 policy brief titled 
Management of the Water Resources of the Republic of South Africa.2S This document, 
known as "the red book" among the country's water policy managers, holds the first 
implicit references to IWRM within the South African context, although little thought 
was given to the operationalization of such a framework during the apartheid era. For 
its part, the red book called for a "holistic water management strategy" through the 
26 Liebenberg and Pillay, eds., Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa, 31-32. 
27 Conca, Governing Water, 328. 
28 Department of Water Affairs (South Africa), Management of the Water Resources of the Republic of 
South Africa. 
29 Conca, Governing Water, 328. 
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realization of policies emphasizing environmental sustainability, and it specifically 
mentioned the mitigation of water quality problems like salinization, eutrophication, and 
pollution.30 The red book also highlighted the need for full-cost water pricing, but 
stopped short of embracing market-based allocation mechanisms, unlike later 
incarnations of IWRM.31 
The publication of the red book was the first tentative step in South Africa's 
IWRM implementation, but it was several years before more substantive commitment to 
IWRM principles occurred. The delay was due to the political upheaval and regime 
change that characterized the decade following the red book's release. As a result, South 
Africa's water policy remained fairly stagnant until March 1995, when the Department of 
Water and Forestry or DWAF (the new government's name for the DWA) issued a thirty-
page report titled You and Your Water Rights, which it billed as a call for public 
response.32 The report contained a detailed review of existing water law and set out the 
rationale for legal reform of old water policy. In You and Your Water Rights, the 
Department of Water and Forestry called for changes in the old policy due to its 
inadequate protection of rural peoples and the environment; the "antique systems" of 
water allocation currently in use; the lack of a well-structured water pricing system 
reflecting the actual value of water; the need to pay greater attention to the water customs 
of rural communities; the failure of existing law to reflect the integrated character of 
water resources; and the derivation of existing principles of water law from European 
Conca, Governing Water, 330-331. 
31 Republic of South Africa - Department of Water Affairs, Management of the Water Resources of the 
Republic of South Africa, xx. 
32 Republic of South Africa - Department of Water and Forestry, You and Your Water Rights. 4. 
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colonizers, who were from places "where the climate, culture and hydrology are very 
different to South Africa."33 
The DWAF's 1995 report was more of a public recognition of the need to reform 
water policy than it was a legally binding legislative document, but its implicit 
commitment to IWRM ideals lingered within the consciousness of the South African 
government and appeared again, in more concrete form, two years later with the issuance 
of the White Paper on the National Water Policy of South Africa. The White Paper 
served as a policy statement in which the government began to view all other IWRM 
principles through the lens of water's social equity, by classifying itself as a guardian of 
the nation's water resources charged with allocating water in a way that is "uniquely 
South African and is designed to fit South Africa's specific circumstances."35 In the 
White Paper, the DWAF even developed a new slogan to reflect its reordered priorities of 
water management. That slogan was and still remains today "Some, For All, Forever," 
which refers to "access to a limited resource (some) on an equitable basis (for all), in a 
sustainable manner now and in the future (for ever)." 
THE WATER SERVICES ACT 
The White Paper espoused IWRM-related principles which were subsequently 
operationalized by the 1997 Water Services Act (WSA) and the 1998 National Water Act 
(NWA). The WSA and the NWA were meant to be the twin pillars of a new and more 
equitable water policy for the South African state. For its part, the WSA focused on 
33 Republic of South Africa - Department of Water and Forestry, You and Your Water Rights, 4. 
34 Republic of South Africa - Department of Water and Forestry, White Paper on a National Water Policy 
for South Africa. 
35 Ibid., 24. 
36Ibid., 7. 
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water supply for drinking and sanitation needs, while the NWA addressed the legal 
requirements of the new policy framework for managing water resources. A combination 
of constitutional and practical considerations determined the split in legislative focus 
between the two documents. Put simply, legislators felt that it was more important to 
deal first with the lack of water resources for black South Africans (a historically 
marginalized group), while a political and legal policy framework for water management 
could occur at a slightly later date without serious repercussions.37 Thus, while the NWA 
addressed the constitutional directive that the national government remain in a standard-
setting role within water management, South Africa enacted the WSA first, as it 
addressed the more practical daily considerations of local water provision. 
The first of the two legislative pillars, the Water Services Act, reiterates the 
constitutional right to an adequate water supply and prioritizes the provision of basic 
water supply and sanitation to all South Africans above every other concern.38 The Act 
gives the DWAF the power to set standards and timetables for local water service 
delivery and water quality, as well as determine any relevant taxes and tariffs. The WSA 
also tasks regional water service authorities with appointing specific water providers in 
their local areas and formulating detailed plans for the delivery and development of water 
provision. As a safeguard, the Act gives the federal government monitoring 
responsibility and intervention power when local water authorities fail to provide 
adequate service, although the legislation fails to detail the terms and conditions of that 
39 
intervention. 
Hemson, "Easing the Burden on Women? Water, Cholera, and Poverty in South Africa," 145. 
Republic of South Africa. Water Services Act [No. 108 1997]. 
Conca, Governing Water, 341. 
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THE NATIONAL WATER ACT 
The National Water Act of 1998 (NWA), as a comprehensive policy framework, 
is more significant in terms of IWRM implementation than is the WSA.40 With its 
enactment, the NWA repealed more than 100 prior water laws dating back to 1914, 
including the discriminatory Water Act of 1956. Moreover, the NWA created the legal 
foundation for several new instruments of water management and policy, in essence 
institutionalizing the four key IWRM components - social equity, decentralization, 
economic efficiency, and environmental sustainability. The legislation gives each of 
these principles careful thought, and a brief discussion of the NWA's approach to each is 
included below. 
SOCIAL EQUITY 
Not surprisingly, given South Africa's historical context of apartheid, IWRM's 
social equity component serves as the lens through which the NWA interprets all other 
IWRM principles. Indeed, the National Water Act adheres to the policy 
recommendations of the 1997 White Paper by advocating a return to a water commons, 
suggesting that the country's water belongs to its entire people and cannot be privately 
owned; thus, officially abandoning the riparian principle.41 The NWA further supports 
this notion of water as a common resource through the creation of an administrative 
licensing system. With this system, the state, and more specifically the DWAF, regulates 
the withdrawal of water for large-scale uses such as industry and irrigation, while it 
exempts the domestic uses of water from permit requirements, including small-scale 
irrigation and the watering of animals for non-commercial purposes. Under the NWA, 
40 Republic of South Africa, National Water Act [No. 36 1998]. 
41 Ibid., 1.3. 
South Africa's government assumes the role of trustee over the state s water, serving to 
reallocate it in a way that allows previously marginalized people access to the resource, 
while also encouraging the conservation of water by those more privileged South 
Africans who have historically maintained ready access to the resource. Taken 
together, the South African government intends these actions to ensure that it can avoid a 
"tragedy" of its water commons, while redressing the social wrongs advanced by the 
country's discriminatory apartheid-era water policies.43 
DECENTRALIZATION 
The NWA also encourages the social equity of water through water policy's 
decentralization. This policy path was taken in response to the governmental 
inadequacies of the past, as even the DWAF itself characterized its own history as that of 
"an inaccessible centralized bureaucracy in which the needs of the people on the ground, 
particularly the black majority, were not taken into account."44 Accordingly, the NWA 
emphasizes the subsidiarity principle, which stipulates that those water management 
functions that can be more efficiently and effectively carried out by lower levels of 
government should be delegated to the lowest appropriate level, leaving the federal 
government as a manager and overseer of policy, but not its main implementation arm. 
To achieve this diffusion of IWRM execution, the National Water Act divides 
South Africa into 19 water management areas (WMAs) which match the boundaries of 
major watersheds, a similar type of classification to the river basin areas that exist in the 
Rhine region and in Canada. To facilitate the implementation of IWRM within the 
42 Funke, et al., "Redressing Inequality: South Africa's New Water Policy," 15. 
43 Hardin, "The Tragedy of the Commons," 1244. 
44 Republic of South Africa - Department of Water Affairs and Forestry, You and Your Water Rights, 30. 
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WMAs, the Act provides for two types of institutions charged with water policy oversight 
— catchment management agencies (CMAs) and water user associations (WUAs). A 
CMA is responsible for the water management of its entire WMA, while a WUA's area 
of jurisdiction remains localized. Additionally, the NWA mandates that CMAs develop 
'strategy plans,' similar in nature to the Rhine's river basin management plans, and those 
plans should detail the protection, use, development, conservation, management, and 
control of water resources in the respective WMA in which they operate.45 At this point 
in time, however, CMAs remain more of a theoretical ideal than a reality, as South Africa 
has yet to formalize and create a single CMA. Until such time as CMAs can be 
established officially, the regional offices of the DWAF will continue to manage the 
water resources within the 19 water management areas of the South African state.46 
In contrast to CMAs, the National Water Act envisions water user associations 
(WUAs) as institutions comprised of stakeholders who wish to undertake mutually 
beneficial steps to manage a local water source. Essentially, these WUAs are to serve as 
organizations that help avert dilemmas of common interest, or the avoidance of reaching 
a suboptimal solution among users in a given water management issue, while ensuring a 
particular and preferred outcome.47 WUAs are accountable for implementing federal 
water policies on a local level, and their responsibilities include ensuring local water 
services and delivery, constructing or maintaining the waterworks necessary for drainage 
and irrigation, and regulating the distribution of water resources according to the relevant 
federal laws. Despite the decentralized nature of WUAs, the federal government 
maintains a strong influence over their actions. WUAs, for instance, may assess water 
45 Republic of South Africa, National Water Act [No. 36 1998]), 2.1-2.7. 
46 Goldin, "It Takes Two to Tango: Steps Towards Change in the Water Sector," 49. 
47 Stein, "Coordination and Collaboration," 309. 
use charges on members, but they have no authority to decide on the applicable pricing 
strategy; instead, the federal government retains that decision-making ability.48 
ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT 
The NWA also stresses social equity through another IWRM principle — that of 
demand-related water pricing. Essentially, the legislation assumes that the assurance of 
economic efficiency in the face of social justice requires South Africa's government to 
evaluate the social, economic, and environmental costs and benefits of competing water 
uses. To achieve this goal, the NWA allows for a system of water-use charges to finance 
the costs of water management and infrastructure, as well as to achieve "an equitable and 
efficient allocation of water."49 Ultimately, the Act gives the DWAF broad powers to set 
fees and to differentiate them across geographic areas, categories of users, or even 
individual users, all for the purpose of promoting the social equity of water provision 
within a framework of economic management.50 
ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY 
Moreover, with its creation of the "Reserve," the NWA acknowledges the 
importance of IWRM's environmental sustainability component, while still stressing the 
primacy of social equity. Both ecological and human elements constitute the Reserve. 
For its part, the Reserve's ecological arm refers to the quantity and quality of water 
required to remain within water sources in order to ensure the healthy functioning of 
surrounding aquatic ecosystems. In contrast, the NWA defines the Reserve's human 
component as the minimum quantity and quality of water required to meet human needs 
48 Goldin, "It Takes Two to Tango," 49. 
49 Republic of South Africa, National Water Act [No. 36 1998]), 5.56. 
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for drinking water, food preparation, and hygiene.51 According to the Act, local water 
managers must set aside an adequate amount of water to meet both ecological and human 
requirements before allocating water to other types of users, such as those in the 
industrial and agricultural sectors. Essentially, then, the Reserve is a quantity of water 
that cannot be allocated to high volume water users. Its purpose is to ensure the 
constitutional right of South Africans to access enough water for their basic needs, along 
with the maintenance of an environment healthy enough to secure socioeconomic 
development that is ecologically sustainable.52 Finally, the Act vests the DWAF with 
authority to determine the level of the Reserve for a given water resource, although the 
legislation fails to specify a mechanism for its calculation.53 
CANADA REDUX: WATER PRIVATIZATION 
The South African government enacted the National Water Act at the same time it 
pursued the privatization of water provision. Indeed, the NWA and privatization worked 
in tandem for a time, as the government's emphasis on recovering the costs of water 
provision operationalized many of the NWA's suggestions regarding water's economic 
management. Eventually, however, in an eerie parallel to the Canadian experience, South 
Africa's water privatization efforts were directly responsible for a public health tragedy. 
In turn, that tragedy served as a catalyst for an even deeper legislative emphasis on the 
social equity of water provision and a concurrent minimization, although not an 
abandonment, of water's cost recovery within South Africa. 
51 Republic of South Africa, National Water Act [No. 36 1998]), 3.16. 
52 Funke, et al., "Redressing Inequality: South Africa's New Water Policy," 16. 
53 Republic of South Africa, National Water Act [No. 36 1998]), 3.16. 
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Like many developing states, South Africa was not immune to the winds of 
economic globalization during the 1990s. Under the guise of macroeconomic growth, the 
country's newly seated government moved to privatize many of South Africa's public 
services during the latter half of that decade. More formally, the government released its 
future fiscal strategy titled "Growth, Employment and Redistribution" (GEAR) in June of 
1996, which included a broad-based privatization component as part of a larger economic 
initiative emphasizing deficit reduction, fiscal discipline, currency deregulation, and 
international investment stimulus. More specifically, in terms of this analysis, GEAR 
targeted water and sanitation services as one of the sectors ripest for privatization in 
South Africa.54 
GEAR's approach to the commoditization of water underscored the restructuring 
of state oversight rather than the full privatization of government-run industries. 
Essentially, GEAR advocated partial privatization - a process by which the government 
would sell equity in public services to various private entities, while remaining a majority 
stakeholder. In other words, the South African government wanted to exist more as an 
overseer of private provision because, in keeping with its promotion of social equity, it 
believed the "social goods" aspect of natural resource provision could not be protected if 
ownership of those resources was entirely private.55 Accordingly, then, the main 
objectives of the government's privatization initiatives were social in nature — 
specifically, to facilitate economic growth, promote the development of historically 
disadvantaged communities and black economic empowerment, extend private ownership 
Jerome, "Privatization and Regulation in South Africa: An Evaluation," 186. 
Gleick, etal., The World's Water, 2004-2005, 60. 
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of government-controlled assets to previously disadvantaged persons, and promote skills 
transfer and fair competition.5 
From its inception, however, South Africa's privatization program suffered from a 
lack of policy credibility within the business and labor communities, albeit for differing 
reasons. Criticism from the South African business community centered on the perceived 
inertia of the government in implementing GEAR, arguing that the government was 
sending the wrong signals to the financial community by delaying much-needed 
investment. Labor's criticism, on the other hand, was based on the supposition that 
GEAR'S implementation endangered the delivery of basic social needs, an analysis that 
seemed rather prescient given the waterborne disease outbreak that occurred at the turn of 
the century. 
During the last several months of the year 2000, South Africa experienced a 
cholera epidemic which sickened 120,000 people and caused 265 deaths. Cholera is a 
highly communicable disease characterized by abdominal cramps, severe diarrhea, 
exhaustion, and without treatment, eventually death, but it is also a disease that is easily 
eradicated by a combination of effective sanitation infrastructure and clean drinking 
water. In this particular case, KwaZulu-Natal, one of South Africa's more economically-
disadvantaged provinces, served as the center of the outbreak. The government later 
concluded that the cholera epidemic in this area was a direct result of policies intended to 
recover the cost of water provision from the country's poorest residents. 
Jerome, "Privatization and Regulation in South Africa: An Evaluation," 189. 
Ibid., 187. 
The most populous of South Africa's nine provinces with about nine million 
people, KwaZulu/Natal is also one of its least developed.58 During the apartheid era, 
water was free in KwaZulu because most people were not connected to a formal water 
system, and instead relied on local streams, rivers, and springs to obtain the water they 
needed. After the ANC government came to power in 1994, its efforts to connect people 
to more formal water sources resulted in the installation of communal taps throughout the 
province. Between 1997 and 2000, however, as part of GEAR, the government allowed 
private companies to install prepaid water meters on those communal taps in order to 
charge people for their water use. As cost recovery was one of GEAR'S primary 
objectives, this seemed a rational step from an administrative and financial point of view: 
prepaid meters cost companies less money to monitor because there are no meter 
readings, no billing statements, and no need to employ bill collectors.59 Instead, the 
meters required the use of "water cards," which consumers could purchase at set 
locations around the province. Once one purchased a water card, he/she only needed to 
swipe it at a keypad on the communal tap, which would then provide water to that 
individual until the card's funds were exhausted, at which point the tap would terminate 
water provision.60 
A connection fee of 50 Rand (at that time, approximately $8.00 U.S.) allowed 
people initial access to the prepaid meters; but in an area where the average monthly 
income was approximately 500 Rand, the connection fee was beyond reach for a large 
number of consumers. Over time, as these individuals became unable to pay for their 
58 Cauvin, "South Africa Asks for Help in Cholera Outbreak: Thousands are 111 and 59 are Dead," January 
7,2001. 
59 Harvey, "Managing the Poor by Remote Control: Johannesburg's Experiments with Prepaid Water 
Meters," 121. 
water cards, many of them reverted back to using local streams and rivers for their water 
provision. That decision proved to be deadly, however, as most local water sources were 
infected with the cholera bacteria. In turn, the infected water users spread cholera to 
other areas of South Africa, and the resultant epidemic lasted months. The outbreak 
engendered unexpected consequences as well, such as the riots in Alexandra, a 
Johannesburg township, where hundreds of squatters fought with police who came to 
evict them out of their homes because the nearby river was infected with cholera.61 
Several months later, after the epidemic receded, the DWAF identified the application of 
cost recovery methods through the prepaid meters as the accelerator of the cholera 
outbreak, if not the "direct trigger." 
SOCIAL EQUITY THROUGH FREE BASIC WATER 
The cholera epidemic served as a catalyst that would change the face of South 
Africa's water policy and management as it ushered in an even deeper commitment to the 
social equity of water provision. In September 2000, as a direct result of the recent 
cholera outbreak, the DWAF adopted the 'Free Basic Water' (FBW) policy, which 
allowed 6,000 liters per month of free water for all South African households (the 
equivalent of 25 liters per person per day). With FBW, the government hoped that the 
poorest South Africans would always have access to clean water, thus negating the need 
for them to resort to bacteria-infested rivers and streams for water provision. 
The move to FBW left the South African government facing a bit of a 
conundrum, however. The philosophy underlying the FBW concept was to provide a set 
amount of water to every South African citizen in order to avoid a repeat of the cholera 
61 CBS News, "Cholera Crisis in South Africa," February 18, 2001.. 
62 Hemson,, "Easing the Burden on Women? Water, Cholera, and Poverty in South Africa," 153. 
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epidemic. Conversely, the government still recognized that the country's available water 
resources were insufficient to meet projected current and future demands, and in that 
respect, water conservation policies, including water price increases, were necessary. It 
was in the attempted reconciliation of these two contradictory goals that South Africa 
decided to integrate the FBW supply of 25 liters per person per day with an increasing 
block tariff water pricing structure for any provision levels beyond that prescribed daily 
amount.63 
The government's approach in this case was not without precedent, as a similar 
water provision strategy had succeeded in Durban, South Africa, the second largest city 
in the country, for many years. Durban's unique water provision strategy evolved 
organically from an initial attempt to regulate the overconsumption of water from 
communal standpipes around the city. Upon the original installation of free communal 
taps in Durban (which occurred in the early 1990s), the city's water managers found that 
the taps were often left running night and day, even when no one was using them. Such 
practices, of course, led to water waste, a situation that Durban could ill afford given the 
scarce nature of its regional water sources. To combat this problem, Durban Water 
decided to offer consumers an alternative that would allow them more convenient water 
access than a communal standpipe at a lesser price than having water piped directly into 
their homes. Ultimately, Durban Water intended the result of this initiative to be a higher 
level of water conservation among the majority of its consumers. 
To achieve this goal, Durban Water advocated the construction of a ground-based 
water tank for each home as a communal tap alternative. Under this system, the 
household paid an initial fee for the tank and its connection to the water main, plus a 
63 Schulz, "Water Pricing, Inequality, and Economic Welfare," 171. 
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monthly fee that included Durban Water filling the 200 liter tank with treated water each 
day. If consumers requested it, Durban could fill the tank more than once a day, but 
customers would pay a premium price for each extra tank refill. Water provided under 
the ground tank system was not piped directly into a consumer's home; instead, Durban 
Water installed a standpipe in the yard, and the tap was for the exclusive use of that 
particular household. Ultimately, the ground tank proved an extraordinarily popular 
water provision model, as the company found that almost all of its household consumers 
preferred the ground tank option to the communal tap system since it ensured a supply of 
water to an individual house on a regular basis. 
Over time, though, Durban Water found that the costs of administering the billing 
of the ground tank system was actually higher than the cost of the initial 200 liters of 
water piped into the tank each day; thus, from 1998 on, all ground tank consumers 
enjoyed their daily 200 liters for free. After the obligatory provision of 200 liters, 
however, the price for additional water use increased exponentially to encourage water 
conservation, but only consumers using more than 200 liters per day were charged at all, 
and only those users could be disconnected for non-payment. 5 
At first glance, Durban's organically conceived system seemed an efficient and 
effective method for the South African government to apply writ large in order to 
successfully address both IWRM's demand management and social equity components. 
Unfortunately, what was relatively easy to implement on Durban's smaller scale has not 
proven as workable in a larger application. Certainly, a decade after the commencement 
of FBW, many South African citizens still do not have access to daily Free Basic Water. 
Schulz, "Water Pricing, Inequality, and Economic Welfare," 171-173. 
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While it is encouraging that the country's most urban provinces, including the Western 
Cape, Gauteng, and the Free State, report that between 86 to 92 percent of their 
populations now receive their free water allocation on a regular basis, more rural and 
impoverished provinces show the lowest levels of FBW implementation in South Africa, 
including Limpopo, Mpumalanga, North West, Eastern Cape, and KwaZulu-Natal. Thus, 
the economically disadvantaged people whom the policy targets have been the last to 
receive it, and today about seven million of South Africa's poorest individuals still do not 
have access to Free Basic Water.66 
Even in areas in which the government has successfully implemented FBW, along 
with its sister block tariff pricing component, such implementation can have unexpected 
and negative consequences for the country's poorest individuals. According to the 
Durban model, the logic behind the pairing of FBW with block pricing is that consumers 
that exceed their FBW allocation will actively conserve water once they face a dramatic 
increase in water prices. A recent study looking at this very issue suggests, however, that 
the water demands of rich households in South Africa are much more responsive to price 
changes than those of poor households because wealthier individuals are able to restrict 
external water uses like watering lawns, washing cars, gardening, etc.; thus, this segment 
of the population can easily cut its consumption of water if it feels the price beyond the 
FBW is too high. Low income water uses, however, are more inelastic; consequently, 
extreme price increases for water supply beyond FBW function more like a tax for the 
poor. A 10% price increase, for instance, cuts the water consumption of South Africa's 
poorest by 3.2%, while their bills increase by 6.5%. Hence, price increases may not be 
66 Hemson,, "Easing the Burden on Women? Water, Cholera, and Poverty in South Africa," 162. 
67 Jansen and Schulz, "Water Demand and the Urban Poor," 606. 
the most effective method for restricting the water consumption of South Africa's 
economically disadvantaged households. Ultimately, South Africa's ambiguous success 
with its FBW/block pricing implementation suggests that reconciling the mutual 
exclusivity of IWRM's privatization and social equity arms will prove an exceedingly 
complicated, if not impossible, task. 
THE FAILURE OF DECENTRALIZATION 
South Africa's passionate commitment to social equity has also hampered its 
government's implementation of policies intended to support IWRM's decentralization 
and environmental sustainability components. The decentralization of South Africa's 
water policy oversight, for example, has failed in large part because of the crippling lack 
of water management expertise in the state - a situation created by apartheid and, perhaps 
counter-intuitively, worsened by the new government's commitment to reversing 
apartheid's social inequity of employment. Both the National Water Act and Water 
Services Act tasks South Africa's federal government (specifically the DWAF) with 
creating iWRM-related polices, but rely on the country's municipalities, towns, and 
villages to execute those policies. Unfortunately, most of these localities lack staff 
adequately trained as water managers, a factor which impedes significantly the 
implementation of IWRM legislation. 
South Africa's federal government declared at the end of the apartheid-era that it 
would transform its administration from predominantly white to predominantly black in a 
period of just ten years, a move intended to reflect the demographics of the country's 
population. At the same time, most local and municipal governments committed to 
transforming their employee demographics in a period of only four years from 
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apartheid's end. At a glance, these transitional efforts were largely successful. Through 
democratic elections, affirmative action policies for members of the black population, 
and redundancy programs for whites, local governments in both the former white areas 
and the former homelands, are now predominantly black. Through no fault of their own, 
however, many of these newly appointed government employees are not adequately 
trained for their jobs due to apartheid labor policies which offered them little opportunity 
for education, instead relegating them to unskilled work and leaving them with modest 
training to meet the technical requirements of their new occupations. 
In terms of water management, the resultant lack of scientific expertise within 
local governments hinders the implementation of IWRM-related legislation. For 
example, the South African federal government estimates that it will take up to 20 years 
to establish the CMAs called for in the National Water Act. Much of the delay is due to 
the fact that each CMA will require a staff of engineers, among other highly trained 
experts, to help monitor and account for the health and functionality of the regional water 
area. Currently, however, South Africa is experiencing a shortage of black civil 
engineers, or indeed, civil engineers of any race. As of 2004, there were only 15,000 
civil engineers in all of South Africa, with the bulk of those in the private sector, meaning 
that exceedingly few engineers are available to serve as the workforce of a prospective 
CMA.69 
Indeed, this shortage of qualified water managers is one of the primary reasons 
that the South African government has yet to establish even one CMA within the 
Funke, et al., "Redressing Inequality: South Africa's New Water Policy," 16. 
Ibid.,18. 
country. Without the technical information that a CMA would provide regarding the 
quantity and quality of the catchment's water resources, South Africa's localities are 
operating within an informational vacuum in terms of apportioning water allocations for 
their areas. Unfortunately, then, this lack of expertise has resulted in a situation where 
more water is allocated than is feasible from the standpoint of ecological sustainability. 
As a result, local governments have over-allocated the water supply of at least 15 of the 
19 water management areas in South Africa.71 
A lack of water management expertise further hampers the National Water Act's 
call for the inclusion of traditional village authorities in the decentralization of water 
management. Under the mandate of the NWA, village leaders participate in water user 
associations (WUAs), and these WUAs have the responsibility of managing several 
aspects of a locality's water provision, including infrastructure maintenance, pricing 
enforcement, and water allocation amounts. The members of these WUAs often have 
even less technical training than water managers in the municipal governments, yet they 
retain considerable decision-making power over the distribution and use of communal 
land and other community natural resources; thus, local and district municipalities are 
forced to work with them to ensure policy implementation.72 
The experience of Ga-Mashishi is illustrative of South Africa's larger struggle 
with the decentralization of water policy. Ga-Mashishi is a relatively small village 
located in the Sekhukhune District of the Limpopo Province. The village has around 
1,000 households, each with an average of 6.5 residents, and the area is economically 
Funke, et al., "Redressing Inequality: South Africa's New Water Policy," 18. 
71 Goldin, "It Takes Two to Tango," 52. 
72 Uiterweer, et al., "Redressing Inequities through Domestic Water Supply," 61. 
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depressed. Unemployment rates are high in Ga-Mashishi, and almost 40% of its 
residents depend entirely on government pensions or welfare for their survival.73 
Ga-Mashishi's water use is governed by a WUA known as the Ga-Mashishi 
Water Committee (GWC), a group comprised of local leaders. The Committee's 
members are elected during a mass meeting held every year in the village, and the GWC 
is responsible for many aspects of the area's water provision, including advancing 
communication between the village and municipal water operators; noticing and repairing 
breakdowns in the system; and collecting water fees from consumers.74 At present, Ga-
Mashishi's water supply consists of 43 communal and 45 approved household standpipes. 
In addition, there are a plethora of illegal water connections to private yards all over the 
village, and although these connections are forbidden officially by both the DWAF and 
municipal water operators, the GWC tolerates and even encourages the illegal 
connections for those who have the money to pay for them.75 
Although the need for water conservation in the area is of the utmost importance 
(it, like much of South Africa, operates off a very limited local water supply), the GWC 
only turns down requests for an illegal water connection if that connection will disturb 
one of the many graves scattered across the village. Certainly, the GWC's members, 
although well-versed in tribal and traditional issues like grave placement, are not very 
familiar with the conservation-related consequences of these illegal connections, in part 
because the NWA legislation does not require WUA members to undergo any technical 
training in water management. Even if the NWA stipulated such training, it is not clear 
that the relevant municipal authorities would be able to provide such education to the 
73 Uiterweer, et al., "Redressing Inequities through Domestic Water Supply," 62. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid. 
GWC, as they themselves are suffering from a lack of technical expertise within their 
ranks.76 As a result of the village's overextended water resources, the taps of local water 
users often run dry, forcing those individuals to resort to nearby stream and rivers for 
their water and increasing the potential for waterborne disease outbreaks. The case of 
Ga-Mashishi, then, suggests that water user associations, having been vested with so 
much legal authority for daily water provision, must have the proper training regarding 
the importance of water conservation and effective resource provision, or they will fail to 
equitably and sustainably allocate and maintain local water resources.77 
THE SOCIAL EQUITY OF S U S T A J N A B I L I T Y 
IWRM's environmental sustainability principle has also suffered under South 
Africa's singular emphasis on redressing the wrongs of apartheid in water management. 
In order to provide impoverished black South Africans with the sewage and water 
treatment the previous government never afforded them, the country's post-apartheid 
authorities have consistently devoted the bulk of the DWAF budget to developing new 
water and wastewater infrastructure in South Africa. In doing so, however, the DWAF 
has provided little to no funding for the maintenance of existing treatment plants, a 
practice that has contributed to what the DWAF admits are unacceptably high levels of 
fecal pollution in many of South Africa's waterways. In 2008, for instance, sections of 
the Vaal River, which serves as Johannesburg's main drinking water source, registered 
excessively high levels of fecal coliform bacteria, forcing the area's water managers to 
warn Johannesburg residents to refrain from contact with the river. In the Vaal's case, 
76 Uiterweer, et al., "Redressing Inequities through Domestic Water Supply," 63. 
77 Ibid. 
78Republic of South Africa - Department of Water and Forestry, Press Release: South Africa's Looming 
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the contamination is largely the result of ill maintained and outdated wastewater 
treatment facilities that have allowed the release of improperly treated sewage effluent 
back into the river. This problem is not unique to the Johannesburg area, as most 
municipal sewage systems in South Africa are between 30 to 50 years old and in need of 
serious repair or replacement. 
The Umsunduzi River provides yet another example of a water source suffering 
from excessive fecal contamination due to improper wastewater treatment. In the days 
after a well-known river race on the Umsunduzi in 2009, over 40% of participants 
reported contracting chronic diarrhea. Subsequent tests showed that the levels of human 
fecal matter in the river were 115,000 parts per 100ml, when international standards 
dictate that an acceptable level of coliform bacteria (in terms of drinkable water) should 
never exceed 150 parts per 100ml of water. Indeed, the region traversed by the 
Umsunduzi River has the highest diarrhea infection rate in all of South Africa.80 
Ultimately, the inattention paid to the maintenance and repair of older sewage treatment 
plants when contrasted with the DWAF's prioritization of sewage treatment provision to 
areas lacking such a service suggests that the healthy water required by the National 
Water Act's ecological and human 'Reserve' is of secondary importance to the social 
equity of water infrastructure development within the South African context. 
THE PATH DEPENDENCE OF APARTHEID 
South Africa's water law was borne out of its history of conquest and expansion, 
as colonial lawmakers implemented the riparian principle so popular in Europe and 
79 IRIN/United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, "South Africa: The Quiet 
Water Crisis." 
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applied it within the unsuitable framework of Southern Africa's arid climate. Over time, 
lawmakers used that principle to advance the interests of a dominant population which 
had privileged access to land, economic power, and ultimately, water. Upon the fall of 
this discriminatory governing system, the new democratic government faced the 
unenviable task of righting past social inequities and providing basic water infrastructure 
services to millions of South Africans who had gone without for decades. The newly-
elected ANC government made it clear from the start that it would address apartheid's 
environmental injustices as an integral part of its reconstruction and development 
mandate, and it chose Integrated Water Resources Management as the prevailing water 
policy framework for addressing the country's unique political legacy and circumstances 
of scarcity. 
In theory, South Africa pursued a righteous course in terms of IWRM policy 
implementation, a fact which makes its failure to achieve its IWRM objectives all the 
more surprising. The theoretical literatures on common-pool resources, privatization, and 
human rights all speak to South Africa's actions in this respect. CPR scholarship, for 
instance, supports South Africa's reclassification of water from an element of private 
property under the riparian principle to a common-pool resource safeguarded by 
government intervention. Upon its election, the ANC government took on the mantle of 
making decisions about water allocation for the purposes of social equity instead of 
leaving those decisions to individual land owners. With this move, the government 
wished to guarantee the non-excludability component of CPR resources, by ensuring that 
all segments of the South African population gained access to this very necessary 
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resource. Moreover, the literature suggests that the mitigation of CPR dilemmas of 
appropriation and provision, both of which South Africans face, may call for an 
institution with the power to coordinate or allot the individual use of the resource; thus 
engendering favorable governing conditions for top-down IWRM mandates. In 
redefining South Africa's water as a CPR, then, the government allowed itself the latitude 
to mitigate the free-rider issue, believing that "social arrangements that produce 
responsibility are arrangements that create coercion of some sort." 
The privatization literature further defends South Africa's operationalization of 
IWRM economic principles. South Africa, as a developing nation facing a very unique 
historical legacy, applied privatization "by the theoretic book," so to speak, given its need 
to both redress the social wrongs of the past and encourage the conservation of the 
country's scarce water resources. Instead of fully privatizing all government industries, 
South Africa's leaders explored the use of partial privatization as an individual strategy to 
help achieve some sort of social objective for the purpose of realigning "institutions and 
decision- making processes so as to privilege the goals of some groups over the 
competing aspirations of other groups."83 As attested to by the literature, "neither public 
nor private sector managers always work to the best interest of the consumer," and South 
Africa followed this mandate, acting as if both groups needed incentives or regulations to 
achieve efficiency (in terms of conservation), while also providing for individual social 
welfare.84 
Ostrom, et al., Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources, 6. 
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Moreover, the literature on norm creation is also relevant to the South African 
IWRM experience. As one of the first states in the world to codify the human right to 
water within its constitution, along with its commitment to providing a prescribed level of 
water at no cost to every citizen, South African certainly internalized the norms inherent 
in IWRM, in essence reaching the stage where such norms are "no longer a matter of 
broad public debate."85 Due to the exclusionary nature of South Africa's apartheid 
regime, the normative drive to provide water to all South Africans has become 
constitutive norm in modern South Africa, or a normative ideal that "create[s] new actors, 
interests, or categories of actions" by establishing an institutional regime that is organized 
around the previously unrecognized combination of IWRM principles.86 Moreover, 
legislation, such as the National Water Act, serves to operationalize and institutionalize 
IWRM as a newly-constitutive norm. 
Despite theoretical support of its water policy initiatives, South Africa post-
apartheid government has stumbled in its realization of IWRM's holistic approach to 
water management. Although the situation has certainly improved since 1994 (with nine 
million additional people gaining access to clean water since apartheid's end), millions of 
South Africans still lack access to water and sewage infrastructure, the overlapping 
mandates and lack of expertise among governmental water managers have yet to 
improve, and the country's rivers face increasing levels of pollution.87 Why, then, has 
South Africa not experienced more success with its IWRM implementation? Certainly, 
the related literatures on regimes/collective action and common pool resources help to 
85 Finnemore and Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," 895. 
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answer this question, as both regime sequencing and the necessity of heterogeneity in 
water policy application prove important. 
For its part, regime sequencing matters in South African water management, just 
as it did in Germany and Canada, as institutions and laws conceived to operationalize 
IWRM within the South African context were not allowed the spontaneous stage of 
regime creation. Indeed, the literature indicates that environmental management 
frameworks that arise spontaneously, or through a process in which actors do not set out 
to explicitly create a regime but fashion one naturally through a tacit learning process, are 
the most successful.88 The story of Durban Water's successful integration of IWRM's 
privatization and social equity components supports this contention. Durban's success 
was the direct result of a completely spontaneous and organic process that evolved over 
time, ultimately becoming formalized into an early version of the Free Basic Water 
concept. 
Unlike Durban Water, South Africa's post-apartheid federal government did not 
enjoy the luxury of time in its regime creation, as it was faced with a large-scale 
catastrophe of water provision at the outset of its term. To mitigate the critical provision 
issues it faced, the ANC government fashioned a series of immediate and more 
formalized water management regulations in order to restore the country's social equity 
of water provision, further codifying its intentions in IWRM-related legislation like the 
1998 National Water Act. This newly-created legislation, did not provide, however, any 
element of enforcement imposition, instead leaving the new policies to be operationalized 
by the country's extremely fragmented and ill-trained water governing network. Due to 
88 IRIN/United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, "South Africa: The Quiet 
Water Crisis." 
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the immediacy of the water problems faced by the post-apartheid government, South 
Africa was never granted the opportunity to allow for spontaneous regime evolution, but 
foregoing this step on the dialectic of regime creation has proven a detriment to its 
effective IWRM implementation. 
Ultimately, however, the ANC government's singular focus on social equity 
provided the definitive hindrance to the implementation of IWRM's decentralization, 
privatization, and environmental sustainability policy components. In the end, the legacy 
of apartheid magnified the importance of IWRM's social equity arm to the point that it 
eclipsed the holistic application of IWRM's other policy emphases. This essentially 
rendered IWRM impotent to a certain extent because a heterogeneity of issues, and the 
ensuing symbiosis between those issues, lies as the heart of the policy framework's 
ideology. The CPR literature provides a parallel to this notion, suggesting that a 
heterogeneity of issues in CPR management is significant because without it relevant 
stakeholders do not have the opportunity to create "the potential for mutually 
advantageous issue linkage, thus increasing the probability of successful cooperation."89 
Simply put, stakeholders will hold differing priorities regarding water management; 
eventually amalgamating these interests to forge a policy compromise for the good of the 
CPR. 
That amalgamation of IWRM's priorities is precisely what is needed in the South 
African case, as the strategic framework calls for a holistic water policy application that 
mirrors the integrative nature of the natural environment it governs. Unfortunately, South 
Africa's legacy of apartheid prevented the country's water managers from seeking such a 
heterogeneous approach. Its government instead employed a more homogenous ideal and 
89 Martin, "Heterogeneity, Linkage, and Commons Problems," 88. 
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prioritized IWRM's social equity component over all others, a move which hijacked its 
attempts to implement the totality of the framework's components. 
Interestingly, South Africa unwittingly foreshadowed its struggles with IWRM in 
its 1996 constitution which, while stressing the importance of redressing the wrongs of 
apartheid, also stipulates that the rights it promises its citizens must be realized 
'progressively,' meaning that the realization of those rights cannot be immediate but must 
occur over time and under conducive conditions. Perhaps a similar commitment to the 
progressive realization of IWRM's policy components would prove more successful in 
South Africa's case, allowing the state to lay the knowledge, development, and governing 
infrastructures required for a sound, successful, and holistic IWRM implementation. 
Until that day, though, full IWRM realization within South Africa remains an unfulfilled 
objective, leaving the government hoping that water will "one day, unheralded, modestly, 
easily, [and] simply flow out to every South African who turns a tap.90 
Republic of South Africa - Department of Water and Forestry. White Paper on a National Water Policy 
for South Africa, 1. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS AND THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
We never know the worth of water till the well is dry. 
-Thomas Fuller, 
Gnomologia, 1732 
The seemingly simple chemical process of water creation belies the difficulties 
many states around the world have in safeguarding and nurturing this fundamental 
resource so essential to human life. The international community, under the auspices of 
the United Nations, has embraced Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) as 
an overarching policy framework providing a potential solution to the world's 
encroaching water woes. Its holistic approach to water management espouses four policy 
components that attempt collectively to decentralize water governance, value water as an 
economic good, promote the environmental sustainability of water resources, and ensure 
equitable water provision to individuals at all socio-economic levels. Simultaneously, 
IWRM attempts to encourage effective interjurisdictional collaboration over shared water 
resources in both an intra- and interstate context. The United Nations heralds the 
flexibility of the IWRM methodology as a system in which diverse types of states can 
pick and choose the solutions that best mitigate their assorted water problems. 
The intensity of the UN's IWRM advocacy over the last two decades has helped 
the framework's four-pronged approach to water management find widespread adoption 
among states across the globe. Unfortunately, not all of these states have realized the 
same level of achievement in executing IWRM's core principles. States within the 
developing world have often struggled to implement IWRM's components while their 
more developed counterparts have seen higher levels of implementation success. 
Certainly, these differences in realization call into question the efficacy of the IWRM 
policy framework as a one-size-fits-all solution to water management. 
This study explored the disconnect between the UN's IWRM rhetoric and the 
reality of the framework's implementation through a theoretical comparison of the 
IWRM experiences of four states. Two of these states, Germany and India, served as 
examples of an IWRM implementation success and failure at the interstate level of water 
governance, while the cases of Canada and South Africa stood as examples of IWRM 
success and failure at the state level. This methodology allowed for an examination of at 
least one success and one failure of IWRM policy at both the national and international 
governance levels, and all four cases emphasized the implementation of IWRM as a 
hypothesized cause of the resulting state water policy, while controlling for macro 
hydrological characteristics, geographic diversity, governance capabilities, and the 
existence of federal and democratic systems of governance. The illustration below 









?ig. 1. Case study matrix 
At its outset, this analysis expected that various theories of international relations 
could help to explain the IWRM implementation gap between Germany, India, Canada, 
and South Africa. These theories include the literatures on regime creation and collective 
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action, common-pool resources, economic privatization, and the construction and 
diffusion of normative ideas regarding water rights across societies. Ultimately, although 
all of these theoretical perspectives illuminated various aspects of a state's success or 
failure with IWRM, it was the scholarship on regimes and collective action that best 
explained variations in IWRM implementation. The regime literature highlighted the 
importance of an historical sequencing of environmental regime creation and the 
integration of both decentralized and centralized water governance mechanisms as key 
explanations of disparate IWRM implementation success. Moreover, the extant character 
of a region's previous water management regimes plays an important normative role in 
reconciling the IWRM framework's internal inconsistencies, while also providing the 
structural policy foundation on which to base the execution of IWRM's core principles. 
COMPARATIVE CASE SUMMARIES 
Indeed, a linear sequencing of regime creation proved important to the success of 
IWRM implementation in both the German and the Canadian experiences. In the 
German/Rhine region, the ICPR, arose in the 1950s as a spontaneous regime tasked with 
mitigating the pollution in the Rhine. Over time and spurred by the public pressure of the 
Sandoz chemical spill, the ICPR transformed into a formalized regime characterized by 
the detailed goals and objectives elucidated in the 1987 Rhine Action Plan. In turn, both 
the ICPR and its Rhine Action Plan were eventually subsumed under the umbrella of 
enforcement provided by the European Union's Water Framework Directive, a move 
which forced the ICPR to become explicitly negotiated with a "formal accounting of 
results."1 Moreover, upon the creation of the WFD, the ICPR functioned as a 'nested 
1 Young, International Cooperation," 84-88. 
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enterprise' to help compensate for the difficulties in cooperation presented by the larger 
number of participants within the EU as a whole.2 
Correspondingly, Canadian IWRM implementation followed a structurally similar 
path to that of IWRM in the Rhine region. Canada's initial water management regimes 
were spontaneous in nature, arising out of a joint need for stakeholders to solve dilemmas 
of collaboration over shared provincial water resources. Such regimes, however, were ad 
hoc in nature and failed to explicate clearly stated goals and objectives in Canadian water 
management. In time, Canada's 1987 Federal Water Policy institutionalized IWRM 
principles into legislation, but the subsequent drive to privatize Canadian water 
management during the following decade prevented the Federal Water Policy from 
reaching full realization. 
Eventually, these privatization attempts led to the Walkerton E. coli outbreak, and 
as in the Rhine region, this water-related tragedy forced the Canadian government's 
return to a more formal implementation of the IWRM doctrine that had characterized the 
historical character of its earlier water management regimes. During the last ten years, 
then, the Canadian national government has been able to enforce the Federal Water 
Policy by requiring Canada's municipalities to adhere to IWRM principles as a 
requirement of federal infrastructure funding. Additionally, Canada's modern water 
management, like that of the Rhine, includes a focus on nested enterprises with the 
creation of small water management governing groups like the Prairie Provinces Water 
Board and the Mackenzie River Basin Board. These groups allow localities a say in their 
neighborhood water policies, while still adhering to a larger policy framework 
emphasizing the federal government's commitment to IWRM. 
Keohane and Ostrom, eds., Local Commons and Global Interdependence, 22. 
In contrast, the interstate management of India's Ganges River, along with the 
management of South Africa's national water resources, represent failures of IWRM 
implementation. In the Indian case, both geography and power factors played a role in 
the failure of IWRM as a transboundary policy regime. India, as the regional hegemon 
and the geographic holder of the majority of Ganges' water, was able to hinder IWRM 
implementation in the region. India's powerful position relative to Bangladesh and 
Nepal, the other riparian actors, allowed the Indian state to establish the unilateral 'rules 
of the game' and forced all actors to conform to these arrangements through a 
combination of "coercion, cooptation, and the manipulation of incentives." 
Additionally, India's construction of the Farakka Barrage, which transformed the Ganges 
from a common-pool resource to a private river under India's sole control, enhanced 
India's unilateral control over the river and rendered the multilateral and collaborative 
objectives of IWRM meaningless within the Ganges context. India's unilateral control 
over the Ganges stands in stark contrast to the stakeholder collaboration of the Rhine 
region. Certainly, none of the Rhine's stakeholders enjoy the same level of regional 
power and geographic control over the Rhine as India does over the water of the Ganges. 
Like India, South Africa has struggled mightily with its IWRM implementation 
and is the only state out of the four cases studied here that attempted to operationalize all 
four IWRM policy components within its water management objectives. Indeed, the 
IWRM principle of social equity played a larger role in the South African context than in 
any other state within this research project. As a developing nation facing a very unique 
historical legacy, the South African government codified the human right to water in its 
Young, International Cooperation, 88. 
constitution, and in doing so, transformed the IWRM principle of social equity into a 
constitutive norm. 
Moreover, as in the Canadian case, South Africa's water privatization experience 
led to a water-related tragedy and affected the state's current IWRM implementation. 
The government's practice of allowing private companies to charge for water access 
resulted in a major cholera outbreak, the deadly consequences of which led South Africa 
to deemphasize privatization and further highlight the social equity of water provision. 
Also, as in the Rhine region and in Canada, South African water management 
institutionalizes the notion of nested enterprises within its IWRM legislation which calls 
for the creation of smaller scale catchment management agencies and water user 
associations to help implement broad IWRM principles on a local basis. Despite these 
efforts, however, IWRM has failed in South Africa because its water regime creation 
lacks the sequential nature of regime creation in the more successful German and 
Canadian cases, a finding that will be further explored below. 
THE IMPORTANCE OF REGIME SEQUENCING 
Oran Young's conception of environmental regimes as "social institutions" (a set 
of rules and conventions that lend an element of orderliness over the activities they 
govern) forms the foundation of much of this analysis.5 Young suggests that a 
spontaneous regime may prove the most effective at solving water-related problems, as 
long as that regime includes regionalization to help mitigate the effect of a large number 
of actors. In contrast, formalized/negotiated and imposed regimes are less helpful when 
dealing with environmental issues because they can include high transaction costs and 
4 Finnemore and Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," 891-892. 
Young, International Cooperation, 14. 
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encroaching restrictions on the individual liberty of stakeholders. Moreover, these more 
formal regimes often incorporate a focus on compliance, which prevents stakeholders 
from building trust before holding each other accountable for breaches of agreement.6 
The application of Young's regime typology to the four case studies within this 
analysis suggest that spontaneity alone in environmental regimes does not necessarily 
constitute the most effective IWRM framework. Although spontaneity and nested 
enterprises certainly prove important in the larger context of water management, a linear 
integration of spontaneous, negotiated, and imposed regime types must occur to create 
the governing framework necessary for successful IWRM implementation. The 
overwhelming success of the Rhine's IWRM regime serves as the most telling example 
of the efficacy of this sequencing in water management. The creation of the International 
Commission for the Protection of the Rhine (ICPR) in 1950 was a spontaneous event, 
involving no element of coercion. The initial ICPR alliance was simply a group of 
stakeholders organizing themselves into a collaborative entity tasked with reducing the 
continued pollution of their primary water resource. Unfortunately, for the next several 
decades, the ICPR effected little substantive change, and although it advocated various 
ideas for the river's pollution mitigation, the operationalization of these ideas remained 
elusive. After the Sandoz tragedy, however, the ICPR faced public pressure to do more. 
As a result, it created the Rhine Action Plan (RAP), a more formalized set of goals and 
quantitative objectives for the river's water management, but the RAP contained no 
instrument for enforcing the various objectives it set. Several years later, the European 
Union's Water Framework Directive and its concomitant water policy enforcement 
mechanisms provided that missing element of imposition to Rhine water management. 
6 Young, International Cooperation, 92-93. 
With that final element of coercion in place, the Rhine's IWRM regime has been able to 
meet and surpass its water management goals over the last decade. As a spontaneous 
regime, then, the ICPR eventually transformed into a more formalized regime, and then 
evolved into an imposed regime with the European Union's intervention. Indeed, it is 
this last iteration of Rhine water management under the EU that has proven the most 
successful in terms of IWRM implementation, but it could not have reached that level of 
success without the evolutionary history preceding it. 
Canada's fairly successful IWRM experience, although occurring within a 
domestic rather than international context, mirrors that of the Rhine's regime sequencing. 
Certainly, an element of spontaneity characterized Canada's earliest collaborative water 
arrangements between its provincial and national water managers. As early as the 1960s, 
Canada's national government, alongside several of its provinces, implemented facets of 
IWRM in the country's water management policy, including enhanced interjurisdictional 
collaboration, the utilization of the river basin as the spatial unit of analysis, and the 
notion of a holistic approach to water management. For several decades, these ideals 
were implemented on an ad hoc basis but were not institutionalized within the country's 
legislation. In time, though, the Canada Water Act and the Federal Water Policy 
formalized IWRM principles by including a clear accounting of water management goals 
and objectives in their precepts. These legislative acts, however, did not include an 
avenue for federal imposition or coercion; thus, they served more as formalized 
guideposts for provincial water management. 
This status quo in water management prevailed until the year 2000, when Canada, 
like the Rhine, faced a water tragedy that spurred it to reinforce its commitment to the 
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environmental sustainability component of IWRM. Since that time, the federal 
government has found creative means of enlarging its role in IWRM enforcement, 
although the country's constitution still restricts the national government from legally 
imposing IWRM-related sanctions upon its municipalities and provinces. For instance, 
the Canadian federal government now requires provinces to meet specific IWRM 
objectives before they can qualify for financial assistance for water-related infrastructure. 
Thus Canada, like the Rhine region, has undergone a linear sequencing of water 
management regimes. This sequence began with localized spontaneous attempts to 
manage provincial waters and transformed over time into more formal legislative agendas 
with the Canada Water Act and the National Water Policy. Currently, the Canadian 
federal government is attempting to add that final element of imposition over its 
provincial and local water managers through the manipulation of IWRM-related financial 
incentives. 
The integration of all three regime types was paramount to IWRM's success in 
the Rhine and Canadian experiences, but it was a lengthy period of spontaneous regime 
creation that allowed stakeholders the time to resolve any of IWRM's inherent 
contradictions before those contradictions manifested in their respective national and 
international water policies. Both Rhine and Canadian water managers were able to 
choose, over time, those IWRM principles that best suited each country's individual 
water needs, while deemphasizing those of the framework's principles that might prove 
contradictory to their chosen water management objective. South Africa, in contrast, has 
failed to fully realize its IWRM-related goals, and it is telling that the process of linear 
regime sequencing that has found success in both the Rhine and Canadian regions never 
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occurred within the South African context. South African water management certainly 
confronts unique challenges not faced by its developed counterparts, as its governmental 
mandate to redress the social injustices of apartheid has created a crisis of provision 
where solutions are needed immediately, rather than allowing the luxury of time for water 
policy to arise spontaneously among stakeholders. In this crisis mode, the South African 
government has skipped the process of spontaneous regime creation altogether and has 
instead advanced to formalizing IWRM principles in its National Water Act (NWA). 
Unfortunately, the forced abandonment of spontaneous regime creation has prevented 
South Africa from enjoying the time needed to reconcile IWRM's internal contradiction 
regarding the concurrent implementation of water's social equity with the conservation-
oriented economic valuation of water. Moreover, the institutionalized NWA regime 
lacks any enforcement mechanism, and the result has been the uneven and unsuccessful 
implementation of IWRM directives throughout South Africa's towns, villages, and 
provinces. At this point in time, then, South African IWRM implementation has failed 
largely because it has only incorporated the negotiated nature of a water regime without 
the benefit of a more spontaneous evolutionary period or the necessary element of 
legislative coercion. 
India suffers from similar sequencing problems to South Africa, albeit for 
differing reasons. On an interstate basis, India's attitude of realpolitik and its unilateral 
management of Ganges water disallowed any transboundary IWRM regime creation 
between interstate Ganges stakeholders. Certainly the geography of the Ganges allowed 
Indian political dominance over the river, as India's soil houses over 90% of Ganges 
water. This situation stands in stark contrast to that of the Rhine, a river in which the 
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majority stakeholder, Germany, holds only 60% of the river. Geography, then, has 
allowed India to control any collaborative agenda between itself and neighboring 
Bangladesh regarding Ganges management. In turn, India's agenda has been an agenda of 
self-interest, disavowing the collaborative aspects of IWRM implementation at any point 
over the last sixty years. 
Conversely, India's national water management has embraced IWRM principles 
regarding the Ganges through the creation of the Ganga Action Plan, a blueprint that 
included formalized quantitative goals regarding pollution control and infrastructure 
creation on the river. Due to the limits imposed by its constitutional mandate for 
decentralized environmental policy, however, India's federal government proved unable 
to provide any sort of centralized enforcement to ensure that the GAP's objectives were 
met. Moreover, even if the central government had been able to hold villages and 
municipalities accountable for IWRM adherence, the informal nature of India's water 
economy may have rendered GAP realization impossible. In an environment in which 
less than 10% of Indian households use water from sources owned and managed by the 
government and only one in every 12 villages has any public or community water supply 
or irrigation system available, the GAP assumed a higher level of infrastructure 
connection than actually existed instead of adapting to the spontaneous nature of India's 
extant local water management regimes.7 Like South Africa, then, India tried to 
implement a negotiated water regime to replace perhaps tens of thousands of localized 
spontaneous systems without imposing a centralized implementation authority. In the 
7 International Water Management Institute, IWRM Challenges in Developing Countries: Lessons from 
India and Elsewhere. 
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end, India's attempts at IWRM regime creation only succeeded in creating a complete 
chaos and dissonance in water governance. 
CENTRALIZATION AND DECENTRALIZATION 
The importance of imposition in environmental regime creation deserves an 
extended discussion here, as it highlights one of the major inconsistencies of the IWRM 
framework. As previously mentioned, the existence of a centralized enforcement 
authority with the power to coerce a regime's stakeholders into complying with IWRM 
directives is a vital component of any effective IWRM implementation. This finding, 
however, stands in direct contrast to one of IWRM's core principles — that of the 
decentralization of water policy formation, an idea whose theoretical underpinnings 
center on the notion that stakeholders will be more likely to comply with water policies in 
whose creation they have been directly involved. In effect, IWRM conflates two distinct 
stages in the policy process—formulation first, and then enforcement—and suggests that 
decentralization works best for both stages. In fact, the study suggests that while 
decentralized formulation is necessary for stakeholder participation, centralized 
enforcement is essential to implement IWRM principles. While it certainly seems logical 
that water management flourishes when individual stakeholders can devise their own 
situation-specific water policies, that emphasis on decentralization, as articulated within 
the framework's principles, is not sufficient for successful IWRM implementation. In 
fact, this emphasis on decentralization constitutes one of the framework's internal 
fallacies in that IWRM assumes policy decentralization to be the only viable method for 
achieving increased stakeholder participation when there are numerous other avenues for 
stakeholder input within the framework of a centralized policy process. Certainly, the 
nested enterprises concept that proved so successful in the Rhine case contradicts this 
assumption, as it speaks to the validity of localized participation within the context of a 
larger implementation authority. Ultimately, the experiences of the four states in this 
analysis suggest that the IWRM framework requires a careful balance between 
decentralized policy formulation and imposed enforcement in order to achieve a high 
level of implementation success. 
Indeed, both India and South Africa lack official enforcement instruments for 
their IWRM-related legislation. The absence of coercion has hindered IWRM's success 
at mitigating water problems in these regions. India's federal government, for example, 
followed IWRM's lead and amended its constitution to decentralize its domestic water 
management, but in the process left no authority for enforcing or coordinating any 
ensuing water policy. The result is a three-tiered system of legislative chaos and disorder 
that has stagnated efforts to mitigate the degradation of the Ganges. Additionally, in 
terms of the Ganges' transboundary water management, India's lack of a centralized 
coordination and enforcement mechanism, coupled with its decentralized national water 
management, could easily allow Indian towns, villages, and municipalities to circumvent 
any water management agreement between India and Bangladesh if the two were ever 
able to come to a mutually acceptable accord over the water allocation of the river. 
The South African case shares some similarities with India in this regard, 
although there are significant differences as well. Unlike India, South Africa's federal 
government retains the power to issue non-binding water policy guidelines to local 
governments, but in a similar fashion to India, South Africa's constitution gives the 
country's provincial and municipal governments control over the final acceptance and 
implementation of that water policy. Thus, the South African federal government has 
little to no power to enforce the IWRM principles it has institutionalized within its 
National Water Act. This absence of imposition has instead resulted in a system that 
lacks consistency and suffers from similar organizational confusion to that of the Ganges 
region, with localities, tribal areas, towns, provinces, and the federal government all 
assuming overlapping roles and mandates for the state's water policy. This situation 
ultimately renders the entire enterprise ineffective. 
The Canadian case offers a counterpoint to the South African and Indian IWRM 
experiences, as Canada's federal government has started to utilize creative methods of 
overcoming its constitutional prohibition against centralized IWRM enforcement. To this 
end, Canada's national government is enforcing IWRM policies through various 
strategies, including limiting federal funding to municipalities that do not comply with 
IWRM mandates; legislating a larger arbitration role for itself in the event that provinces 
cannot come to an agreement regarding water allocation; and perhaps most importantly, 
creating smaller organizational groupings, or nested enterprises, such as the Prairie 
Provinces Board or the Canadian Council of Environmental Ministers, in which the 
federal government plays a role in advising provinces regarding appropriate IWRM 
policies. Through the utilization of these inventive strategies, Canada's national 
government has begun to find a way to centralize IWRM enforcement in practice, while 
still allowing its provinces the ability to localize their water policy creation. 
The Rhine region is again the best example of the seamless integration of 
environmental policy decentralization and centralization, further demonstrating that 
nested enterprises can help to successfully amalgamate decentralized policy formulation 
with a centralized enforcement component. The ICPR, as a nested enterprise within the 
larger European Union's Water Framework Directive, compensates for the difficulty 
imposed by the large number of EU stakeholders because it organizes those stakeholders 
into smaller localized groupings. This stratified organizational structure allows large 
group cooperation throughout Western Europe to be built upon the foundation of 
successful small group collaboration, so that the number of regime members becomes 
secondary to other considerations within the water policy regime.8 The ICPR, then, is 
allowed to create policy specific to the regional and local needs of Rhine river 
stakeholders, but as a nested enterprise, is still subject to the element of policy coercion 
provided by the EU at large. 
PRE-EXISTING WATER REGIMES 
The success of a state's IWRM endeavors not only rests upon the sequencing of 
its water management regimes and the successful integration of its policy decentralization 
with centralized enforcement, but also on the instrumental value of a region's pre-
existing regimes. These play an important normative role in reconciling rWRM's 
internal inconsistencies, including the previously discussed tension between the 
decentralization of policy and the centralization of enforcement and, as evidenced by the 
South African case, the incongruity between concurrently providing for the social equity 
of water and manipulating its price to stem demand. Although IWRM is theoretically a 
holistic approach to water management, in practice, its most successful implementation 
occurs when states concentrate on the execution of only one or two of its components. 
Keohane and Ostrom, eds., Local Commons and Global Interdependence, 22. 
Accidents of history help to determine which emphases prevail within each state, 
as past attempts to manage water shape the form and function of modern IWRM 
implementation. Certainly, water crises have played a pivotal role in this sort of path 
dependence of IWRM-related policy. The Rhine region, Canada, and South Africa all 
faced water tragedies of some sort (a chemical spill, E. coli epidemic, and cholera 
outbreak, respectively) that spurred each state to emphasize certain IWRM principles 
over others and set the stage for any future iterations of the framework's application. 
Prior to its adoption of IWRM, for instance, the Rhine region had a long history of a 
commercially-oriented water management regime whose actions and decrees eventually 
created an untenable amount of pollution in the Rhine River. These policies led 
ultimately to the Sandoz chemical tragedy on the Rhine, and as a direct reaction to that 
pollution incident, the IWRM principle of environmental sustainability emerged as a way 
to correct the wrongs of the previous regime. As such, ecological integrity, rather than 
human rights or economic demand management, has comprised the primary focus of the 
Rhine's successful water management for the last two decades. 
As in the Rhine region, decades of policies oriented around the environmental 
sustainability of water resources characterize Canada's national water management 
agenda. A brief policy detour into privatization prompted the water-related tragedies of 
Walkerton and North Battleford. Since that time, Canada has implemented IWRM's 
environmental sustainability component as a reinforcement mechanism embodying its 
previous emphasis on pollution mitigation. Thus, in both the Rhine and Canadian cases, 
IWRM implementation acts as a sort of intervening variable that helps to organize and 
magnify the success of extant sustainability-oriented policies. Such a finding implies that 
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while IWRM can certainly enhance the effectiveness of existing water management 
policies, without the support of an existing policy framework, the implementation of 
IWRM principles may not be sufficient for the mitigation of water pollution and scarcity. 
In further support of this point, consider the relationship between IWRM 
principles and the absence of pre-existing water management regimes in both South 
Africa and India. At the time of their respective IWRM implementations, water 
distribution in both states revolved around informal water economies rather than 
formalized, government-controlled water management regimes and infrastructure. In 
South Africa, apartheid policies that assumed water access to be a tool of dominance and 
exclusion comprised the country's only form of pre-existing water management regime. 
These policies created the prevalence of an informal water economy in much of South 
Africa. Apartheid's artificially created homelands and territories deprived black South 
Africans of formal water provision and forced them to operate under conditions 
characterized by "self-provision, informal exchanges and local community institutions 
that [were] not under the direct influence of formal public institutions."9 This informal 
water economy became the inheritance of the post-apartheid regime and since the new 
constitution came into force in 1994, governments have attempted unsuccessfully to force 
the extant informal water economy to conform to a more formalized IWRM framework. 
This pervasiveness of an informal water economy characterizes India's historical, 
and in many ways, its modern water management, as only 10% of Indian households are 
currently hooked up to the infrastructure of formal water provision.10 Given these 
conditions, India faced the policy dilemma of making a square peg fit in a round hole. It 
International Water Management Institute, IWRM Challenges in Developing Countries: Lessons from 
India and Elsewhere. 
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is unsurprising, then, that a country with virtually no history of centralized water 
management regimes failed to implement successfully a formal IWRM regime during the 
1990s. Certainly, in both India and South Africa, the lack of pre-existing water 
management regimes, or indeed the most basic pre-existing water management 
infrastructure, has hindered the execution of IWRM principles. 
ACCOUNTING FOR RIVAL EXPLANATIONS 
In assessing any potential shortcomings of this study's findings, one must 
acknowledge and address rival explanations of IWRM success or failure. In particular, 
the importance of good governance stands as a possible alternate rationalization of 
variations in IWRM implementation success. Although it may seem logical to assume 
that governance provides an easy and convincing explanation as to why IWRM more 
often succeeds in developed rather than developing states, sophisticated governance 
mechanisms and/or high levels of development are not persuasive rival explanations for 
IWRM success or failure. Indeed, the two IWRM "failures" in this study, India and 
South Africa, served as crucial cases because they are two of the best governed and most 
developed states in the Global South. At the outset, then, one expected IWRM 
implementation to succeed in both cases, and since it did not, these cases prove important 
analytically and help to support the findings of this study. 
As further evidence of this point, one should consider that IWRM implementation 
has failed even in states that have both transparent and consensus-oriented governance 
and high levels of development. The United States, for instance, as one of the best 
governed and most developed states in the world, has tried but failed to implement 
IWRM policies in its Colorado River region. Over the last fifteen years, the Colorado 
River s relevant stakeholders, including federal, state, municipal, and international 
governments, have employed IWRM as a basis for collaborative management to mitigate 
the region's water scarcity and pollution. The results have been lackluster at best, and 
despite the policy framework's implementation in this region, water scarcity in the 
Colorado has worsened over the last ten years. Current projections indicate that by 2025 
the river's water will be wholly "insufficient to meet certain consumptive water resource 
demands."11 The river's pollution levels have also worsened in recent years, and the 
water's increasing salinity poses an increasingly vexing issue for Mexico. Indeed, the 
overconsumption of the Colorado's water on the U.S. side of the border has substantially 
increased salt levels in Mexico's allocation of the river's water, which in turn, has 
negatively affected Mexican irrigation and agriculture. All of these problems continue 
to worsen despite the application of IWRM principles in this very highly developed and 
well-governed region of the world, and this particular IWRM failure suggests the 
spurious nature of using either governance or development as rival explanations for 
variations in IWRM implementation success. 
Moreover, these four case studies suggest a finding that may make IWRM 
advocates very unhappy: IWRM is a more successful policy framework for mitigating 
pollution rather than water scarcity. This seems a logical conclusion on the face of the 
matter, as governments can significantly affect water pollution by regulating industrial 
and agricultural output or by constructing water or wastewater treatment plants, but they 
do not have the power of Mother Nature to produce rain on a whim. Indeed, perhaps one 
of the reasons IWRM has found such success in both the Rhine region and Canada is 
11 Bates, et al., eds., Climate Change and Water: Technical Paper, 105. 
12 Ibid. 
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because both areas suffer from excessive water pollution rather than severe water 
shortage; thus IWRM implementation has allowed stakeholders in those regions to realize 
sizable gains in pollution alleviation without having to worry about the thorny allocative 
issues involved in water scarcity amelioration. 
One must consider the possibility, however, that IWRM implementation success 
in the Rhine and Canadian cases is overdetermined, and instead, two equally plausible 
explanations exist to explain IWRM's efficacy in the developed world. Certainly, the 
first reasonable explanation is that of the importance of spontaneous regime creation in 
allowing Canadian and Rhine stakeholders the time to resolve any of IWRM's inherent 
contradictions before those contradictions manifested in their respective national and 
international water policies. As this analysis suggests, it is for this reason that IWRM has 
more effectively promoted sustainability than it has scarcity mitigation. 
It is also possible, however, that scarcity mitigation is more difficult to achieve 
than ecological sustainability because scarcity is a dilemma of common interests rather 
than a dilemma of common aversion.13 Conditions of water scarcity constitute a dilemma 
of common interests because when faced with decreasing water resources, all actors wish 
to be the sole user of the resource, and careful collaboration between stakeholders is 
required to resolve such a dilemma. Achieving sustainability, on the other hand, amounts 
to a dilemma of common aversion because all actors wish to avoid one outcome - in this 
case, the continued pollution of the resource. Sustainability, then, requires coordination 
to achieve, which relevant theory indicates is a much easier undertaking than the creation 
of a collaborative regime.14 
13 Stein, "Coordination and Collaboration," 312. 
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If overdetermination is indeed present in both the Rhine and Canadian success 
stories however, than IWRM is an even weaker regime than this analysis suggests 
because IWRM acts as a spurious, rather than intervening, variable. Moreover, and just 
as importantly, the difference between scarcity mitigation and sustainability, while 
analytically useful, is blurred in an ecological sense. Unsustainable practices clearly 
create conditions of scarcity, and scarcity can exacerbate efforts to mitigate pollution, 
thus linking the two factors inextricably. For this reason, one cannot view Germany and 
Canada's implementation success through the singular lens of coordination resolution. 
Instead, that success constitutes a complex integration of solutions that help to mitigate 
both dilemmas of common interest and aversion. 
POSSIBILITIES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Of course, this study represents only a first step in what could, in time, become an 
extensive project. With the encouragement of the United Nations, states around the globe 
are operationalizing IWRM components within their transboundary or internal water 
policies in larger numbers each year, thus providing an almost endless amount of subject 
matter for additional qualitative and/or quantitative study regarding the framework's 
implementation. In the future, for example, one could attempt to quantify the 
independent variables within the study to derive a more precise numerical measurement 
representing IWRM's implementation successes or failures. Another of the many 
possibilities for future research might include an expansion of the qualitative component 
of this analysis to study IWRM implementation in additional geographic regions of the 
world and/or by various forms of political systems beyond federalism. China's 
increasing focus on IWRM implementation, for example, would prove an excellent test 
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case for the application of the findings of this study, particularly in terms of assessing the 
necessity of the intricate balance between policy democratization and the enforcement 
potential provided by a strong central government. A case of successful IWRM 
adaptation in China, with its highly centralized policy structure, may provide additional 
means of redefining the importance of IWRM's policy decentralization component. 
Turkey's IWRM application in the Tigris-Euphrates river basin may prove to be 
another instructive case in terms of the theoretical implications of this study. Turkey, like 
India, enjoys geographic domination over the upstream development of the Tigris and 
Euphrates in a region rife with water scarcity and pollution. Also, as in the Indian case, 
recent water policy squabbles between riparian actors Turkey, Iraq, and Syria suggest that 
Turkey feels confident exerting its unilateral control over the Tigris-Euphrates river 
basin. As a state that is in line for accession to the European Union, however, Turkey is 
also required to comply with the mandates of the EU's Water Framework Directive and 
its IWRM-compatible policies. Thus, the tension between Turkey's interest in 
safeguarding its scarce water resources at the same time it is required to collaborate with 
its riparian neighbors might prove enlightening in terms of IWRM efficacy and the 
strength of the IWRM regime. 
Finally, any future scholarship on this topic should include a comprehensive 
assessment of the initial process of IWRM regime establishment in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s. Such an assessment would seek to answer the question of how the IWRM 
regime became rife with internal contradictions from its inception. Certainly, the answer 
to this question has important theoretical implications regarding the idea that the 
functional logic of institutionalism does not always prevail. The findings of such an 
assessment may substantiate the sociologically-based theoretic view that regimes are 
highly idealized and internally inconsistent creations, rather than fully pragmatic ones.15 
Ultimately, the subject of IWRM implementation contains a myriad of future research 
possibilities, and any of these potential approaches will allow both researchers and water 
managers further insight into whether IWRM principles and suggested practices will 
work to alleviate pollution or scarcity within the context of a country's own unique water 
economy. 
THE INADEQUACIES OF THE IWRM FRAMEWORK 
In the end, the results of this analysis suggest that the theoretical literatures on 
regimes and collective action best explain the IWRM implementation gap across the 
developed and developing worlds by highlighting the importance of environmental 
regime sequencing, the integration of both decentralized and centralized water 
governance mechanisms; and the extant character of a region's previous water 
management regimes as the primary predictors of IWRM success or failure. Moreover, 
the nature of a region's principal water problem matters, as IWRM has proven a more 
effective framework for countering sustainability issues than for mitigating water 
scarcity. These results present an obvious question - can the IWRM policy framework 
help to solve water-related problems in the scarcity-plagued and informal water 
economies of the developing world? 
The answer is a resounding no. Since IWRM proves a more helpful model for 
solving issues of ecological sustainability rather than scarcity, the framework is an 
untenable policy model for developing states, many of which frequently confront 
15 Meyer, et al., "World Society and the Nation-State," 144-181. 
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conditions of both water pollution and extreme water scarcity at the same time and 
without the luxury of time to reconcile the internal inconsistencies of IWRM's principles. 
Certainly, the two developing states in this analysis, South Africa and India, suffer from 
severe water scarcity, and they are not unique in this respect as conditions of water 
scarcity are becoming ubiquitous across much of the developing world. Today, most 
regions of Africa, Central, South, and Southeast Asia all face conditions of severe 
physical water scarcity that experts project will only worsen over time.16 As these states 
struggle to correct their impeding water woes, this analysis suggests that IWRM as a 
model for alleviating conditions of water scarcity is not compatible with their pre-existing 
informal water economies. 
In point of fact, IWRM's primary weapon in the fight against water scarcity is its 
economic management component, which encourages pricing water to control demand as 
a means of conserving a precious and finite resource. How, though, can IWRM's 
emphasis on economic management ever become an effective tool of conservation when 
employed within an informal water economy? How can a public provider of water in a 
state like India expect to encourage widespread conservation by charging higher prices 
for the resource when less than 10% of the country's households obtain their water 
through public provision? India certainly recognized the futility of this effort in its 
domestic IWRM implementation and completely ignored IWRM's economic 
management component, instead concentrating on the framework's pollution mitigation 
potential. 
South Africa's informal water economy has also proven an inhospitable 
framework for IWRM's emphasis on demand management, as the country's government 
16 International Water Management Institute, Getting the Message Out, 1. 
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feels it must provide for the social equity of water while at the same time encouraging the 
conservation of its scarce water resources. Not surprisingly given the complexity of its 
situation, South Africa's attempts to reconcile the dichotomy of its water objectives have 
proven unsuccessful thus far. For instance, when South Africa attempted to recover the 
cost of water provision from its poorest members by allowing a private supplier to utilize 
pre-paid meters, a deadly cholera epidemic resulted. In response to the epidemic, the 
South African state advanced the idea of Free Basic Water to be deployed simultaneously 
with a conservation-oriented block pricing framework, but again, the implementation of 
Free Basic Water has struggled to take hold in the country's poorest areas. Moreover, the 
conservation pricing scheme has not accounted for the inelasticity of demand for water 
from the poor, ending up as a form of a tax on the people who can least afford it. 
Under these types of conditions, IWRM is ineffective at mitigating water scarcity 
and pollution because its design components are not intended nor equipped for dealing 
with the unique and multifaceted water problems that accompany the informal water 
economies in many parts of the developing world. The major policy implication at the 
heart of this study, then, is that the IWRM framework cannot be fixed to better address 
the needs of developing states and states characterized by informal water economies; 
instead it must be abandoned, and the international community should begin deliberating 
anew more efficacious solutions. Certainly, if IWRM can only succeed under certain 
extant conditions, such as in states with a history of spontaneous water policy regime 
creation, effective sustainability-oriented policies, extensive public water provision, and 
centralized policy enforcement, then IWRM proves an inadequate policy model for states 
without such pre-existing conditions. 
As it stands now, and despite the claims of the United Nations, IWRM is an 
inflexible management system whose adoption inhibits the efficacy of its suggested 
policy prescriptions; thus it is not nearly as flexible a policy framework as its advocates 
portray. At the end of the day, the gap between UN discourse and the reality of IWRM 
policy implementation implies that an exact replication of successful policy models from 
developed and formal economies is incompatible with the more informal water 
economies of the developing world, many of which may be structurally resistant to 
certain IWRM mandates. In a way, then, the IWRM framework represents a further 
extension of the policy hegemony of the developed world; its successful implementation 
requires a certain level of extant organized governance and public water provision, but its 
principles fail to provide a roadmap for establishing those conditions in states without 
them. 
The informal water economies of the world that suffer from the twin degradations 
of water pollution and scarcity deserve a more effective solution for providing their 
populations with a clean and sufficient amount of water to sustain their lives. This is 
certainly an important task in a future characterized by population growth, rising 
urbanization levels, the spread of water-reliant industries, and the deleterious effects of 
climate change, all of which combine to portend an era of increasing water scarcity. 
Given these conditions, one truth is certain — the international policy community should 
welcome, and indeed, encourage, a dialogue on the value of IWRM as a policy 
framework, as both the gravity of the globe's impending freshwater issues and the form 
and function of the solution to those issues cannot be overstated. 
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